Europe is still searching for a way to respond to a Russia that combines conventional warfare with drones, disinformation, sabotage and migration pressure. Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya, a Belarusian opposition activist and politician, analyses that challenge from the perspective of a country that, under Alexander Lukashenko, has become part of the Kremlin’s strategy.
For the leader of the Belarusian opposition, the problem goes far beyond her country’s political future:
"Belarus is a European security question". Europe, which for years became accustomed to peace, she argues, must learn to respond more firmly when Moscow tests its limits.
In this conversation at the La Toja Forum, Tsikhanouskaya discusses the weaponisation of migration, tensions in the transatlantic relationship, the role of the United States and the future of the war in Ukraine. She also warns of the risk of new provocations on Europe’s eastern flank —
"don’t panic, but be prepared"— and explains why a peace settlement that leaves Belarus’s subjugation to Russia intact would not solve the problem. On Spain, she highlights its support for Belarusian democratic forces and recalls that
"when Belarus has needed help, Spain has been there".
Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya during her conversation with Agenda Pública at the La Toja Forum. Photo: Agenda Pública / Yanka Soto
There is something Europe still seems unable to resolve: how to respond effectively to Russian hybrid warfare. As a Belarusian, you know Russia extremely well and you know what Russia is capable of. Perhaps you can help us understand both countries better and, more importantly, how Europe should respond.
With a free, democratic and independent Belarus, Europe would be much stronger. Because we share a border with Russia and have been subjected to Russian domination for such a long time, we have considerable experience of resisting Russian subjugation and hybrid attacks.
The situation today is that Belarus, because of [Alexander] Lukashenko’s policies and his alliance with [Vladimir] Putin, has become part of these hybrid attacks against Ukraine and, of course, Europe. As long as Lukashenko remains in power, there will be
constant threats coming from Russia through Belarusian territory towards the borders of the European Union and NATO.
It is very painful for me to see migrants being used to put pressure on the borders; to see drones flying over Lithuania, Poland and Latvia; to see the regime disrupting airports with smuggling balloons, and to see Russian and Belarusian propaganda trying to poison the minds of Europeans with populist narratives.
I also understand that if — or when — Ukraine wins this war and Belarus becomes free, it will be much easier for Europe to deal with these hybrid attacks.
"It is very painful for me to see migrants being used to put pressure on the borders; to see drones flying over Lithuania, Poland and Latvia"
As for the broader question of how to protect Europe, I don’t have a simple answer. The most powerful people in the world are thinking about this. But after living next to Russia for so long, I know one thing: Russia will not stop until it is stopped. And Russia can only be stopped by a strong, powerful, decisive and bold Europe.
Russia is better prepared for hybrid warfare because Europe became accustomed to living in peace. European institutions were built for peacetime. Europe was not prepared for escalation or provocation because, for many years, its policy towards Putin was based on appeasement and a business-oriented approach.
Eventually, however, we discovered that Russia is not a trustworthy neighbour or partner. In fact, it is not a partner at all.
Europe therefore faces new challenges. But I think everything begins with ordinary people and their governments. Belarusian society is different: we know who our enemy is and we know what we are fighting against. We do not need to persuade Belarusians that Russia represents a threat.
"Russia is better prepared for hybrid warfare because Europe became accustomed to living in peace. European institutions were built for peacetime"
One of Russia’s tactics is to
overwhelm ordinary people with information — to create such a flood of information that people can no longer distinguish what is true from what is false. Eventually, people distance themselves from politics altogether. And that is precisely the objective of Russia and of the Belarusian regime.
That is why it is important to find new ways of involving people in politics and providing them with reliable information. Everyone has a responsibility here: businesses, the media, artificial intelligence companies, governments and NGOs. We need to find a way of bringing people back into politics and making them interested in what is happening in the world.
Let’s talk about the weaponisation of migration. You know very well how the Belarusian government has used migration as an instrument of pressure against Poland. Recently, in Spain, we have experienced something that raises some of the same questions. Do you see similarities between the weaponisation of migration on Europe’s eastern border and what can happen on its southern border?
Immigration itself is already a major challenge for societies. But when migration is orchestrated or weaponised, it becomes a double problem. On our borders, we know how the system works. People are flown in and brought towards the border, where attempts are made to push them across.
