The director of the Institut Montaigne: "We need to restore the link between policy decisions and their outcomes"

The Institut Montaigne occupies an unusual space in France when seen from Spain: it is a private centre, funded by companies, that works with experts, policymakers and economic actors to intervene in the design of public policy. Marie-Pierre de Bailliencourt has led it since 2022 with a very practical understanding of the job. She wants the institute to be more than a factory of reports: "I’m trying to transform a think tank into what I would call, at least in part, a do tank", she explains.

The conversation begins there, with the role that an institution of this kind can play in a country approaching a decisive presidential election. De Bailliencourt believes France is heading towards 2027 with an evident fracture between elites and citizens, eroded institutional trust and a public debate that has lost the link between decisions and consequences. Her answer is to explain public policy better: "We’re not telling people what they should choose. We’re simply explaining the consequences of each option", she says.

The dialogue then moves towards the major issues shaping that election and France’s place in Europe: semiconductors, economic security, industry, China, the United States, energy and strategic autonomy. De Bailliencourt does not put Washington and Beijing on the same footing, but she insists that Europe must learn to think in terms of power. "The United States is a crucial ally. But it is also a competitor", she argues. And on China, the diagnosis is just as clear: "France cannot effectively compete with either China or the United States on its own".
 
What do you think about the heat here in Paris over the past few weeks?

I’m always a bit skeptical when we talk about the climate. There was a cartoon circulating online showing a map of France with temperatures of around 30 degrees and a TV presenter saying: "Oh, beautiful weather in France". That was in the 1980s. Then it showed the same map, with the same temperatures, but today accompanied by heat warnings and messages about health risks. My skepticism is not about the reality of the heat or about climate change, but about the way we talk about it and shape people’s perceptions.

This time, however, the authorities were much better prepared. France went through a traumatic experience in 2003, when an exceptional heatwave caused a sharp increase in mortality among elderly people. That trauma explains much of our current approach. We have to cope with the heat, remain vigilant and educate people about what it means.

In Spain, Portugal and North Africa, people have a different relationship with the weather. France has been extremely fortunate because it has a temperate climate. We are not used to extreme heat or extreme cold. In many ways, we have been blessed: we don’t have hurricanes, we have very few earthquakes and we are not accustomed to major climatic events.

"France went through a traumatic experience in 2003, when an exceptional heatwave caused a sharp increase in mortality among elderly people"

We are learning how to deal with this. Sometimes we probably overreact a little, but the climate is evolving and we have to adapt, mitigate its effects and continue reducing emissions. Paradoxically, France is one of the leading countries on climate policy and industrial decarbonisation. That is one of the many French paradoxes: we have suffered less than many other countries and yet we are among those making the most noise about climate change. At the same time, we are acting in a positive way. We have one of the lowest carbon footprints among industrialised countries, we have been very active on ESG and CSR compliance, and we are on a better trajectory than many other countries. Even so, we constantly feel that we are not doing enough. That is the French paradox.

Let me ask you about the role of the Institut Montaigne in the French public debate.

The Institut Montaigne is a private, independent and non-partisan think tank. We receive no public funding, which is quite unusual in France. We are entirely financed through membership fees from our members, which are small, medium-sized and large companies. Those companies support Montaigne because they want to ensure that economic issues are properly reflected in public policymaking.

Twenty-five years ago, Claude Bébéar, the former chairman of AXA, believed it was a mistake to leave businesses outside the policy debate. His idea was that companies had practical knowledge that could improve public action, and that is why he founded the Institut Montaigne. Today, we are one of the leading think tanks in France and we also have a permanent presence in Brussels.

I have been leading the Institut Montaigne for the past four years, and I have deliberately oriented the organisation towards something much more operational. My conviction is that there are ideas everywhere. There are reports, conferences and publications, but very little action and very little impact. I come from industry, so I am very focused on implementation. Together with my team, we have tried to identify the critical points where intervention can genuinely make a difference.

For example, we identified semiconductors as one of the strategic vulnerabilities of the French and European economies. We realised how dependent we had become on external suppliers and concluded that this issue had to be addressed. With Mathieu Duchâtel, our Director of International Studies, we have developed what is now the leading European initiative on semiconductor resilience: the Chips Diplomacy Initiative.

