Javi López and Dave Keating: "Europe’s future will also be decided on 29 November"

There is a paradox in Brussels that is hard to ignore. The European People’s Party supports Ursula von der Leyen’s majority alongside socialists and liberals, while turning to the radical right for the votes to pass certain policies. It is an arrangement that is creating ever greater tensions and could become even harder to sustain if the 29 November election leaves Pedro Sánchez out of La Moncloa.

To understand how much longer this arrangement can last, I travelled to Brussels to speak with Javi López and Dave Keating, two people who know how the European institutions work from very different perspectives: one takes part in their decisions, while the other reports on them from Brussels. Both, however, agree on the Spanish prime minister’s influence over the European centre-left, although López insists that the stakes go beyond who governs Spain: "Europe does not need an institutional crisis right now".

The balance of power in the European Parliament is only the starting point. The conversation also explores the rise of the radical right in Germany, the prospect of a Marine Le Pen presidency in France, trade relations with China and the consequences of US elections for Europe. It also turns to Ceuta, where the European response has once again raised the issue of solidarity among member states. Keating describes the underlying contradiction: "There is an official majority supporting von der Leyen, and an unofficial right-wing majority used to pass particular measures".
  Editor’s note: This interview has been edited for length and clarity. The written version may therefore differ from the video.

Spain is heading towards a general election, and Sánchez has become one of the most prominent centre-left leaders in Europe. Given how much national politics now shapes decisions in Brussels, what would a change of government in Spain mean for the European Union?

Javi López (J. L.): Pedro Sánchez is probably the most influential leader of the European centre-left since Tony Blair. That is partly because of his electoral success in one of Europe’s major countries, but also because his political approach has influenced the broader centre-left across Europe.

We have demonstrated that economic growth and a strong social model are not mutually exclusive. You can grow without cutting wages or public investment, and combine industrial policy, the green transition and an independent international voice committed to defending international law.

"Pedro Sánchez is probably the most influential leader of the European centre-left since Tony Blair"

Sánchez has challenged assumptions on Gaza, migration, transatlantic relations, Iran and the green agenda. He has also helped preserve some political balance in the European Council, where the progressive camp has very few representatives. I hope he continues to lead Spain. Otherwise, we risk consolidating centre-right dominance, with growing influence from the radical right at the heart of European decision-making.

Dave Keating (D. K.): I agree that Sánchez is the most important centre-left leader since Tony Blair. But that says as much about the dire state of the European left as it does about Sánchez. Who else could claim that position? Olaf Scholz? François Hollande? Sánchez is something of the last man standing.

The centre-left has very little weight in the European Council. Mette Frederiksen has moved considerably to the right on several issues, Malta has limited political weight, and Sweden may produce another centre-left prime minister. But without Sánchez, the traditional centre-left would lose almost its only prominent voice at that table.

"But without Sánchez, the traditional centre-left would lose almost its only prominent voice at that table"

There could also be consequences in the European Parliament. There have been reports that Iratxe García, the S&D leader, wants to withdraw from the centrist arrangement supporting Ursula von der Leyen. Socialist MEPs are frustrated that the European People’s Party increasingly works with the radical right to pass legislation. Some want a formal agreement with the EPP, including limits on that cooperation.

According to those reports, Sánchez has been an important figure in preventing a rupture. So even if he is not particularly enthusiastic about von der Leyen, he may be helping keep her parliamentary majority together. His departure could change that.

Javi, conservatives, socialists and liberals have long been the political families driving European integration. But their relationship now seems to be under considerable strain. How fragile is that majority, and what is the main source of tension?

J. L.: Extremely fragile. We are in a precarious equilibrium. But the real question is not who governs which country; it is the direction of European policy. If the agenda becomes exclusively about restrictive migration policies, deregulation and weakening the Green Deal, the Socialist group will withdraw its support.

"If the agenda becomes exclusively about restrictive migration policies, deregulation and weakening the Green Deal, the Socialist group will withdraw its support"

I am proud of the previous mandate: common borrowing, NextGenerationEU, our response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the European Green Deal. The current mandate, by contrast, has been disappointing. We talk constantly about competitiveness and European sovereignty, but are doing far too little to achieve either.

Our response to the new geopolitical environment has been weak. We have not found the political strength to establish a credible European voice in the world. Europe does not need an institutional crisis right now. We want to help, but preserving a pro-European majority requires an agenda that can hold it together.

Dave, at a time when Europe needs greater unity, the alliance that has traditionally supported European integration is under strain. What would it mean if the Socialists broke with the centrist majority supporting Ursula von der Leyen?