What these regimes want to achieve is to distract the attention of governments and societies from fundamental questions — peace and war, democracy and dictatorship — and redirect it towards migration. They also force governments to divert resources towards managing the migration crisis.
In our region, for example, the war in Ukraine continues. Resources spent dealing with an artificially created migration crisis are resources and political attention that cannot be devoted elsewhere, including to supporting Ukraine. That is part of the objective.
"What these regimes want to achieve is to distract the attention of governments and societies from fundamental questions — peace and war, democracy and dictatorship — and redirect it towards migration"
At the same time, these regimes are exploiting human beings and human lives. So there is always a moral dimension to the problem. Democratic societies debate endlessly how to help people while simultaneously preventing the instrumentalisation of migration. On the borders with Belarus, for example, walls have been built.
For authoritarian regimes, however, human lives mean very little. They are willing to use people as an instrument to put pressure on and blackmail democratic countries. I don’t know whether there is an easy way to resist this. On the one hand, you sometimes have to negotiate with the countries responsible in order to prevent these situations. On the other hand, dictators do not necessarily want to negotiate. They want to humiliate you. They want you to come to them asking for something and, ultimately, to compromise your principles.
This is part of the confrontation between democracy and dictatorship. Any indecisiveness will be perceived as weakness by authoritarian regimes, and that will embolden them. We can already see that this is not only about migrants. There are many different forms of hybrid attack. They are constantly testing how far they will be allowed to go. If there is no response, they take another step.
Look, for example, at the drones that recently fell on Lithuanian territory. There was no particularly strong reaction from the West. Nobody was injured and nothing catastrophic happened. But the message Russia may receive is: we can go one step further.
What happens next? A building is destroyed? And after that? People are killed by
drones? At what point will there be a reaction strong enough for Russia to understand that this is unacceptable?
These operations are also attempts to divide governments, parliaments, political parties and societies. We can see populist forces growing in Europe. But populists often offer to close an issue rather than solve the underlying problem. That is not a way out.
How does Washington’s approach affect your strategy in Belarus and, more broadly, Ukraine and Eastern Europe?
First of all, from the Belarusian perspective, we are grateful to the United States for its efforts to secure the release of political prisoners. That humanitarian track is continuing.
"These operations are also attempts to divide governments, parliaments, political parties and societies"
Around five hundred people have already been released from Belarusian prisons. Of course, Lukashenko continues to detain new people, so it can feel like a revolving door. Nevertheless, five hundred people have been released, five hundred lives have been saved for the moment, and we encourage the United States to continue these efforts.
As for Ukraine, we need Ukraine to win this war and we are grateful for American attempts to launch negotiations. We see US representatives travelling to Russia and Ukraine trying to organise a process.
But what matters to us is that any peace should be lasting and just — not simply a short pause allowing Russia to regroup and attack again. I want to believe that Americans ultimately want the same thing.
Of course, we all see the turbulence in the transatlantic relationship. Reactions to that turbulence vary. Some people think it is terrible for the transatlantic community — and in many respects it is. Others argue that it has forced Europe to recognise that it must become stronger in its own right.
We can already see movement in that direction: Europe is thinking much more seriously about
its own defence and about how to protect itself if, for example, the United States reduces its commitment to European security.
In that sense, this turbulence has strengthened Europe’s determination to act from a position of greater power. Nevertheless, I believe the world would be much safer if transatlantic unity were preserved and strengthened. What is particularly important is that changes in the US position should not divide the European Union.
Take Belarus. US engagement with the Belarusian regime over the release of political prisoners has triggered a discussion in Europe: perhaps Europe should also begin talking to Lukashenko. That is dangerous.
We encourage our European partners to remain strong, principled and decisive towards Belarus. There should be no appeasement and no legitimisation of the regime.
"What is particularly important is that changes in the US position should not divide the European Union"
American sanctions can be used as leverage to release political prisoners. But Europe has a different role: Belarus is your neighbour. A free, independent and democratic Belarus is also in Europe’s security interest.
Our formula is therefore the following: American sanctions can help release people, and European sanctions should help release the country.
Let’s talk about Spain and its support for the democratic movement in Belarus.
It might sound surprising to ordinary people, but Spain has turned out to be one of the strongest supporters of Belarus and its democratic forces.
