Martes, 28 de julio de 2026
CONVERSATIONS
Javier Colomina (NATO): "In a European war such as the one in Ukraine, 90% of the missiles used come from the United States"
Global instability demands a military machine capable of responding at any latitude. In this conversation with Marc López Plana, director and editor of 'Agenda Pública', diplomat Javier Colomina defends NATO’s ‘360-degree’ vision. Colomina, Spain’s highest-positioned officer in the Alliance, maintains that NATO "doesn’t have the option of choosing between threats" and is committed to Europe taking fuller control of its own defense, toward the goal of achieving the "real capacity to produce what is needed."
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Marc López Plana (left) and Javier Colomina (right) chat at the Palau Macaya in Barcelona.Agenda Pública / Tsun Ho
Europe’s military autonomy collides on the battlefield with a harsh industrial reality. In this conversation with Javier Colomina, NATO’s deputy assistant secretary general and special representative for the southern neighbourhood, the Spanish diplomat breaks down the continent’s shortcomings when it comes to its day-to-day defense. Because, despite the political and financial effort of recent years, the European Union still depends on the North American market for its daily needs. That was also the starting point that brought the diplomat to Barcelona, where he took part in the micro-event organized by Agenda Pública entitled Defense, security and industry: a strategic opportunity for Europe, Spain and Catalunya.
Continental rearmament is unavoidable if the Western alliance is to be rebalanced. Faced with voices calling for alternatives, Colomina stresses that this advance must take shape "within the transatlantic framework". This shared space offers unmatched nuclear deterrence, and he also recalls that "96% of the population of the European Union lives in NATO countries". A complete decoupling is entirely out of the question.
The European defense industry, which includes Spain and its autonomous communities, faces the urgent challenge of reducing its operational fragmentation in order to multiply domestic production. Europe currently acquires "80% of its military equipment from abroad" and still depends on Washington to sustain Kyiv. Faced with this deficit in sovereign capabilities, will the Twenty-Seven be able to build a genuine common defense and prevent the shortage of resources from ultimately compromising the continent’s security?
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In the Middle East, NATO is carrying out work to identify Iranian missiles. I think this offers a clear demonstration of the importance of the organization and of its defense and support capabilities. How do you assess it from inside the Alliance?
In recent years, NATO has, in my view, taken all the right decisions to increase our deterrence capacity and our collective defense capacity across all domains. We have approved regional plans with force allocation from that perspective, with the ability to mobilize more than half a million soldiers in two or three weeks if needed, together with the necessary command and control.
That is how security works: you have to be prepared for when something happens. And now that something has indeed happened: three missiles from Iran that we intercepted, with an absolutely forceful and flawless response. They were identified and brought down within minutes.
From Spain, there may be a certain perception that NATO, for obvious and understandable reasons, is looking more toward the east. Do you think that, not only because of your own responsibilities but also because of the current conflict in the Middle East, a new phase is opening in which we will need to operate with two perspectives and truly complete that 360-degree approach?
NATO remains focused on firmly supporting Ukraine so that it can defend itself against Russian aggression. Supporting Ukraine had already been a priority since 2014, but above all since February 2022. And it will not cease to be so, because one of the two agreed threats we face, and the most direct one, is Russia. The other threat is terrorism, which in large part takes us south.
As I was saying, collective defense has clearly advanced in recent years toward that 360-degree concept, which was not previously fully embedded in the organization. NATO has always had an eastward focus, by inertia, since it emerged after the Second World War and in opposition to the Warsaw Pact.
That is perfectly compatible with the fact that, today, one of the main priorities remains the eastern flank because of the war in Ukraine. But NATO does not have the option of choosing between threats: it has to be capable of responding to all of them.
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Within that southern strategy, which countries are NATO partners and what kind of relationship do we have with them? Seen from Spain, it is easy to think that many of the problems may also come from the south. How is work currently being done to prevent them? Not in purely economic terms, but in terms of relations and cooperation with those countries.
NATO has eleven partners in the south, in addition to Iraq, where we have had an advisory mission. This week, the mission withdrew its physical presence from the country. Its personnel in Iraq have been relocated so they can continue carrying out advisory activities from our command in Naples. With other partners, there is generally no operational presence: the relationship is more political.
Those partners range from Mauritania and all of North Africa to Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the four Gulf countries, excluding Saudi Arabia and Oman. In addition to those partners, there are relations with other countries that are not formal partners but are political actors with whom we interact and whom, in some cases, we also invite to courses or partially open up some of our activities to.