The initiative maps supply chains, analyses regulatory frameworks, identifies strategic vulnerabilities and proposes concrete risk-mitigation measures. We work closely with Japan and South Korea, while coordinating at the European level with the Netherlands and ASML, as well as with France, with Italy through STMicroelectronics, with Germany and with other partners. The objective is not only to analyse problems, but to act on them.

"We realised how dependent we had become on external suppliers and concluded that the issue of semiconductors had to be addressed"

Another example concerns public health after COVID-19. Many companies are increasingly worried about the impact of mental health both on their workforce and on society more broadly. I believe Spain faces similar challenges. We studied international best practices, particularly in the United States, and designed a new approach to organising mental healthcare.

We then launched a pilot programme in the Yvelines, near Versailles, involving hospitals, doctors and patients. The results have been very encouraging: fewer relapses, lower consumption of psychotropic medication and a higher rate of return both to work and to normal life. Initially, the Institut Montaigne financed the entire pilot itself. Following those results, we asked Parliament to allocate public funding so the programme could be expanded to five departments. We still have around six months left in the pilot phase, but if the final results confirm what we have seen so far, the programme could eventually be rolled out nationwide.

"Ideas matter, but what matters even more is ensuring that they become concrete action. Companies, whether small, medium-sized or large, play an essential role in that process"

I am trying to transform a think tank into what I would call, at least in part, a do tank. Ideas matter, but what matters even more is ensuring that they become concrete action. Companies, whether small, medium-sized or large, play an essential role in that process. They tell us what they face every day: how they manage their workforce, their supply chains, regulatory burdens and strategic risks. The Institut Montaigne is therefore a place where businesses, experts and policymakers work together to identify both problems and practical solutions. That collective approach is very important to me because it gives our work a legitimacy that governments are willing to listen to.
 
France will hold presidential elections in 2027, and Spain is also expected to hold elections that year. What is the best way to engage citizens in the debate, not only about politics, but about public policy? I have the feeling that we are living through a period in which politicians talk more about politics than about policies. And I think it is increasingly important to engage citizens in discussions about public policy.

That is a very important question. I can tell you what we are trying to do. I don’t claim it is the only way, but it is the path we have chosen. We started from a simple observation: today there is a significant gap between elites and citizens. Trust in institutions has steadily eroded. I don’t know whether the situation is exactly the same in Spain, but in France there is a profound sense of mistrust.

That mistrust stems from three main factors. First, people no longer understand what is happening. The world has become too complex, it is changing too quickly and nobody has taken the time to explain it properly. Second, people no longer trust what they are told. They feel that politicians have lied to them repeatedly over the years, that they no longer listen and that, therefore, they are not credible. Third, social media has reinforced what we call confirmation bias. People are constantly exposed to information that confirms what they already believe. As a result, they are no longer challenged by opposing views and society becomes increasingly polarised and radicalised.

"The world has become too complex, it is changing too quickly and nobody has taken the time to explain it properly"

Our response is to do the opposite. We don’t tell people what they should think or what is right or wrong. We try to give them the tools to make their own decisions: well-informed decisions. And an informed decision requires understanding the consequences of the options available.

For the presidential election, we have organised our work around three pillars. The first is to explain the situation France is currently facing and, above all, how that situation affects people’s everyday lives. If we are discussing economic security, we don’t speak in abstract terms. We ask practical questions: can you still obtain antibiotics for your children? Can factories continue operating because they have access to essential components? Last year France experienced shortages of antibiotics for children and several factories had to slow down or stop production because of disruptions in global supply chains. The same applies to innovation, social protection, healthcare or any other major public policy issue. We always begin with the concrete impact on citizens’ daily lives.

The second pillar is explaining how we arrived at the current situation. This is essential because people often forget that today’s circumstances are the consequence of political decisions taken years earlier. The link between cause and effect has disappeared from public debate and our objective is to reconnect those two elements. For example, if someone says they want to retire at 62, that is perfectly legitimate. But the consequences have to be explained: what it means for pension levels, for contributions and for public finances. We’re not telling people what they should choose; we explain the consequences of each option.