Geographically, you are far away. Belarus might not seem like an obvious Spanish priority. But the solidarity shown by the Spanish government, parliament and, I hope, Spanish society has been considerable.
First of all, Spain has consistently aligned itself with the European Union’s policy towards Belarus, including sanctions and political pressure on the regime.
Our strategy has two dimensions: putting pressure on the regime while helping Belarusian society become stronger. We are not asking anyone to fight instead of us. We are asking for help so that we can become stronger and more resilient ourselves.
But Spain has also taken some steps that are, in certain respects, unprecedented. Many people who were forced to flee Belarus because of repression continue to suffer transnational repression. One of the tools used by the regime is to deprive Belarusians abroad of valid documentation. We cannot renew our passports.
In Spain, thanks to Foreign Minister Albares, specific instructions were introduced allowing Belarusian citizens to use expired documents when renewing residence permits. This is an extremely important measure.
"Spain has consistently aligned itself with the European Union’s policy towards Belarus, including sanctions and political pressure on the regime"
There is also the question of political prisoners. Thousands remain imprisoned. Some have been released thanks to American diplomatic efforts, but many of those released are immediately expelled from Belarus. Democratic forces then have a responsibility to help them begin a new life because many have lost everything.
We established the International Humanitarian Fund, to which Spain has contributed twice. That money genuinely saves lives. It pays for physical and psychological rehabilitation, accommodation and relocation. We have also opened the Mission of Democratic Belarus in Madrid to represent Belarusians in Spain and provide an organised focal point for the diaspora. That was also possible with the support of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Prime Minister Sánchez has been very supportive and vocal about Belarus. I have met him several times. We are also trying to think about the future of Belarus.
After the Franco dictatorship, Spanish society had to undergo its own process of democratic transition and reconciliation. Belarus will eventually have to confront similar questions, and we want to learn from the Spanish experience about how such a process can be managed.
Our cooperation therefore takes place at many levels: experts, human-rights defenders and political institutions.
I understand perfectly well that Spanish citizens cannot think about Belarus every day. You have many problems of your own, and there are many crises around the world. But when Belarus has needed help, Spain has been there.
We will not forget that. And when democracy eventually prevails in Belarus, Spain will have been part of that story.
Let me ask you about your own next steps. How are you working today — and how do you intend to work in the coming years — to achieve democracy in Belarus?
Belarus is, to some extent, hostage to broader geopolitical developments — above all the war between Russia and Ukraine.
The Belarusian regime is participating in the conflict because it allows Russia to deploy missiles, nuclear weapons and military infrastructure from its territory. Nobody knows whether there could eventually be provocations or escalation along the border with the European Union.
Belarusian society and the democratic movement are firmly opposed to Lukashenko’s regime. We stand with Ukraine, and we want a European future for Belarus.
Our task today is to preserve unity and continue developing the institutions and instruments needed to resist the regime both inside and outside the country. I am proud of what we have achieved.
In 2020, we had a huge democratic uprising. It was brutally suppressed. Putin supported Lukashenko, and today Putin and Lukashenko are extremely close allies. It is no longer realistic to imagine simply separating them.
For six years Belarus has experienced enormous repression. In many respects, people live under conditions reminiscent of the Stalinist period. More than 900 people are currently behind bars for political reasons, and at least half a million people have been forced to leave the country because of repression. Yet we have managed to build alternative institutions of power in exile.
Independent media that were destroyed inside Belarus have restored their operations from abroad. Around 70 per cent of their audience is still inside Belarus. That tells us something important: people remain interested. Despite fear and repression, people inside the country continue providing information and data to democratic institutions.
We have also established formal relationships with the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and others. We have become part of international political structures.
Today there are, politically speaking, two Belaruses: a regime serving Russian interests, and a Belarusian society that wants a European future and wants to become a reliable partner for Europe rather than a permanent source of insecurity.
Despite having very limited space and resources, we have managed to keep Belarus on the international agenda. We continue to remind the world about our struggle and about political prisoners.
And after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we have also demonstrated something else: Belarus is no longer simply a human-rights or humanitarian question. Belarus is a European security question.
"Belarus is no longer simply a human-rights or humanitarian question. Belarus is a European security question"
A free and democratic Belarus is in Europe’s national and collective security interest. Only with a free Belarus can Europe’s eastern border ultimately become more secure.