D. K.: The first question is what opposition would actually mean. If it ultimately led to a successful vote of no confidence, the entire Commission would have to be replaced. That would take time, there is no obvious successor to von der Leyen, and the Socialists could lose their most important commissioner, Teresa Ribera. Those are considerable risks.

"If it ultimately led to a successful vote of no confidence, the entire Commission would have to be replaced"

But the EPP has dominated European politics for more than two decades. There has been no centre-left Commission president since 2004, and the EPP has been the largest group in Parliament since 1999. The Parliament is now the institution where S&D has the greatest leverage, because it is still the second-largest group.
 
You have described the European Parliament as the Socialists’ main remaining source of leverage. Is that because the European Council is politically unbalanced, or does it simply reflect the governments that European voters elect?

D. K.: European voters keep electing centre-right governments. That is democracy. The European Council reflects the governments voters choose, although I am not sure citizens always realise how consistently that has kept the centre-right in power at EU level.

The European Parliament is more politically balanced. That is why some Socialists believe they should use their leverage: at least threaten to withdraw support unless the EPP commits to a more stable coalition agreement and stops working with the radical right. That is the argument I am hearing.

J. L.: Exactly. No parliament can function sustainably with two competing governing majorities. Yet the EPP wants to cooperate with the radical right on deregulation and migration, while depending on the pro-European majority for institutional appointments and the EU budget. That cannot work indefinitely. Sooner or later, it will lead to a serious political accident.

"No parliament can function sustainably with two competing governing majorities"

The midterm negotiations in Parliament are an opportunity to rebuild a stable majority. What matters is not just who gets which position, but whether we can agree on a political programme: investment, industrial policy, the green transition and greater sovereignty in security and digital technology. That takes resources, appropriate rules and, above all, political will.

D. K.: And the contradiction is striking. After the 2024 European elections, the EPP said it would maintain the cordon sanitaire and work with liberals and the centre-left. Yet it has increasingly joined forces with the radical right in individual votes. There is an official majority supporting von der Leyen, and an unofficial right-wing majority used to pass particular measures.

In Germany, Friedrich Merz’s CDU/CSU still refuses to govern with the AfD and instead works with the centre-left. In Brussels, the same political family cooperates with parties further to the right. I do not think the public fully understands that contradiction.

In Germany, the CDU continues to reject cooperation with the AfD, but that separation looks less secure elsewhere and even at the European level. Could the pattern we are seeing in Brussels eventually extend to a German federal government?

D. K.: Germany is increasingly the exception. Elsewhere, centre-right parties have already made arrangements with the radical right. In Sweden, the centre-right has depended on the Sweden Democrats. In Italy, Forza Italia governs with Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy. There are examples in Finland too.

Spain could face a similar choice, with the PP either governing alongside Vox or relying on its parliamentary support. Germany is not leading this trend; it is one of the holdouts.

J. L.: I agree. Cooperation with the radical right has become normal for much of the European centre-right, including in Brussels. I think it undermines the democratic consensus on which European integration was built, and it can damage traditional conservative parties themselves. Look at what happened to them in countries such as Italy and France.

But does that mean the cordon sanitaire is enough to defeat the radical right? Absolutely not. It can limit these parties’ influence over fundamental political decisions, but it does not answer why people vote for them. We need to understand the fear and insecurity they exploit, and offer protection, stability, confidence in our institutions and a credible sense of hope.

D. K.: There is an argument against the cordon sanitaire: parties permanently excluded from government can criticise everything without ever taking responsibility. The Netherlands is an interesting test. Geert Wilders’s party entered government, that government collapsed, and the party later lost support — but it did not disappear.

"Governing may expose a party’s limitations, but there is no guarantee it will weaken it"

I imagine some in Spain make a similar argument about giving Vox ministerial responsibility and letting voters see the difference between rhetoric and governing. The problem is the risk. Governing may expose a party’s limitations, but there is no guarantee it will weaken it. Wilders’s party still finished second.

J. L.: I remain in favour of the cordon sanitaire. It protects an important democratic consensus, even if it cannot be our only electoral strategy. That is another reason the Spanish election matters: it will affect both the centre-left’s voice in Europe and the balance between political forces in its institutions.
 
Let us imagine the AfD becomes Germany’s largest party at the next federal election, as some polls suggest. Even if it cannot govern alone, could its influence change Berlin’s relationship with Russia or its support for Ukraine? How realistic is that prospect?

D. K.: For now, the mainstream parties say they would keep the AfD out of government, even if it came first. Germany’s electoral system also makes an outright AfD majority extremely unlikely.

