Martes, 28 de julio de 2026
LÓPEZ PLANA'S EUROPEAN COMPASS
The 2027 elections in Spain will still be decided in 2008
Spain’s upcoming 2027 elections are being read as a duel between the PSOE and PP, but the real story isn’t so simple. To what degree are politics in Spain still following rules imposed by the 2008 financial crisis? In this edition of 'Brújula Europea', Marc López Plana, editor and director of 'Agenda Pública', explores how fragmentation, coalitions, and the rise of new forces are not exclusive to Spain but reflect a broader transformation currently running through all of Europe’s democracies.
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Sánchez and Feijóo face off in Parliament amid a full-blown clash over corruption and calls for an election.Gustavo Valiente / Europa Press
Elections don’t only change governments; sometimes, they change the country. Or, more precisely, they change the rules of competition for power. Consider the changes wrought by the Great Recession of 2008. Nearly two decades after the financial collapse that shook Europe, the economic fallout is mostly behind us. Austerity policies have been relaxed, employment has recovered, and the pandemic forced a review of certain principles that dominated Europe’s response to the financial crisis. Yet the political effects of that crisis remain fully in force.
The general elections in 2027 will again demonstrate that condition. Public debate will focus on alternation between the PP and PSOE, but it will also be worthwhile to examine the political system spawned by the crisis: parliamentary fragmentation, permanent negotiations, a weakened two-party system, and increasing difficulty in building and sustaining stable majorities.
For a number of years, upstart parties like Podemos and Ciudadanos were viewed as temporary reactions to the 2008 crisis. With the passage of time, that reading proved incomplete. Political science has long warned that the effects of major economic crises can outlast the recovery period. In Ruling the Void, author Peter Mair explained how the crisis accelerated a breakdown of political representation, deepening the distance between parties and citizens. Professor Hanspeter Kriesi of the European University Institute has contended that globalization and the financial crisis consolidated a new axis of political competition that reorganized Europe’s party systems. In Anti-System Politics: The Crisis of Market Liberalism in Rich Democracies, professor Jonathan Hopkin of the London School of Economics argued that the Great Recession opened an era of ‘anti-system’ politics, the consequences of which continue to structure electoral contests all across the continent.
In this sense, the trajectory of the PSOE has diverged from other European social democratic parties. Some historical forces like Greece’s PASOK or France’s Socialist Party were reduced to marginal positions or replaced by newcomers, while Spain’s socialists have managed to keep progressive politics at center stage. They haven’t clung to the old two-party system; instead they’ve managed to constitute an axis around which a parliamentary majority can be articulated.
Something similar is happening now at the other end of the spectrum. The Partido Popular remains the essential party of Spain’s center-right, but it has never recovered the absolute majorities enjoyed by José María Aznar and Mariano Rajoy. The emergence of Vox has structurally modified the conservative space and brought to Spain a debate being heard across most of Europe: What is the optimal relationship between traditional center-right parties and the radical right?
Again, this dilemma is not exclusive to Spain. In fact, it is a central political question all across Europe.
Italy has normalized the presence of the radical right at the head of government. In France, a second-round contest of radical left versus radical right could hand a victory to Le Pen. In the Netherlands, governments have been forming themselves around this very issue for years. In Germany, where the CDU officially serves as a protective barrier against ‘Alternative for Germany’, the surge of the far right has forced the main conservative party to constantly redefine its strategy.
Spain is part of that same debate. For too long we have interpreted politics in Spain as an anomaly marked by ‘el procés’, the motion of censure, electoral repetition – political consequences of the Great Recession. But contemporary Spain resembles other European democracies much more than it did 15 years ago. Fragmentation in Congress is no longer an exception but normal. Absolute majorities are becoming less and less likely. Governing means negotiating on a permanent basis. Medium and small parties can acquire veto power, and stability depends less on the winning party’s strength than on its ability to forge agreements.
The consequence is that Feijóo – if he gets to Moncloa – will probably have to act in exactly the same way. He won’t be able to govern like Aznar, and to do it like Rajoy won’t be easy. He’ll have to operate in a fragmented parliament, continuously negotiating for support amid the dilemma now facing practically all of Europe’s conservative parties: How does one relate to a radical right that’s no longer a temporary phenomenon but a structural actor in the political system?
Maybe that’s the real question that the 2027 elections will raise: not just who will occupy Moncloa, but which candidate is better prepared to continue managing the political cycle sparked by the Great Recession.
Major economic crises seldom end with the return of jobs and growth. Rather, their effects linger on for years in a country’s institutions and parties, and in the expectations of its citizens. The Transition shaped a political system that dominated Spain for over three decades. The Great Recession severely altered that balance, launching a very different era.
The general elections in 2027 will again demonstrate that condition. Public debate will focus on alternation between the PP and PSOE, but it will also be worthwhile to examine the political system spawned by the crisis: parliamentary fragmentation, permanent negotiations, a weakened two-party system, and increasing difficulty in building and sustaining stable majorities.