Ukraine’s victory is therefore essential. If the war is simply frozen, or if Ukraine is allowed to lose, the 'status quo' in Belarus could also be frozen for decades. Russia would continue to subjugate and gradually absorb our country.
So my question to Europe is whether Europe is prepared to be bold and decisive enough to defend its own interest in a free and democratic Belarus.
We need more than expressions of solidarity and condemnation. We need practical and technical support, political support and assistance for Belarusians living abroad. We need the resources and energy to continue this struggle.
Supporting democratic Belarus is not charity. It is an investment in European security.
At the moment, understandably, much of the attention is focused on
a possible Russian-Ukrainian peace agreement. But Belarus is often treated as a separate question that can be dealt with later.
Our message is: you cannot postpone Belarus until the day after a settlement in Ukraine.
If the Belarusian question is not addressed alongside Ukraine, you may simply be postponing the next escalation. Russia will not forget Belarus.
Russian subjugation of Ukraine and Belarus is part of the same strategic problem.
Do you think Putin could launch a military attack against one of the Baltic states in the foreseeable future? Some experts believe this could be the next step.
As I always say: don’t panic, but be prepared. A great deal depends on whether Europe demonstrates unity. Look at the drones over Lithuania; there was no major response, and Russia may interpret that as a green light to go further.
I lived in Lithuania for five years before moving to Warsaw. When the war began, people were already discussing whether Lithuania or other countries in the region could eventually be attacked. The first problem was military preparedness, and the situation has improved considerably since then.
"Don’t panic, but be prepared. A great deal depends on whether Europe demonstrates unity"
But there is another issue: society. I remember people asking whether, in the event of an attack, our partners would really come to help us and defend us. There was uncertainty about that, and that feeling is extremely dangerous because it means citizens are not completely confident in the strength of the alliance to which they belong. Perhaps that uncertainty exists not only in society but also at the political level.
If Russia senses weakness or disunity, it may decide to test Europe. Experts often mention
the Suwałki Gap, for example, but we also have to understand that war today has many different fronts and is no longer simply about land invasion. Russian soldiers do not necessarily need to cross a border: there are drones, cyber operations, sabotage and other forms of attack.
In Belarus, new military infrastructure is being constructed that would not be necessary if the country were not preparing for possible conflict. There are antennas capable of redirecting drones and increasing intelligence activity along the borders with the European Union. Does this mean provocations or escalation are possible? Yes. Does it mean we can be certain they will happen? Of course not.
You know Russian society far better than I do. Is there a point at which that society might cease to accept Putin’s policies?
Russia has never invested enough in its people. Even before the war, there was a huge gap between the wealth accumulated by businesses, oligarchs and Putin’s circle and the resources devoted to ordinary citizens.
In addition, there is another problem: imperial attitudes remain deeply rooted among significant parts of Russian society. Many people believe that the war against Ukraine is justified. Propaganda is now also preparing them to think of Europe as an enemy and to contemplate the possibility of a much broader confrontation.
The narrative is: we are a great country; how dare they challenge us? People influenced by these imperial ideas may support confrontation. Changing that mentality could take decades, perhaps generations. But for that process even to begin, Russia must first be defeated in its attempt to subjugate its neighbours.
You mentioned the oligarchs. Could economic pressure and sanctions eventually change their position towards Putin? They are losing access to markets and assets. Could that translate into political pressure?
It is difficult for me to judge Russia directly because the Russian and Belarusian contexts are different. I can speak more confidently about Belarus. Of course, businesspeople are unhappy when they cannot trade normally. But dictatorships build systems designed to protect the dictator.
Even powerful businesspeople can be kept under control through fear. The security services operate on behalf of the regime; the courts operate vertically; and at any moment a businessman can be arrested and imprisoned. We have seen this in Belarus.
"Businesspeople are unhappy when they cannot trade normally. But dictatorships build systems designed to protect the dictator"
At the same time, some regime-connected businesspeople can continue making money alongside the dictator. War can also close some economic opportunities while creating others.
In Belarus, for example, the war has created significant economic opportunities for parts of Lukashenko’s system because Belarusian enterprises are producing military equipment and supplies for the Russian war machine.
So while some oligarchs or businesses may lose money because of sanctions, others may benefit from
the wartime economy. Something similar may be happening in Russia, although I cannot judge the Russian situation with the same confidence.
Thank you very much.