With our partners there is a broad menu of practical cooperation activities and political dialogue. We work closely with them in areas such as maritime security, counterterrorism, counter-drone work, interoperability — which is an essential element — exercises, training and the education of military personnel at every level, from regular officers to special operations.
We work at different levels, because not all our partners receive the same: it depends very much on what they want, on their needs and also on what they contribute.
There are different capacity-building packages. The most advanced partners are Jordan, Tunisia, Mauritania and the case of Iraq, which has that advisory operation. Other countries make more progress in some areas than in others, but the final objective is for them to be more capable of confronting the security threats we share and, at the same time, to contribute directly to our security through their participation in our operations and activities.
In some cases, for example, the Gulf countries or Morocco have very significant capacities in the defense industry. And there we are trying to identify synergies and real areas of cooperation. In particular, in counter-drone work and missile defense, the Gulf is extremely capable.
Morocco deserves a specific question because it is our strategic neighbour, both because of its relationship with Africa and with the Sahel. What is being worked on with Morocco within that cooperation?
Yes, Morocco is a vital partner within North Africa. It is an active country in foreign policy and security policy, with broad influence not only in the Maghreb but also in sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel. For all those reasons, it is a very important partner for us, just as it is for Spain and for other countries in the Mediterranean basin.
We work in many of the areas I mentioned earlier. They are interested in continuing to coordinate activities, from counterterrorism to maritime security. There are many areas in which we cooperate, but I think the potential for growth is high because it is a key country in North Africa.
European defense or greater weight for the European pillar within NATO?
The second. There has to be undeniable growth in European defense. We are already seeing decisions being taken by the European Union, largely energized by our own decisions and by the demands we have made of Europeans to take on a greater role in European defense.
First, because that framework gives us the ability to manage that burden shifting, since within it we have full visibility over where U.S. troops, equipment and enablers are, where changes or movements can take place and how they should be compensated by greater European leadership.
And second, because it is the sensible course: for Europeans to move forward, to grow, to have many more capabilities and a greater ability to shape how decisions are taken, but within a solid framework from which we benefit greatly.
The transatlantic framework offers nuclear deterrence that has no equal, a collective military capacity across the 32 countries. We always talk about the United States, but we also have to talk about the United Kingdom, Turkey or Norway, which are not part of the European Union. We cannot forget that 96% of the population of the European Union lives in NATO countries. The overlap between the EU and NATO is obvious, and I think moving forward within that transatlantic framework, however complex it may sometimes be, is how we should see things.
Is more money more power? Given the way NATO works, can it be explained that, if Europe puts in more money, it will also have greater decision-making capacity?
The way to explain it is different: more threats and a more difficult strategic context have led us to the need for more money because more military capabilities are required. That is the general reflection, valid for NATO’s 32 allies.
Indeed, the more Europeans invest, the more defense industry and military capabilities they put on the table, the more decision-making capacity they will have in many areas. NATO is an intergovernmental organization, it decides everything by consensus, and that will continue to be the case.
But what does it mean exactly that everything is decided by consensus?
It means that everything is decided among the 32. There are no qualified majorities of any kind.
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Do you think that could change in the future?
No, I do not think so. The strength of the organization lies precisely in the fact that everything is decided unanimously. And, although building those consensuses is very difficult, that is the strength of an organization that, unlike the European Union or others, deals only with security and foreign policy, which are very powerful areas of sovereignty.
In those fields, the concept of solidarity really only exists if there is unanimity in decision-making. Then, naturally, the real power of each ally is different, and that has an impact when it comes to negotiation. The fact that Europeans have doubled their defense investment and are going to produce more military capabilities, more quickly and in greater quantity, will also have an impact on their capacity to influence.
In fact, last month the leadership of NATO’s different headquarters was announced, both the component commands and the joint commands. An essential decision was taken there: the component commands — sea and air — will remain in U.S. hands, while the joint commands, which until now were also generally in U.S. hands, will pass into European hands.
That is an evolution that shows that we are moving in the direction of greater balance in decision-making.
One final question on the defense industry. Does putting in more money mean producing more military equipment? What are the current figures? When we talk about the relationship between the U.S. and Europe, it is worth putting the numbers on the table.
Yes, it is essential. When we talk about looking for alternatives or continuing to work within a transatlantic framework, I always say that, in addition to the fact that this framework has served us very well for 76 years and has guaranteed a level of security that has enabled European prosperity, we have to look at what the real alternatives to that framework are. Of course it has complexities and tensions, some of which we see today and others we have seen at other points in history. The figures help to make that visible.
In other words, in a European war, bordering several countries of the European Union and NATO, for missile defense, which is now absolutely essential, 90% of the missiles currently needed come from the U.S. market.
