Von der Leyen's latest move: The European Commission recalibrates its stance toward big tech

April 13 brought clarity to a mystery running through the corridors of Brussels: Anthony Whelan, a veteran of EU institutions and an architect of the bloc's digital strategy, took up the reins as the Commission's director-general for competition. With his appointment, Ursula von der Leyen managed to place her preferred candidate in one of the EU executive's most influential posts, marking a triumph for the president's vision of future antitrust policy.

From digital advisor to director-general: a wide-ranging profile

Whelan's track-record reads like a roadmap of the European institutions and suggests a mandate for technical rigor. His time at the Court of Justice, at the Commission's Legal Service, and at the Directorates for Competition and Communication all speak to his range of experience. Nonetheless, what best defines Whelan's profile is his tenure since 2019 as von der Leyen's digital advisor. He was among the fundamental drivers of the Digital Markets Act.

"Markets can offer higher quality and better prices, to the direct benefit of the European citizen's pocket"

As director-general for competition, he'll be handling some powerful tools. They have been useful in shielding the single market, bringing tech giants to heel, and preventing State subsidies from favoring specific companies. Markets can offer higher quality and better prices, to the direct benefit of the European citizen's pocket.

A more economic approach 2.0

What can be expected from this mandate? Everything points to a renewed attempt at a more economic approach – an echo of the major reforms of two decades ago. At the end of the 1990s, the Commission suffered resounding defeats in the European courts with cases like Airtours or Tetra Laval. The apparent arbitrariness of some decisions forced Brussels to back down. At that point, attempts were made to limit administrative discretion and to increase the predictability of the system.

"Under such an approach, authorities in charge of competition are reduced to pursuing efficiency, leaving social or political considerations off their agenda"

At first, that turn suggested convergence with the U.S. model. Then-Commissioner Neelie Kroes explained in 2005 that the purpose of antitrust rules was "to protect competition, to improve consumer welfare, and to ensure efficient allocation of resources". This didn't necessarily entail a more economic analysis, but a different economic and ideological model. Efforts focused on integrating Chicago School tenets—namely, a preference for market self-correction and a sceptical view of intervention—into the EU's traditional hands-on regulatory framework. That translates into a light-touch competition policy, the analytical simplicity of which can prove seductive to those seeking legal certainty. Under such an approach, authorities in charge of competition are reduced to pursuing efficiency, leaving social or political considerations off their agenda.

In the European ecosystem, however, that model never quite caught on. Here, competition law moves to the rhythm of the Union project, necessarily integrating a social dimension. Early reforms coincided with the unstoppable rise of Big Tech. The approach to European antitrust policy gave big players considerable room for maneuver. It allowed them to consolidate their dominance and to stifle innovation. Any company threatening to overshadow them was either bought or driven out of the market.

Vestager and European resistance to the free market

Efforts to reverse that inertia have been remarkable, especially under the mandate of former Commissioner Magrethe Vestager. On the digital front, Brussels struck the Google empire several times, imposing record-breaking fines for its attempts to exclude rivals. Apple had to pay Ireland €13 billion after an advantageous tax deal was ruled to have constituted illegal State aid. And the crackdown on tech hasn't been limited to Silicon Valley. One turning point came when a merger was blocked between European giants Siemens and Alstom. Despite pressure from France and Germany, which lobbied the Commission to allow the creation of a viable "European champion" to compete with China, the Commission stood firm. It would have been too detrimental for competition.

"An overly rigid regulatory framework would be preventing European companies from standing up to giants in the U.S. and China"

Although the Commission won that battle, the debate was hardly settled. In 2024, the Draghi report acted as a catalyst for a new change of course. According to that report, an overly rigid regulatory framework would be preventing European companies from standing up to giants in the U.S. and China. On top of that internal pressure, the second Trump administration has been threatening to impose tariffs on jurisdictions that target U.S. tech companies.

Toward a new pragmatism?

Teresa Ribera assumed the portfolio of Commissioner for Competition with the mandate of revitalizing European growth, to give the business community a respite. While it's still early to ascertain the effectiveness of this strategy, Ribera appears to seek a pragmatic balance between effective law enforcement and the need to foster growth. At this juncture, Whelan enters with an ideal profile: a seasoned veteran with Big Tech experience whose career alongside figures like Kroes and von der Leyen hints at a conciliatory approach. His appointment has been met with relief in the Brussels law firms. They see Whelan as a bet for settlements over sanctions.

"Success in the business world should be the fruit of efficiency and innovation, not potentially harmful concentrations"

The impending key DMA decisions against tech giants and the imminent merger control reform will reveal the direction in which Whelan wishes to steer the policy. The new draft merger guidelines, expected shortly, will reportedly adopt a lax approach, aimed at fostering industrial growth. Such a shift would bear important risks. Success in the business world should be the fruit of efficiency and innovation, not potentially harmful concentrations.

The Commission should not forget that the powerful Brussels effect stems precisely from the EU's mighty regulatory model, essential to guarantee healthy markets. This requires an effective legal system that is rigorously applied to all players.