A new world order: "Democracy will survive as long as it proves capable of being resilient"

The world has shifted up a gear in the transformation of the international order. Given this new reality, the debate now seems to centre on how this new order will be defined, which powers will rise, which will step aside and which principles and values will prevail during this period.

There is no clear answer, but the reflections of Pol Morillas and Bruno Maçães offer some reasons for optimism from a European perspective. At the same time, they realistically identify a range of areas where uncertainty is greater and where particular attention will be required. 

Morillas, director of CIDOB, interprets the present "disruptions" —such as the war in the Middle East— as a sign that "we are still uncertain about the form the new order will take". Yet, within that uncertainty, he is clear that we must speak of a "post-Western world".

Maçães, for his part, argues from a European perspective that "the fundamental problem is nostalgia", particularly among the continent’s leaders. On the technological revolution, which both identify as one of the main accelerators of change, he notes that "it may appear that Europe is falling behind, but past technological revolutions were never limited to the technology itself". In other words, the integration of these advances into systems of governance may prove even more decisive than the development of the technologies themselves.
 
I wanted to begin with what we discussed yesterday about the new global order. When we try to understand where it is heading, where should we look? We think, of course, about China, artificial intelligence or the war in the Middle East. What is driving this new global order?

Bruno Maçães (B. M.): In some respects, it is simply a normal transition, what academics call a hegemonic transition. We know from history that hegemonic cycles exist and, although some people disagree, it seems clear to me that we are going through one.

American power is diminishing and technology is spreading across the world. In modern times, technology is a source of power, so that diffusion translates directly into changes in the distribution of power.

There are also transformations taking place within the United States. It no longer behaves like a benevolent hegemon, but rather like a deeply anxious hegemon in decline. And, of course, questions arise about Europe’s place in this future order, because Europe formed part of the existing structure and of the hegemonic system itself.

"In modern times, technology is a source of power, so that diffusion translates directly into changes in the distribution of power"

We are not simply facing a transition between Western powers, as happened in the past with Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, France, Britain and the United States. That has been the history of the past five hundred years. This is an especially important moment because, in certain respects, it represents a transition away from the West, rather than one taking place solely within it.

Pol Morillas (P. M.): Building on Bruno’s point, I think we are discussing two parallel phenomena, both of which are very important in shaping the current state of the global order and its future form.

On the one hand, we are talking about the distribution of power across all its domains: economic, technological, military and even soft power, which has been a fundamental component over recent decades and is now being eroded in many countries. The distribution of power gives us a picture of the world in which we live, but, above all, of the world we are entering.

This is where the debates emerge over whether we are heading towards a new bipolarity or whether middle powers will be equally important and help construct some form of more multipolar system. Everyone agrees that it will not be unipolar.

On the other hand, there is the question of how that distribution of power is managed. Will we continue to do so through mechanisms of cooperation that need to be reformed? The current system is not prepared for the new world we are entering or for this new distribution of power.

We need to ask whether we intend to reform the existing mechanisms of cooperation in order to manage climate change, artificial intelligence, technologies and global public goods. We must also consider what forms of cooperation we are going to build: whether we are witnessing the birth of new organisations and new forms of cooperation between regions, or even within them, and whether those regions will subsequently cooperate at the global level through an entirely new architecture of international governance.

"Will we continue to manage the distribution of power through mechanisms of cooperation that need to be reformed? The current system is not prepared for the new world we are entering"

At the present moment, with these two dimensions still open, what we see is disruption. We see it in conflicts, in the weaponisation of interdependence and in great-power rivalry. These are disruptions of the system because we are still uncertain about the form the new order will take. I think that is exactly where we are now.
Turning to Europe, I am somewhat sceptical about whether we share the same analysis. Consider, for example, Spain’s position on China, which you discussed yesterday. Faced with such different national interests, what should Europe do? How does all this fit into cooperation between new regions and centres of power?

B. M.: Europe has to accept change and even embrace it. I think the fundamental problem is nostalgia, and it is particularly acute at this moment because of a generational question.

The generation currently in power is the one that came of age in 1989. It is so deeply shaped by that moment that it finds it very difficult to think in any other way. It is a problem that will be resolved quite naturally through generational change.

We will have a generation that is less attached to the past and does not suffer as much from this nostalgia. 1989 was a beautiful moment in history, almost a miracle, but one cannot live in the past forever.

I hope there will be an embrace of the future. That means accepting that the world order is changing and that Europe must participate in that process. It must possess the power required to help shape the future, although not in a hegemonic manner, because that too would be a form of nostalgia for an imperial age. It must do so as one stakeholder among many, representing its own values.

That is another of the changes taking place. We have to accept something resembling value pluralism. China and India represent different civilisations. Europe itself is also a civilisation.