What is more, this is happening while Europeans have spent four years placing support for Ukraine very clearly at the center of their foreign and security policy. Despite having taken the right political and financial decisions, they still need 90% of those missiles to come from U.S. stockpiles. They are financed by Europeans, which clearly indicates their commitment, but the desirable outcome would be for Europe to be able to produce a substantial share of what Ukrainians need.
Indeed, a few days ago President Zelensky said that the 90-billion-euro loan still pending approval by the European Union will be used to acquire, through the system NATO has established — PURL in its English acronym — the missiles Ukraine needs. Because, as the Ukrainian president himself added, Ukraine currently has no alternative.
That puts into perspective everything Europe still has to do.
The European Union has already done a great deal, and that has to be acknowledged, but from now on it will be less about the political and financial decision itself and more about the concrete result of that whole process. That result, in the field of security and defense, essentially translates into defense industry and the real capacity to produce what is needed.
The European defense industry is powerful, although fragmented. It now has to start working to reduce that fragmentation and multiply its production capacity.
Thank you very much.
Continental rearmament is unavoidable if the Western alliance is to be rebalanced. Faced with voices calling for alternatives, Colomina stresses that this advance must take shape "within the transatlantic framework". This shared space offers unmatched nuclear deterrence, and he also recalls that "96% of the population of the European Union lives in NATO countries". A complete decoupling is entirely out of the question.
The European defense industry, which includes Spain and its autonomous communities, faces the urgent challenge of reducing its operational fragmentation in order to multiply domestic production. Europe currently acquires "80% of its military equipment from abroad" and still depends on Washington to sustain Kyiv. Faced with this deficit in sovereign capabilities, will the Twenty-Seven be able to build a genuine common defense and prevent the shortage of resources from ultimately compromising the continent’s security?
Javier Colomina, NATO’s deputy assistant secretary general and special representative for the southern neighbourhood. Photo: Agenda Pública / Tsun Ho
In the Middle East, NATO is carrying out work to identify Iranian missiles. I think this offers a clear demonstration of the importance of the organization and of its defense and support capabilities. How do you assess it from inside the Alliance?
In recent years, NATO has, in my view, taken all the right decisions to increase our deterrence capacity and our collective defense capacity across all domains. We have approved regional plans with force allocation from that perspective, with the ability to mobilize more than half a million soldiers in two or three weeks if needed, together with the necessary command and control.
That is how security works: you have to be prepared for when something happens. And now that something has indeed happened: three missiles from Iran that we intercepted, with an absolutely forceful and flawless response. They were identified and brought down within minutes.
"The Alliance is a defensive alliance that fundamentally invests in deterrence. But, if it has to react, it reacts"That is NATO: something we have been calling for over many years, particularly Spaniards, Italians and other allies, with a 360-degree vision, so that any threat receives a forceful response. That in no way changes the fact that the Alliance is a defensive alliance that fundamentally invests in deterrence. But, if it has to react, it reacts.
From Spain, there may be a certain perception that NATO, for obvious and understandable reasons, is looking more toward the east. Do you think that, not only because of your own responsibilities but also because of the current conflict in the Middle East, a new phase is opening in which we will need to operate with two perspectives and truly complete that 360-degree approach?
NATO remains focused on firmly supporting Ukraine so that it can defend itself against Russian aggression. Supporting Ukraine had already been a priority since 2014, but above all since February 2022. And it will not cease to be so, because one of the two agreed threats we face, and the most direct one, is Russia. The other threat is terrorism, which in large part takes us south.
As I was saying, collective defense has clearly advanced in recent years toward that 360-degree concept, which was not previously fully embedded in the organization. NATO has always had an eastward focus, by inertia, since it emerged after the Second World War and in opposition to the Warsaw Pact.
"There is no doubt that what happens on the ground also shapes the political agendas of all our countries"Now, in recent years, progress has been made, for example, by approving the Action Plan for the Southern Neighbourhood at the 2024 Washington summit. A few weeks later, I was appointed to implement that action plan. There is no doubt that what happens on the ground also shapes the political agendas of all our countries. The open conflict in the Middle East, especially since the terrorist attacks of October 2023; now the war in Iran; the situation in the Sahel... All of that puts the focus on the many threats and security challenges we face in the south.
That is perfectly compatible with the fact that, today, one of the main priorities remains the eastern flank because of the war in Ukraine. But NATO does not have the option of choosing between threats: it has to be capable of responding to all of them.