Could the CDU/CSU eventually change course and bring it into a coalition? It is conceivable. It might hope that the responsibilities of governing expose the AfD’s weaknesses. But I find it difficult to imagine the CDU handing it the Foreign or Defence Ministry, with direct responsibility for relations with Russia and support for Ukraine. Its influence would depend heavily on which role it played in government. I cannot currently see a realistic scenario with an AfD chancellor. Javi, do you agree?

J. L.: Broadly, yes. I think Germany still has sufficient institutional safeguards. The AfD is one of the most extreme parties on the European radical right. I profoundly disagree with Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, but they are not the same as the AfD.

D. K.: And Meloni is pro-Ukraine.

J. L.: Exactly. She also broadly accepts the existing EU institutional framework. An AfD-led Germany could represent something fundamentally different — even the end of the European Union as we know it.

"An AfD-led Germany could represent something fundamentally different — even the end of the European Union as we know it"

But the question that interests me most is how to prevent that situation. Germany has endured years of economic stagnation. The radical right blames migration, EU regulation, China and other external forces, but the deeper problem is that Germany’s traditional economic model no longer works.

It depended on cheap Russian energy and a particular form of globalisation. Those conditions have changed. Germany and Europe underinvested for two decades and failed to build real economic and strategic sovereignty. Addressing those structural weaknesses is more useful than endlessly speculating about the AfD.

Javi has just described the problems facing Germany’s economic model and the need for a stronger European industrial policy. Dave, France and Germany have now put forward a joint position on China. Why is Berlin’s shift significant, and how might other member states respond?

D. K.: It is a significant change for Germany. France has long supported stronger protection for European industry against Chinese competition. Germany resisted, partly because its economy is so closely integrated with China. That is why Merz’s support for the joint letter surprised Brussels. The French position was predictable; the German one was not.

There is growing concern about Europe’s economic dependence on China, although the Nordic countries and others remain sceptical about protectionist measures. But we have to be realistic. China is deeply embedded in European markets and supply chains.

The idea of an economic kill switch raises a fundamental question: if Europe cut China off from its market, how would our economy withstand the shock? I do not think that question has been adequately answered, and without an answer I am not convinced the strategy is credible.

J. L.: First, it is good news when France and Germany agree. That has not happened often enough, and the lack of agreement between Paris and Berlin has been a major problem for Europe. But leadership means bringing other member states along, not imposing a position on them.

Second, our trade imbalance with China is enormous — roughly €1 billion a day. Europe needs industrial policy again, and we need to rebuild strategic industrial capacity. After decades of minimising the public sector’s role, it is encouraging to see that debate change.

"I would not recommend opening a third geopolitical front with China"

But threatening to disconnect China from the European market is not a credible strategy in my view. We should negotiate a rebalancing that works for both sides. China has shown extraordinary imagination in responding to economic challenges, and Europe needs to be equally imaginative.

Our relationship with the United States is changing, and we need to become a stronger power to remain a credible ally. Russia is already a direct, existential threat following its invasion of Ukraine. I would not recommend opening a third geopolitical front with China.
 
The US midterm elections are another major uncertainty for Europe. Many in Brussels hope a Democratic victory would limit Donald Trump’s room for manoeuvre. Would that really change the transatlantic relationship, or might it have the opposite effect?

D. K.: I am concerned it might have the opposite effect. Even if Democrats won both chambers and took their seats, Trump could concentrate more on areas where the president enjoys considerable freedom: foreign policy and tariffs.

"Trump could concentrate more on areas where the president enjoys considerable freedom: foreign policy and tariffs"

Many people in Brussels seem to be waiting for the "good Americans" to rescue Europe. But the imperial presidency has grown for decades, particularly in foreign policy. There are ways Congress can constrain tariff policy, yet its ability to restrain the White House in some areas that matter most to Europe is limited.

So I do not see why a Democratic victory would fundamentally transform the transatlantic relationship. Europeans are looking for solutions in the wrong place.

J. L.: That is exactly the mistake we made during Trump’s first presidency. We waited for the situation in Washington to change, hoping to return to the international order we knew. It was a disastrous strategy. We lost a decade waiting for a different political outcome in Washington.

Javi, Dave is warning against waiting for US politics to solve Europe’s problems. Yet it sometimes seems that Ursula von der Leyen’s Commission is doing exactly that. How do you assess its approach?

J. L.: I would call its approach appeasement, and I am very critical of it. I recognise the Commission’s good intentions. In Brussels, we applaud Mark Carney’s speeches and almost never do what he actually does. That contradiction should make us think.