We also explain the constraints we face. The French pension system is based on intergenerational solidarity. If fewer children are born while the number of retirees continues to increase, eventually the system reaches its limits. In reality, we reached that point several years ago. Today we are borrowing money simply to finance current pensions, instead of investing in future growth. That means increasing public debt to preserve the status quo, which is clearly unsustainable.

Alongside those constraints, we explain where France’s strengths lie: what assets we can build on and what opportunities we have. We also compare ourselves with other countries. How have Germany, Italy, Canada or Japan responded to similar challenges? Looking abroad often helps people understand that France is not facing unique problems.

Finally, we devote a great deal of attention to correcting misconceptions, what we call idées reçues. Many assumptions circulating in public debate simply are not supported by evidence. Whenever possible, we correct those misconceptions with facts, scientific evidence and a non-judgmental approach.

"The link between cause and effect has disappeared from public debate and our objective is to reconnect those two elements"

Only once we have done all that do we move to the second stage. At that point we say: "Now that you understand the situation, let us examine the different public policy options available". We have identified 25 major themes, including purchasing power, defence, housing, healthcare, innovation, energy and the environment. For each one, we present the different policy choices that could realistically be pursued by a future president.

Every proposal we analyse must satisfy four conditions: it has to be operational, financially credible, implementable and legally feasible. Constitutional or legislative reforms are possible, but everything must remain within the framework of the rule of law. We present the available options, without telling citizens which option they should support. We show them what is realistic.

The third pillar is different. After presenting the facts and the available options, we explain how we would approach the decision. Not because we believe people should follow us, but because every public decision involves trade-offs. We evaluate policies according to three criteria: impact, feasibility and acceptability. A policy may be economically sound, but if society rejects it completely, it becomes impossible to implement. Our objective is not to propose reforms that would provoke social unrest, but to find the right balance between impact, feasibility and public acceptance.

"A policy may be economically sound, but if society rejects it completely, it becomes impossible to implement"

For the presidential election, we will publish these analyses very widely. Ultimately, our approach is based on respect for citizens. That means making a genuine effort to explain complex issues in simple language, without technocratic jargon and without political posturing. We focus on identifying the policies that can realistically be implemented during the next presidential term and that can deliver the greatest possible impact.
 
Did you follow the same approach during the last presidential election?

No, not at all. We had never done it before. What is part of the Institut Montaigne’s tradition is our financial analysis of the programmes of presidential candidates.

The presidential election will take place in May, but candidates usually publish their programmes in January or February. When they do, we analyse them and estimate their cost. This has become one of our reference areas because political parties often do not carry out a rigorous financial assessment of their own proposals. As a result, our estimates are widely recognised as an independent benchmark for evaluating the cost and credibility of campaign promises.

"Political parties often do not carry out a rigorous financial assessment of their own proposals"

Of course, we will continue doing that work. But before assessing the financial cost of the candidates’ programmes, it is essential to ensure that the public debate is conducted properly. During the 2022 presidential election there was very little substantive debate. The context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine overshadowed much of the campaign. We believe France must consciously choose its future, and to do that citizens need to understand the different options available to them. That is what we are trying to contribute.

To maximise our reach, we work closely with television channels, newspapers, radio stations and social media platforms. Our objective is to enrich the public debate by making citizens aware of the range of choices available.

France, like Spain, does not make decisions in isolation. When people vote today, they are not voting only about France: they are also voting in a European context. And, beyond Europe, many of the forces that determine our future originate elsewhere, especially in China. To me, understanding this new international environment is becoming essential if citizens are to make informed electoral choices.

I don’t think you can present it to people in those terms. When French citizens vote in a presidential election, they believe they are electing the president of France. They do not see themselves as voting for Europe. Ironically, it is almost the opposite in European Parliament elections: many people vote there primarily to send a message to the French Government, rather than to influence European politics. It is a rather paradoxical situation.

I agree with the substance of your point. There are many external forces affecting France and, unless citizens understand them, they cannot make informed decisions. The way we have chosen to address this is to organise our work around specific public policy themes.

"There are many external forces affecting France and, unless citizens understand them, they cannot make informed decisions"

Take economic security as an example. Economic security cannot be achieved if France acts alone. Given the scale of today’s challenges and the commitments embedded in the European treaties, cooperation is inevitable. When we present public policy options to citizens, one possibility is to strengthen economic security through deeper European integration. Another option, which is also part of the political debate, is to build what some would call a national fortress.

