Ian Shapiro (Yale): "Sánchez is not a far-left populist. He is a fairly conventional social democrat"

"He's a much better politician than most. He's very skilful." That is how Ian Shapiro describes Pedro Sánchez. Not because he sees Spain's prime minister as a particularly original political thinker. Quite the opposite: he regards Sánchez as a fairly conventional social democrat. What interests him is his ability to recognise political opportunities and act before they slip away. With Spain's general election on 29 November approaching, that assessment carries particular weight.

We meet in New Haven after a seminar at Yale University, where Shapiro has taught political science since 1984. He has spent the session explaining why he believes the international order established after the Cold War has run its course, an argument he develops in his latest book, After the Fall: From the End of History to the Crisis of Democracy, How Politicians Broke Our World. Our conversation continues over dinner at Olea, a Spanish and Mediterranean restaurant near the university.

For more than an hour, we discuss Donald Trump, the mistakes of the Western left, the rise of radical parties, immigration and the power of major technology companies. We also discuss Sánchez's decision to call an early election. The subjects vary, but the reflections of the South African-born American political scientist keep returning to one question: how well do political leaders recognise and seize the opportunities that could change the course of politics?

The opportunities missed after the Cold War

Shapiro began developing some of the ideas behind his book in 2019, when he delivered Yale's DeVane Lectures, a university course also open to the public that was subsequently made available on YouTube.

His argument is that the end of the Cold War created a period of extraordinary possibilities. The collapse of the Soviet Union offered a chance to rethink international relations, reform institutions and build a different political order. Instead, Western leaders chose to consolidate American hegemony and extend the institutions already in place. The result was a model built around economic liberalisation, globalisation and the belief that liberal democracy would eventually become the dominant form of government.

"Western leaders chose to consolidate American hegemony and extend the institutions already in place"

Little remains of that consensus. "I think we're in a situation today that is rather similar to the end of the Cold War. The neoliberal consensus has collapsed, and we still don't know what will replace it," Shapiro tells me. This time, however, the radical right has been the first to recognise the opportunities created by the new political landscape.

Donald Trump knew when to break with Republican Party orthodoxy. Other politicians, including Pat Buchanan, had advocated similar positions years earlier without managing to transform the party. For Shapiro, the difference cannot be explained by political skill alone. Luck also plays a part, and he believes the social sciences pay too little attention to it.

An idea can be politically irrelevant for decades and then suddenly move to the centre of the debate. Ideas matter, but so do the circumstances in which they emerge and the ability to recognise when the time has come to make the case for them.

Pedro Sánchez and the mistakes of social democracy

When I ask about Pedro Sánchez, Shapiro rejects the portrayal of the Spanish prime minister as a figure of the radical left. "I don't see Sánchez as a far-left populist. He's a fairly conventional centre-left social democrat," he says.

In Shapiro's view, one of Sánchez's main strengths is that he has resisted shifting to the right to win over centrist voters. For decades, much of Western social democracy did precisely that, particularly from the 1990s onwards. The strategy became known as triangulation and was employed by Bill Clinton with the advice of Dick Morris: adopting some of an opponent's positions to attract that opponent's voters.

Shapiro argues that the approach delivered electoral victories but weakened the left in the long run. "It was a good short-term tactic, but a terrible long-term strategy for the left," he says. Social democratic parties accepted much of the conservative economic framework, helping to shift the boundaries of political debate. Meanwhile, the right continued moving further away from the old consensus.

"Social democratic parties accepted much of the conservative economic framework, helping to shift the boundaries of political debate"

He uses taxation to illustrate the point. For much of the post-war period, top marginal income tax rates reached 70% or 80% in some Western countries. Today, far more modest tax proposals can face fierce opposition. For Shapiro, this shift helps explain why the left gradually lost its ability to offer a recognisable alternative, even when it continued to win elections. "You have to distinguish between tactics and strategy," he insists.

In Europe, decades of cooperation between conservatives, liberals and social democrats helped build and consolidate the European Union. But, Shapiro argues, they also made it harder for voters to see meaningful differences between the main political traditions.