I want to turn to Ceuta as a European border. When Poland faced pressure at its eastern frontier, other EU governments spoke of solidarity and the defence of Europe’s borders. Why was the initial European reaction to the crisis in Ceuta so different?

J. L.: I think the explanation is political. Governments from the European People’s Party used the Ceuta crisis to attack Spain’s progressive government instead of defending the European general interest.
 
Are you saying that the Spanish Partido Popular used its influence within the European People’s Party to turn the Ceuta crisis into a political attack on Sánchez’s government?

J. L.: Of course. The PP is an important force within the EPP, and the crisis was exploited in an extremely partisan way. What we were witnessing was an attack on Spanish and European sovereignty, with implications for strategic autonomy and the security of the Strait of Gibraltar.

"Governments from the European People’s Party used the Ceuta crisis to attack Spain’s progressive government"

After several days, the matter reached the European Council and a more institutional response began to emerge. But the delay mattered. Episodes like this test European unity, and I believe we failed that test.

There is another factor: migration has become a toxic political issue. Fear and electoral anxiety shape the response in a way that was different a decade ago, when many Syrian refugees were reaching Greece and Italy. Both partisan confrontation and the toxicity of the migration debate played a role.

D. K.: I see two factors too. The EPP was angry about Spain’s migrant regularisation programme and tried to present the crisis as a consequence of that policy, although the evidence does not establish that link.

But Spain also complicated its position by not publicly acknowledging the possibility of a hybrid attack. Poland directly accused Belarus of deliberately putting pressure on its border. Spain did not publicly attribute what happened in Ceuta to Morocco.

There are legitimate questions. Why were so many people able to cross? Why were so many of them Moroccan nationals? But I understand the government’s reluctance to accuse Rabat: Spain depends heavily on Moroccan cooperation to manage migration, and a diplomatic confrontation would carry a high cost.

"Spain depends heavily on Moroccan cooperation to manage migration"

That caution left a political vacuum. Leaders such as Meloni advanced their own explanation, linking the crossings to Spanish migration policies. More broadly, the EU’s dependence on Morocco makes even discussing possible deliberate pressure diplomatically difficult.

In Poland’s case, the EU could openly discuss Belarus’s role. With Ceuta, Europe’s dependence on Morocco seems to make any such accusation more difficult. Could the Commission even prefer that Sánchez avoid publicly attributing the events to Rabat?

D. K.: Yes. That is consistent with what I have heard.

J. L.: I understand the point. But a state can formally attribute an operation only when it has sufficiently reliable evidence. Spanish authorities have not publicly identified who may have been behind the unusual migration flows or the activity observed on social media. There may simply not be enough evidence to make an accusation.

Spanish and European authorities also acknowledged good cooperation with Morocco in the days after the incident. The situation may be more complex than the case of Belarus and Poland.

What concerns me most is the initial lack of solidarity and the political instrumentalisation. It was a sad moment for Europe. European unity was tested, and we did not pass the test.
 
Spain is heading to the polls, and France, Poland and Italy face important elections too. Taken together, these contests could change the political balance across Europe. What kind of European Union do you imagine emerging from this electoral cycle?

J. L.: Ultimately, citizens will decide. That is the positive side of democracy: the future is not written. Europe’s future will also be decided on 29 November.

I see two possible directions. One is a Europe where conservatives and the radical right cooperate not only in parliamentary votes but in national governments. That could freeze European integration and weaken our ability to protect prosperity, democracy and our social model in a much more hostile world.

The alternative is to build a new pro-European consensus, as Sánchez is trying to do in Spain: strengthen European sovereignty, defend our social model and develop the collective power to act effectively. Individual states cannot achieve all of that alone. Europe needs strength and a common voice.

D. K.: I do not want to end on too pessimistic a note, but I don't see any scenario in which the European Union as we know it survives Marine Le Pen becoming president of France. She may have abandoned Frexit, but her project would roll back integration towards something resembling the period before Maastricht: little more than a free-trade area.

"I don't see any scenario in which the European Union as we know it survives Marine Le Pen becoming president of France"

The institutions might survive on paper, but powers would return to national capitals. That would mean abandoning the ambition of European sovereignty. Le Pen tells French voters that France can be independent on its own, but even France cannot achieve genuine strategic autonomy in isolation.

Some expect her to govern pragmatically, like Meloni. But Meloni has moderated her approach within the existing European balance of power. A Le Pen presidency would change that balance and give Meloni less incentive to accommodate the European centre. If Le Pen wins, I think it is probably game over for the European Union as we know it.

Thank you both.