One position holds that France cannot effectively compete with either China or the United States on its own. Only the scale of the European Union provides sufficient leverage in negotiations with major powers such as China. Another position argues exactly the opposite: its supporters believe that Europe is too slow, too divided and too ineffective. From that perspective, France should strengthen its own national resilience and become more self-sufficient.

There is also a third approach, perhaps a more pragmatic one. Rather than choosing between Europe and national sovereignty, it proposes selecting the most appropriate level of cooperation on a case-by-case basis. Depending on the issue, France could work with the European Union, with Canada, with India or with any other relevant partner. The objective is to identify which partnership best serves French interests.

We devote an entire section of our work to the relationship between France and Europe. There is growing scepticism towards the European Union in France, but that does not necessarily mean people reject the European project itself. More often, they question the way Europe currently functions. So we ask a simple question: how can France and Europe create mutual benefits? Again, we do not give a single answer. We present the different options.

"There is growing scepticism towards the European Union in France, but that does not necessarily mean people reject the European project"

The same approach applies to defence. Should it primarily be organised at the European level? Or should France rely more heavily on its own national capabilities? These are legitimate political choices. Talking about Europe in very broad, abstract terms is often ineffective. It is a conversation that appeals mainly to elites. Most people do not wake up in the morning thinking about the balance between the global, European, national and regional levels. They think about whether they feel safe, whether their company can continue operating, whether they can access healthcare or find work. Our role is not to tell them what they should believe, but to explain how all those levels of governance are interconnected and how they affect everyday life.
 
You are the director of the Institut Montaigne, which, as you explained, is funded by private companies. What are the main concerns of French businesses today?

There are several. Just yesterday we published a report on the regulatory burden, which is one of the issues companies are most concerned about. Many people complain about European regulation itself, but when we examine the issue closely, we often find that the real problem lies in the way European directives are transposed into French law. In many cases, the French implementation goes far beyond what Europe actually requires.

That is why we always try to remain evidence-based and fact-driven. We want to understand where the real problems lie. Regulation is certainly one of the main concerns. Another fundamental issue is economic security. Companies are increasingly worried about resilience, supply chains, customs duties, tariffs, the weaponisation of interdependence and the extraterritorial application of foreign laws. More broadly, they are concerned about how to remain competitive in a world that is becoming more fragmented, more confrontational and more unpredictable. That is probably their number one concern.

"Many people complain about European regulation itself, but we often find that the real problem lies in the way European directives are transposed"

The second major issue has to do with people: talent, skills and human capital. Companies are asking themselves how they should adapt to profound changes in society. That includes mental health, particularly among younger generations, new forms of management, demographic change and the impact of artificial intelligence. AI is transforming organisations and businesses are trying to understand how to adapt.

There is also the question of robotics and what we call physical AI. How can automation improve productivity while remaining socially acceptable? These are fundamental questions. Finally, there is institutional stability. Businesses need a predictable environment in which to invest: fiscal stability, regulatory stability and confidence that they can plan for the long term. I would summarise their main concerns in three blocks: economic security, adapting to technological and societal transformation, and institutional stability.

What worries French businesses most about China? And, along these lines, does France currently have a coherent policy towards China?

That depends very much on the size of the company. If you run a small business, your main concern is unfair competition. If you lead a large multinational, your concerns are very different: the weaponisation of interdependence, supply-chain vulnerability, extraterritorial legislation, intellectual property theft and market disruption.

"How can automation improve productivity while remaining socially acceptable? These are fundamental questions"

We know, for example, that China is currently stockpiling a number of strategic materials, not only for domestic use, but also because this gives it influence over global markets. Large companies operating internationally are very aware of those risks. Small companies, on the other hand, experience Chinese competition mainly through subsidised production and price distortions. They see competitors benefiting from state support that European firms do not receive. That creates a significant competitive disadvantage.

As for your second question, yes, France does have a policy towards China. There is a French policy and a European policy. France has long been one of the most advanced European countries in matters of economic security. For many years we have paid special attention to intellectual property protection and technology transfer. We are relatively advanced in those areas, although our policies remain largely defensive.