We represent values that are not universal. One would hope that the future world order will be shaped from different places and through different contributions. It will be a kind of hybrid world order.

"I hope there will be an embrace of the future. That means accepting that the world order is changing and that Europe must participate in that process"

I do not generally speak of multipolarity, but rather of hybridity or a hybrid world order, because, ultimately, there is a single order shaped from different places. I do not believe we are moving towards a fragmented order.

Order is always global, especially in the age of advanced technology. It is not possible to maintain exclusively local orders. Ultimately, there is a global system that is financial, technological and economic.

Europe has to be one of the stakeholders involved in it. It is a question of percentages: different parts of the world will contribute in different ways to shaping that future order.

P. M.: Along the same lines, I think it is essential to understand that we talk a great deal about a post-Western world, and for good reason. The United States and Europe are no longer moving in the same direction, and there are multiple actors with a great deal to say about the present and future of the global order.

The entry into this post-Western phase reflects the fact that the context has changed, both in transatlantic relations and in relation to the growing importance of other powers. But this post-Western world is not moving in a single direction, nor is it leading towards an alternative order that completely excludes the West.

"The entry into this post-Western phase reflects the fact that the context has changed, both in transatlantic relations and in relation to the growing importance of other powers"

A complete system is not emerging, with a new set of values and institutions ready to replace the previous one. That is not what is happening. What we are witnessing is the obsolescence of the Western-led order and the need for the new order to represent more accurately the role of other actors in shaping it.

It is precisely at this juncture that Europe still retains the capacity to exert influence. Since there is no fully constructed alternative order, it is up to many actors —and Europe is one of them— to help shape the future. We must accept that it will not be the same order we knew and that it will have to be more representative, more efficient and more consistent with the new distribution of power. But that does not mean Europe will be irrelevant.

This opportunity may be even greater if the United States retreats, because someone from the so-called West will have to contribute a vision for the future of the global order. That is where Europe’s window of opportunity lies.

The problem is that Europe is not always aware of these major tectonic changes or clear about what it wants to defend at this particular moment. Sometimes this is due to its internal divisions, which limit its capacity to influence the shape of the new order. At other times, it reflects its traditional dependencies on the United States. Many European countries believe that moving away from Washington leads to irrelevance, while others consider that the time has come for strategic autonomy and a stronger European role.

The main problem, therefore, lies within Europe itself. We have to ensure that our interlocutors in this new system can identify a European voice. First, we must build that voice and then understand that the new order has yet to be constructed. That is precisely our opportunity.
 
I am interested in what is going to happen to democracies. In a sense, the West was also identified with democracy, but we are moving towards a scenario in which democracy may no longer be regarded as indispensable. Do you think democracy will be questioned even more broadly in Europe, given what is happening in the United States and the rise of new centres of power?

B. M.: First of all, I think Pol has made a very important point. We live with the permanent anxiety that another world order already exists, fully constructed and ready to replace us. We project the image of an enemy waiting just outside the door to take our place, when in reality the future is open and will also be shaped by us.

That is an important idea, and it is connected to the question of democracy. We could adopt an optimistic perspective —we are sometimes too pessimistic— and argue that we are going through a process of democratisation of the global system. Power will be more widely distributed, and values will be more open to contestation, change and debate.

"We project the image of an enemy waiting just outside the door to take our place, when in reality the future is open and will also be shaped by us"

Ultimately, Fukuyama’s image of the end of history was extremely undemocratic. One may disagree: it was democratic within Western democracies, but at the level of the global system, power was supposed to remain concentrated in certain places and the shape of the system was not open to discussion, debate or change. We had supposedly reached the end of history, and both the values and the system had been defined for ever.

That is why this may also be a moment of democratisation. Democracy, of course, contains a certain ambivalence. In a democracy, we must often accept that the solution adopted will not be the one we prefer because we happen to be in the minority. Democracy is also, by its nature, somewhat unstable, precisely because the final outcome remains open.

Therefore, saying that we are entering a process of democratisation of the system also means recognising that we are going through a dangerous moment.

However, the intellectual heritage of the West —the criticism and questioning of established structures, monarchies, the clergy and hierarchies— has not disappeared. In fact, it has been embraced by India, China and the rest of the world.

That questioning is, in a sense, the source of democracy: we should not accept social and political structures as simply given or as necessarily belonging to tradition. They must remain open to criticism.

I am not pessimistic about democracy. I simply think that the structure and form of democracy we had in the West —liberal, stable and organised— will probably not be the democracy of the future.

It may resemble democracy in India, which is less liberal and may appear less stable from the outside. But one cannot necessarily conclude that it is less democratic.