Plana and Colomina discuss NATO’s 360-degree approach in depth. Photo: Agenda Pública / Tsun Ho
Within that southern strategy, which countries are NATO partners and what kind of relationship do we have with them? Seen from Spain, it is easy to think that many of the problems may also come from the south. How is work currently being done to prevent them? Not in purely economic terms, but in terms of relations and cooperation with those countries.
NATO has eleven partners in the south, in addition to Iraq, where we have had an advisory mission. This week, the mission withdrew its physical presence from the country. Its personnel in Iraq have been relocated so they can continue carrying out advisory activities from our command in Naples. With other partners, there is generally no operational presence: the relationship is more political.
Those partners range from Mauritania and all of North Africa to Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the four Gulf countries, excluding Saudi Arabia and Oman. In addition to those partners, there are relations with other countries that are not formal partners but are political actors with whom we interact and whom, in some cases, we also invite to courses or partially open up some of our activities to.
With our partners there is a broad menu of practical cooperation activities and political dialogue. We work closely with them in areas such as maritime security, counterterrorism, counter-drone work, interoperability — which is an essential element — exercises, training and the education of military personnel at every level, from regular officers to special operations.
We work at different levels, because not all our partners receive the same: it depends very much on what they want, on their needs and also on what they contribute.
"You have to protect your own security and, in doing so, shared security normally increases. That is the final objective of what we do with all these countries"The way we read everything we do here is that our own security has to increase as a result of it. We always talk about shared security, because that has to be the concept, but security is also, in itself, a self-interested concept. You have to protect your own security and, in doing so, shared security normally increases. That is the final objective of what we do with all these countries.
There are different capacity-building packages. The most advanced partners are Jordan, Tunisia, Mauritania and the case of Iraq, which has that advisory operation. Other countries make more progress in some areas than in others, but the final objective is for them to be more capable of confronting the security threats we share and, at the same time, to contribute directly to our security through their participation in our operations and activities.
In some cases, for example, the Gulf countries or Morocco have very significant capacities in the defense industry. And there we are trying to identify synergies and real areas of cooperation. In particular, in counter-drone work and missile defense, the Gulf is extremely capable.
Morocco deserves a specific question because it is our strategic neighbour, both because of its relationship with Africa and with the Sahel. What is being worked on with Morocco within that cooperation?
Yes, Morocco is a vital partner within North Africa. It is an active country in foreign policy and security policy, with broad influence not only in the Maghreb but also in sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel. For all those reasons, it is a very important partner for us, just as it is for Spain and for other countries in the Mediterranean basin.
"There are many areas in which we cooperate, but I think the potential for growth is high because it is a key country in North Africa"It is a partner whose importance will increase, given how it has chosen to position itself in recent years. It has a very good relationship with many other countries in the Middle East. It has a generally good relationship with the West. And it maintains significant alignment with the Euro-Atlantic area and its principles. All of that means that cooperation with Morocco, which is already good, can only grow in the coming years.
We work in many of the areas I mentioned earlier. They are interested in continuing to coordinate activities, from counterterrorism to maritime security. There are many areas in which we cooperate, but I think the potential for growth is high because it is a key country in North Africa.
The Spanish diplomat has held his NATO post since 2024. Photo: Agenda Pública / Tsun Ho
European defense or greater weight for the European pillar within NATO?
The second. There has to be undeniable growth in European defense. We are already seeing decisions being taken by the European Union, largely energized by our own decisions and by the demands we have made of Europeans to take on a greater role in European defense.
"The overlap between the EU and NATO is obvious, and I think moving forward within that transatlantic framework, however complex it may sometimes be, is how we should see things"We have all heard what the United States was asking for, that burden shifting. We believe that, indeed, the relationship was unbalanced and that, to rebalance it, more Europe is needed, also more Canada, but above all more Europe. Europe has to take decisions to advance in European defense, to have more weight and leadership, particularly in the continent’s conventional defense, but, in my opinion, everything must be done within the transatlantic framework.
First, because that framework gives us the ability to manage that burden shifting, since within it we have full visibility over where U.S. troops, equipment and enablers are, where changes or movements can take place and how they should be compensated by greater European leadership.
And second, because it is the sensible course: for Europeans to move forward, to grow, to have many more capabilities and a greater ability to shape how decisions are taken, but within a solid framework from which we benefit greatly.
The transatlantic framework offers nuclear deterrence that has no equal, a collective military capacity across the 32 countries. We always talk about the United States, but we also have to talk about the United Kingdom, Turkey or Norway, which are not part of the European Union. We cannot forget that 96% of the population of the European Union lives in NATO countries. The overlap between the EU and NATO is obvious, and I think moving forward within that transatlantic framework, however complex it may sometimes be, is how we should see things.