At the European level, France is one of the countries pushing hardest for a stronger response to China’s economic strategy. This Wednesday I had lunch with the French Minister for Industry and we discussed at length the distinction between "Made in Europe" and "Made with Europe". France strongly favours the first approach. Germany is more inclined towards the second. That difference reflects Germany’s much greater dependence on Chinese components and supply chains. Germany therefore finds itself in a particularly difficult position.

Interestingly, today I was invited to lunch by the Chinese Ambassador, who told me: "I’d like to discuss everything you’re currently working on". It is clear that these issues are attracting attention. France also played an important role in promoting the European Industrial Act because we believe Europe must reindustrialise.

Our main criticism is not that Europe is doing nothing, but that Europe reacts too slowly. The pace is wrong, the governance is inadequate and the scope of action remains too limited. Europe is still acting primarily in a defensive rather than an offensive manner. Its decision-making procedures are too slow to respond effectively to today’s strategic challenges. As you know, European decisions require broad political consensus, and a relatively small number of Member States can block important initiatives on industrial policy, sanctions or other strategic matters.

"Our main criticism is not that Europe is doing nothing, but that Europe reacts too slowly. The pace is wrong."

At the Institut Montaigne, we believe Europe needs a much stronger industrial strategy. We support a genuine Buy European Act and a stronger preference for products made in Europe. The objective is not to become hostile towards China, but to recognise that China pursues a long-term strategic agenda and to stop being naive. Europe also needs a strategy of its own. The difficulty, however, is that some European countries remain highly exposed to Chinese economic pressure, making it increasingly difficult to maintain a unified European position.
 
China and the United States are engaged in an increasingly intense strategic competition, and Europe finds itself in the middle. Both countries are trying to exploit divisions within Europe. How do you view the United States from the perspective of France and the Institut Montaigne? Both politically and among companies in each country.

I see the United States today much as I did three years ago, or even ten years ago. It is a crucial ally, but it is also a competitor. As we often say, countries do not have friends; they have interests. That has not changed.

"Some European countries remain highly exposed to Chinese economic pressure, making it increasingly difficult to maintain a unified European position"

What has changed is that recent developments in the United States have accelerated Europe’s awareness of our own dependencies. That is particularly true in the digital sphere, but also in defence, finance and several other strategic sectors. We have become much more conscious of how vulnerable we are to the decisions of our allies, our suppliers and our partners. That awakening is extremely important. At the Institut Montaigne, we are working to help structure a European response that reduces those vulnerabilities.

That said, I do not place China and the United States on exactly the same footing. One is a democracy and the other is not. If Europe were ultimately forced to choose between the two, my personal position is perfectly clear. Still, President Macron has chosen to define France as what he calls a balancing power, a puissance d'équilibre, positioned between China and the United States. It is an intellectually interesting position, but also an extremely difficult one to maintain. I have always been somewhat cautious about trying to play the role of arbitrator. After all, when neither side is happy with the outcome, the first instinct is often to blame, or even eliminate, the referee.

"I do not place China and the United States on exactly the same footing. One is a democracy and the other is not"

The reality is extremely complicated. We need to maintain a constructive relationship with the United States while, at the same time, seeking greater strategic autonomy. We also need to reduce our dependence on China without provoking unnecessary confrontation, because we remain economically interconnected. In many respects, Europe is in a difficult position. The positive aspect is that we are now fully aware of that reality. There is also a growing willingness, at least in some parts of Europe, to change it.

The situation is particularly complex when it comes to Germany. Germany remains heavily dependent on the United States for its security, on China for large parts of its industrial economy and, until very recently, on Russia for energy. That combination has left the country in an especially vulnerable position. Today, Germany seems increasingly focused on protecting its own national interests. It is rebuilding its own capabilities and becoming more inward-looking. In some respects, it is pursuing a more national approach than a genuinely European one. That inevitably weakens Europe’s collective response.

France, by contrast, tends to take a more strategic and longer-term view. Perhaps we are slightly less reactive, but there is still a great deal of work to do. At the Institut Montaigne, we devote significant attention to European energy policy, industrial strategy and technological sovereignty.

That brings us to energy. You know better than I do that there is an ongoing debate, especially between countries such as France and Spain, about nuclear energy and renewable energy.