He now sees a similar pattern among mainstream centre-right parties, particularly on immigration. He points to the British Conservatives, Germany's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and also Denmark's Social Democrats, who have adopted a markedly tougher stance on immigration.

"The genuinely xenophobic voters prefer the original," he says. His argument is that adopting the radical right's policies may bring an occasional electoral victory, but ultimately reinforces the ideological framework of the parties mainstream politicians are trying to defeat.

"Adopting the radical right's policies may bring an occasional electoral victory, but ultimately reinforces the ideological framework of the parties mainstream politicians are trying to defeat"

Sánchez, in Shapiro's view, has taken a different path. He has maintained a recognisable social democratic identity without adopting many of his opponents' positions. Shapiro does not see him as a revolutionary, but as a politician who understands that ideological moderation does not require abandoning one's convictions.

The early election and knowing when to act

Winning an election is of little use if you fail to make use of the power it brings. Shapiro returns to this idea several times. "You have to do two things: win an election, and then use the victory," he says.

As an example of a leader who has fallen short on the second task, he cites Keir Starmer. In his assessment, the British prime minister secured an extraordinary parliamentary majority but has failed to turn it into meaningful political change. By contrast, he sees in Sánchez and Canadian prime minister Mark Carney a greater ability to read the political situation and act accordingly. "If you have a moment, you have to seize it. It won't last forever," he says.

For Shapiro, electoral promises should not become an excuse for avoiding difficult decisions. Governing also means reassessing priorities, taking risks and recognising that political opportunities do not last indefinitely.

"Governing also means reassessing priorities, taking risks and recognising that political opportunities do not last indefinitely"

I then ask him about Spain's early general election, announced on 5 October and scheduled for 29 November. I outline the difficulties Sánchez was facing: the housing crisis, his fragile parliamentary majority, inflation and an international situation that could further damage the economic outlook.

Shapiro sees the decision as an attempt to regain the initiative before conditions become even less favourable. "I suppose he thought there wouldn't be better news between now and next year. So he might as well go now and regain the initiative," he says, before adding a qualification: "Or perhaps it's simply the least bad moment."

In politics, waiting for ideal conditions is not always an option. Leaders often have to make decisions with incomplete information, anticipate what may happen next and judge whether time is working for or against them. Shapiro believes Sánchez is particularly good at making that calculation.

"Leaders often have to make decisions with incomplete information, anticipate what may happen next and judge whether time is working for or against them"

When I raise the possibility of the PSOE winning without securing enough parliamentary support to govern, Shapiro recalls that the polls were wrong in 2023. Nor does he rule out a future comeback for Sánchez if he loses. "He probably could," he says.

This is not a forecast based on electoral data, but an assessment of Sánchez's political abilities. Shapiro is less interested in predicting the result on 29 November than in examining how the prime minister has chosen to deal with a difficult situation. For him, the election call reflects a quality not all leaders possess: knowing when to take a risk.

How immigration unites the radical right

Wealthy people seeking lower taxes, conservative business leaders and workers frustrated by the economy have found themselves in the same electoral coalition. For Shapiro, the far right has succeeded in bringing together groups with very different material interests, largely through their shared opposition to immigration.

"The easiest way to hold a coalition together is to demonise outsiders," he says.

This is what Shapiro calls zero-sum politics, rooted in the belief that any gain for one group must necessarily come at another's expense. Immigrants become a common adversary for people whose interests otherwise conflict.

"Immigrants become a common adversary for people whose interests otherwise conflict"

I point out some of the distinctive features of the Spanish case. Spain's multiple national identities make it harder to construct a homogeneous nationalism based on a single ethnic identity. The prominence of Latin American immigration also brings cultural and linguistic factors that distinguish Spain from other European countries.

Shapiro nevertheless argues that the strongest case for immigration is not necessarily a cultural one. "It's better to make the economic argument. And above all, the demographic one," he replies.