Is more money more power? Given the way NATO works, can it be explained that, if Europe puts in more money, it will also have greater decision-making capacity?
The way to explain it is different: more threats and a more difficult strategic context have led us to the need for more money because more military capabilities are required. That is the general reflection, valid for NATO’s 32 allies.
"The more Europeans invest, the more defense industry and military capabilities they put on the table, the more decision-making capacity they will have in many areas"Now, within that reflection, it is undeniable that European countries were the ones far below the defense investment needs — which we ourselves had defined in order to confront those threats — and therefore the ones that had to move forward the most. And, in doing so, also recover influence.
Indeed, the more Europeans invest, the more defense industry and military capabilities they put on the table, the more decision-making capacity they will have in many areas. NATO is an intergovernmental organization, it decides everything by consensus, and that will continue to be the case.
But what does it mean exactly that everything is decided by consensus?
It means that everything is decided among the 32. There are no qualified majorities of any kind.
The conversation between López Plana and Colomina takes place after the micro-event organized by Agenda Pública. Photo: Agenda Pública / Tsun Ho
Do you think that could change in the future?
No, I do not think so. The strength of the organization lies precisely in the fact that everything is decided unanimously. And, although building those consensuses is very difficult, that is the strength of an organization that, unlike the European Union or others, deals only with security and foreign policy, which are very powerful areas of sovereignty.
In those fields, the concept of solidarity really only exists if there is unanimity in decision-making. Then, naturally, the real power of each ally is different, and that has an impact when it comes to negotiation. The fact that Europeans have doubled their defense investment and are going to produce more military capabilities, more quickly and in greater quantity, will also have an impact on their capacity to influence.
In fact, last month the leadership of NATO’s different headquarters was announced, both the component commands and the joint commands. An essential decision was taken there: the component commands — sea and air — will remain in U.S. hands, while the joint commands, which until now were also generally in U.S. hands, will pass into European hands.
That is an evolution that shows that we are moving in the direction of greater balance in decision-making.
One final question on the defense industry. Does putting in more money mean producing more military equipment? What are the current figures? When we talk about the relationship between the U.S. and Europe, it is worth putting the numbers on the table.
Yes, it is essential. When we talk about looking for alternatives or continuing to work within a transatlantic framework, I always say that, in addition to the fact that this framework has served us very well for 76 years and has guaranteed a level of security that has enabled European prosperity, we have to look at what the real alternatives to that framework are. Of course it has complexities and tensions, some of which we see today and others we have seen at other points in history. The figures help to make that visible.
"In a European war, bordering several European countries of the European Union and NATO [...] 90% of the missiles currently being used come from the U.S. market"At present, Europe buys 80% of its military equipment from outside the European Union and, of the material bought from outside, almost 70% comes from the United States. But I will give you a figure that, to me, is even more devastating: today, Ukrainians, for their daily defense — and one of its essential elements is missile defense — use missiles that are 90% sourced from the United States.
In other words, in a European war, bordering several countries of the European Union and NATO, for missile defense, which is now absolutely essential, 90% of the missiles currently needed come from the U.S. market.
What is more, this is happening while Europeans have spent four years placing support for Ukraine very clearly at the center of their foreign and security policy. Despite having taken the right political and financial decisions, they still need 90% of those missiles to come from U.S. stockpiles. They are financed by Europeans, which clearly indicates their commitment, but the desirable outcome would be for Europe to be able to produce a substantial share of what Ukrainians need.
Indeed, a few days ago President Zelensky said that the 90-billion-euro loan still pending approval by the European Union will be used to acquire, through the system NATO has established — PURL in its English acronym — the missiles Ukraine needs. Because, as the Ukrainian president himself added, Ukraine currently has no alternative.
That puts into perspective everything Europe still has to do.
The European Union has already done a great deal, and that has to be acknowledged, but from now on it will be less about the political and financial decision itself and more about the concrete result of that whole process. That result, in the field of security and defense, essentially translates into defense industry and the real capacity to produce what is needed.
The European defense industry is powerful, although fragmented. It now has to start working to reduce that fragmentation and multiply its production capacity.
Thank you very much.
Etiquetas
Conversaciones (ENG), Agenda Pública in English, Seguridad, defensa, Otan, OTAN 5%, gasto, Oriente Medio, Irán, España, Europa, Estados Unidos, Occidente, Sahel, Ucrania, Rusia, geopolítica, economía, Guerra Ahora en portada
27 de julio de 2026
27 de julio de 2026
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