P. M.: I agree that the state and quality of democracy are in crisis. All the major institutes studying the issue tell us the same thing. There is a shift towards autocracy, and democratic quality is deteriorating in many places.

At the same time, democracy is also resilient, because it is precisely about managing changes within our societies. The future of the world will depend on the ability to adapt. The problem is that this domestic adaptation is taking place amid a profound transformation of our political systems: fragmentation, polarisation, the role of social media, fake news and disinformation.

All these phenomena lead us to ask whether democracy, as a tool, is equipped to manage today’s changes. But that does not mean questioning the democratic principle. What is being questioned is the operational framework through which democracy functions.

Our political systems must demonstrate that their resilience enables them to adapt to changing conditions.

I also agree with Bruno’s criticism of the idea that democracy can simply be exported: the belief that there is a single way of practising it and that everyone else must learn to do it as we do in the West. That is precisely what is being deeply contested today.

There are alternative ways of understanding democracy. Some major powers argue that they too are democratic, but that their systems require a certain degree of guidance, and they regard that guidance as the truly important element.

There are many ways of interpreting democracy. The problem arises when we understand it as something static, both within our own societies and externally. If we accept only one conception of democracy, it will not be resilient and will ultimately collapse under the many pressures currently driving it into crisis.

In that sense, Fukuyama’s interpretation was highly static: the Western form of democracy would eventually be exported or adopted by everyone else. It is a static and linear conception.

"If we accept only one conception of democracy, it will not be resilient and will ultimately collapse"

What we are going through, however, both geopolitically and politically, is characterised by non-linearity. There are multiple ways of interpreting values, the fundamental elements of a society, the economy and the use of technology.

Everything is very fluid. Democracy will survive as long as it proves capable of being resilient and adapting to these circumstances.

To conclude, and from a European perspective, what is the strongest argument for remaining optimistic about Europe’s future?

B. M.: I think Europe still retains important advantages. It remains connected to values inherited from the past, particularly the values of the Enlightenment, which will also be important in the future.

Our societies still have a broad social consensus. Compared with others, they seem to me less fragmented, and that is an important asset. I think we are well prepared to confront these difficult times.

Consider the arrival of new technologies. At first, it may appear that Europe is falling behind, but past technological revolutions were never limited to the technology itself. They also depended on how social and economic systems changed with its arrival.

Managing that change requires democracies that function properly and are capable of responding. I believe European democracies probably work better than the American system and perhaps better than other alternatives around the world.

How will societies change in response to artificial intelligence? It will be an extremely difficult process, with major challenges, including for employment. I believe European democracies are better prepared to deal with them.

"Managing that change requires democracies that function properly and are capable of responding"

This question seems to me more important than the mere invention of new technologies. What is decisive is how they spread, how societies absorb them, how they adapt to them and how they learn to manage them. Managing a new disruptive technology is, in fact, more important than inventing it.

The United States was extraordinary at managing the arrival of electricity, for example. It did so through social, political and economic systems that now appear deeply dysfunctional in America and considerably less dysfunctional in Europe.

Ultimately, I think our politics is in better shape than politics elsewhere. That will be the determining factor in establishing which societies are most successful.

P. M.: To answer from a positive perspective as well, I think it is essential to understand contemporary European politics. There is a very strong reaction from those who defend a Europe of nations and the so-called patriots, who present an alternative model for the continent’s future.

They speak of returning powers to the national level, of placing power in the nations rather than in the European Union, of halting further integration, strengthening intergovernmentalism and even returning competences that have already been transferred. There is, therefore, an alternative model.

But I interpret this model as a reaction to many things that have gone wrong. I am referring to the economic situation, the distribution of wealth, the cost of living, recent socioeconomic crises, immigration and the idea that the world was moving in a linear direction and that there were no alternatives to the establishment or to the political centre.

The Europe of nations and patriots is, to a large extent, a response to the neglect of real problems. For me, that response represents a first step, but not the final one.

It does not mean that Europe is about to disintegrate. It means that it must recognise the existence of a new cleavage that is placing enormous pressure on many member states: the division between those who support integration and those who defend a Europe of nations and patriots.

Europe’s future can be positive if we understand that the demands emerging from many member states are calls for reform, for a new way of doing things in Europe and for a new role for Europe in the world.

"The Europe of nations and patriots is, to a large extent, a response to the neglect of real problems. For me, that response represents a first step, but not the final one"

We will need a united Europe that is resilient and capable of acting on the global stage. That is why I believe integration remains the right formula in the long term.

In the meantime, we must address the problems that have prevented that formula from succeeding, or that have led it to be viewed negatively by those who defend a Europe of nations.

The future is not written. The contest between these models is not over. In fact, it has only just begun.