His main concern is Europe's ageing population. How will European countries sustain their pension systems, public services and economies if their working-age populations continue to shrink? In his view, failing to address the problem could intensify the struggle over resources between younger and older generations. "The alternative is class warfare between generations," he warns.

Shapiro does not overlook the challenges of integration. Pressure on housing, education and healthcare calls for public policies that can keep pace with population growth. Without adequate investment in these services, immigration may come to be seen as competition for scarce resources, a perception that plays into the far right's hands.

"Without adequate investment in these services, immigration may come to be seen as competition for scarce resources, a perception that plays into the far right's hands"

Making the case for immigration therefore means explaining its economic and demographic contribution while ensuring that public services can meet people's needs. Otherwise, pressure on resources may deepen the political divisions that radical parties exploit to broaden their support.

Big business and the new social contract

Towards the end of dinner, we turn to the power of major technology companies. How can democracies regain the ability to make decisions in the face of companies that command extraordinary economic resources?

Shapiro acknowledges the scale of the challenge, but rejects the idea that money entirely determines political outcomes. He recalls Linda McMahon's two unsuccessful campaigns for the US Senate in Connecticut, in which she spent tens of millions of dollars of her own money. He also wonders whether new technologies might ultimately open up opportunities for smaller players, much as relatively inexpensive drones have changed the balance of power in military conflicts.

He has no definitive answer as to how the power of major corporations will evolve, but he is convinced of the need to rebuild the social contract. Digital markets, he explains, tend to produce outcomes in which a handful of companies capture a disproportionate share of the profits. That is why he believes traditional antitrust measures are not enough.

"Digital markets tend to produce outcomes in which a handful of companies capture a disproportionate share of the profits"

"We can accept that they succeed, but we have to tax those profits," he argues. The revenue should fund investment in education, healthcare, housing and workforce training.

I ask how big companies can be persuaded to accept greater obligations. His answer is pragmatic: it is in their own interests. Businesses need skilled workers, stable institutions, open markets and societies with enough purchasing power to sustain demand. The rise of authoritarian and nationalist movements threatens some of those conditions.

He recalls European business leaders in the 1930s who believed they could use Hitler or Mussolini to advance their own interests. The consequences ultimately went far beyond anything they had anticipated.

In Shapiro's view, a weakened democracy eventually becomes a problem for business as well. That is why he advocates a new settlement between companies, workers and governments to share the gains from economic growth more widely and reduce material insecurity.

A chance to change course

Before we part, Shapiro tells me about his next project: a book on South Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, before the end of apartheid. It is a country he knows well. He was born there, into a family that had lived there for three generations. He left in 1972, lived in Britain and arrived in the United States in 1978, where he was able to continue his postgraduate studies.

His biography helps explain his interest in the role of historical circumstances and the choices available to individuals. This is also a central concern of After the Fall, in which he examines the decisions that took the West from the optimism that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall to the present crisis of its democracies.

For Shapiro, that outcome was not inevitable. Western leaders made decisions that helped erode trust in institutions and fuel the rise of political movements opposed to the liberal consensus. He also believes that the present moment offers new possibilities, even if the radical right has so far been more adept at seizing them than its opponents.

"Western leaders made decisions that helped erode trust in institutions and fuel the rise of political movements opposed to the liberal consensus"

What Shapiro values in Sánchez is his refusal to abandon his social democratic positions in order to compete with the right. He does not regard him as an especially original political thinker; what interests him is his ability to make decisions when circumstances demand it. Other centre-left leaders, Shapiro believes, have spent too much time fighting on terrain chosen by their opponents.

As I leave the restaurant, I find myself reflecting on something Shapiro has repeated throughout dinner: winning an election is not enough; a leader also needs to know how to use power. And to win office in the first place, a politician must recognise when a risk is worth taking.

On 29 November, we will find out whether Sánchez's electoral calculation was right. What happens next, if he manages to form a government, will depend on the second ability Shapiro has stressed throughout our conversation: making use of power while you still have it.