For a number of years, upstart parties like Podemos and Ciudadanos were viewed as temporary reactions to the 2008 crisis. With the passage of time, that reading proved incomplete. Political science has long warned that the effects of major economic crises can outlast the recovery period. In Ruling the Void, author Peter Mair explained how the crisis accelerated a breakdown of political representation, deepening the distance between parties and citizens. Professor Hanspeter Kriesi of the European University Institute has contended that globalization and the financial crisis consolidated a new axis of political competition that reorganized Europe’s party systems. In Anti-System Politics: The Crisis of Market Liberalism in Rich Democracies, professor Jonathan Hopkin of the London School of Economics argued that the Great Recession opened an era of ‘anti-system’ politics, the consequences of which continue to structure electoral contests all across the continent.
"The mandates of Pedro Sánchez can only be understood from that context"Albeit with its own distinct characteristics, Spain has clearly followed that European trend. The mandates of Pedro Sánchez can only be understood from that context – not because he caused the fragmentation, but because he was the first President of the Government to fully adapt to it. In many respects, he was the first Spanish leader to comprehend the new political landscape. No other Executive since the restoration of democracy was able to govern so long through simultaneous agreements with leftist, nationalist, and pro-independence factions and partners, each with very different priorities. Sánchez’s main political contribution has been more than his legislative agenda: he has shown that Spain can govern itself in a multi-party system, where negotiation is no longer an exception but the most common method of exercising power.
In this sense, the trajectory of the PSOE has diverged from other European social democratic parties. Some historical forces like Greece’s PASOK or France’s Socialist Party were reduced to marginal positions or replaced by newcomers, while Spain’s socialists have managed to keep progressive politics at center stage. They haven’t clung to the old two-party system; instead they’ve managed to constitute an axis around which a parliamentary majority can be articulated.
Something similar is happening now at the other end of the spectrum. The Partido Popular remains the essential party of Spain’s center-right, but it has never recovered the absolute majorities enjoyed by José María Aznar and Mariano Rajoy. The emergence of Vox has structurally modified the conservative space and brought to Spain a debate being heard across most of Europe: What is the optimal relationship between traditional center-right parties and the radical right?
"The color of the Executive will change, but changing the rules of the game will be much more difficult"That will likely be among the major questions of the 2027 elections. Should Alberto Núñez Feijóo reach the presidency, he’ll inherit the same political system bequeathed to Pedro Sánchez in 2018. The color of the Executive will change, but changing the rules of the game will be much more difficult. The problem of building a sufficient majority to govern will be compounded by the role that Vox decides to assume. Will that party choose to enter the government? Will it facilitate investiture by remaining outside the Council of Ministers? Will it maintain parliamentary autonomy in order to preserve its own political profile?
Again, this dilemma is not exclusive to Spain. In fact, it is a central political question all across Europe.
Italy has normalized the presence of the radical right at the head of government. In France, a second-round contest of radical left versus radical right could hand a victory to Le Pen. In the Netherlands, governments have been forming themselves around this very issue for years. In Germany, where the CDU officially serves as a protective barrier against ‘Alternative for Germany’, the surge of the far right has forced the main conservative party to constantly redefine its strategy.
Spain is part of that same debate. For too long we have interpreted politics in Spain as an anomaly marked by ‘el procés’, the motion of censure, electoral repetition – political consequences of the Great Recession. But contemporary Spain resembles other European democracies much more than it did 15 years ago. Fragmentation in Congress is no longer an exception but normal. Absolute majorities are becoming less and less likely. Governing means negotiating on a permanent basis. Medium and small parties can acquire veto power, and stability depends less on the winning party’s strength than on its ability to forge agreements.
"Stability depends less on the winning party’s strength than on its ability to forge agreements"Thus it may be convenient today to re-read the mandates of Pedro Sánchez from a less circumstantial perspective. More than fluke or a succession of tactical decisions, they represent Spain’s adaptation to a deeper change being experienced by Europe’s democracies. Sánchez didn’t invent coalition politics, but he has been the first president of Spain to effectively govern within it.
The consequence is that Feijóo – if he gets to Moncloa – will probably have to act in exactly the same way. He won’t be able to govern like Aznar, and to do it like Rajoy won’t be easy. He’ll have to operate in a fragmented parliament, continuously negotiating for support amid the dilemma now facing practically all of Europe’s conservative parties: How does one relate to a radical right that’s no longer a temporary phenomenon but a structural actor in the political system?
Maybe that’s the real question that the 2027 elections will raise: not just who will occupy Moncloa, but which candidate is better prepared to continue managing the political cycle sparked by the Great Recession.
Major economic crises seldom end with the return of jobs and growth. Rather, their effects linger on for years in a country’s institutions and parties, and in the expectations of its citizens. The Transition shaped a political system that dominated Spain for over three decades. The Great Recession severely altered that balance, launching a very different era.
"The 2027 elections will decide who governs Spain for the next few years, but they’ll also give us insight on whether the long shadow cast by 2008 still covers our democracy or whether – nearly 20 years later – a new political cycle has finally begun"The political generation of Felipe González governed a country born in 1978. Mariano Rajoy sought to manage the exhaustion of that model. Pedro Sánchez has been governing the Spain that emerged from the financial crisis. If Alberto Núñez Feijóo proves victorious, he will probably end up doing about the same. The 2027 elections will decide who governs Spain for the next few years, but they’ll also give us insight on whether the long shadow cast by 2008 still covers our democracy or whether – nearly 20 years later – a new political cycle has finally begun.
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