The debate is often framed in the wrong way. I do not see nuclear energy and renewable energy as opposing alternatives, but as complementary. We need both. Each has its own strengths and weaknesses.

"Demand for electricity is not going to decline, but will continue to grow. Instead of arguing endlessly about which source of energy is preferable, we should recognise that Europe needs a diversified energy mix"

What is beyond dispute is that we are entering an increasingly electricity-intensive world. Demand for electricity is not going to decline, but will continue to grow. Instead of arguing endlessly about which source of energy is preferable, we should recognise that Europe needs a diversified energy mix. We also need a genuinely integrated European energy network. We must strengthen our grids, improve resilience and manage demand collectively. Those are the real priorities.

Coming back to the United States, has it become more difficult for French companies to do business there than it was in the past?

I don’t think so. Americans are, above all, very pragmatic. Business comes first. If your company is competitive, innovative and performs well, there is still plenty of room to do business in the United States. I certainly do not see French companies withdrawing from the American market. Quite the opposite.

The incentives to invest in the United States remain very attractive. Many French companies are expanding their American operations or reorganising their activities there. I do not see any significant retreat. What I do see is a much greater emphasis on risk management. Chief executives are paying more attention to geopolitical risk and reorganising their international operations accordingly. But that is different from disengagement.

More broadly, I don’t think it is in the United States’ interest to distance itself from Europe. Likewise, many American companies remain firmly committed to maintaining their presence in Europe. That relationship remains strategically important for both sides.
 
My final question is about the next presidential election. Many opinion polls suggest that the second round could be contested by candidates from the political extremes, but my question is broader. Is there still genuine political competition in France? Are there real ideological differences today between figures such as Emmanuel Macron and Jordan Bardella, or has French politics become more about personalities than projects?

Yes, there are real differences. The first thing to remember is that France operates under the institutions of the Fifth Republic, which is a rather unique political system. When people talk about the presidential election, they often focus exclusively on the election of the president. But that is only part of the picture. What really matters is how the future president will govern, and that depends just as much on the parliamentary elections as on the presidential election. If you ignore the parliamentary dimension, you miss a fundamental aspect of how political power actually works in France.

"What really matters is how the future president will govern, and that depends just as much on the parliamentary elections as on the presidential election"

The French are often portrayed as revolutionary, but in reality we are rather conservative. Whoever the next president is, Parliament will increasingly act as a counterweight. That was not necessarily the case 15 years ago. Back then it was almost taken for granted that the president would have a parliamentary majority and, therefore, would be able to govern effectively. Today the situation is very different. Even if a candidate from one of the political extremes were elected president, Parliament would provide an important institutional balance.

At this stage, nobody really knows what will happen. Everything remains open. We are currently waiting for the court’s decision regarding Marine Le Pen. The ruling is expected on 7 July and will determine whether she is eligible to run for the presidency. That decision could fundamentally reshape the campaign. If she is unable to run, the immediate question would be whether Jordan Bardella takes her place. From that moment onwards, the political landscape could change very quickly.

We are already beginning to see signs of political realignment. Just yesterday, Laurent Wauquiez, speaking on behalf of Les Républicains in Parliament and despite his own party’s internal dynamics, indicated his willingness to work with Édouard Philippe. That suggests politicians are already positioning themselves for possible new alliances.

Almost anything remains possible. Let us not forget that Emmanuel Macron entered the 2017 presidential race relatively late. He emerged as what we often call the "third man", completely transforming the campaign. Many people now speculate that another outsider could emerge towards the end of this year. It is possible.

Beyond domestic politics, we also have to consider the international context. What if France experiences an exceptionally deadly heatwave? What if there is a major terrorist attack? What if another geopolitical crisis erupts? Events of that magnitude could completely reshape the campaign.

"Ultimately, this election should not simply be about personalities or party labels. The real question is much more fundamental: what project do we want for France?"

I do not think anything has been decided. The election remains completely open. That is precisely why, at the Institut Montaigne, we are placing so much emphasis on improving the quality of the public debate. Our objective is to ensure that France discusses the issues that truly matter. Ultimately, this election should not simply be about personalities or party labels. The real question is much more fundamental: what project do we want for France?

Thank you very much.