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Spain's roadmap against global disinformation: "The law of the jungle or the law of democracy"

Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares points out from the Munich Security Conference that "sovereignty means being free from trade coercion, from the threat of the use of force, and also achieving digital sovereignty". Jeremy Cliffe talks in depth for 'Agenda Pública' with the Spanish minister, who claims Spain's foreign policy is based on "humanist values versus an authoritarian vision of the world".

Jeremy Cliffe Jeremy Cliffe 15 de febrero de 2026
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Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares (left), alongside ECFR editorial director Jeremy Cliffe (center), and the director and editor of 'Agenda Pública', Marc López Plana. | Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Saioa Hermosa
Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares (left), alongside ECFR editorial director Jeremy Cliffe (center), and the director and editor of 'Agenda Pública', Marc López Plana. | Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Saioa Hermosa
Spain is elevating digital sovereignty to the status of geopolitical priority, says its top diplomat. In an in-depth conversation with our columnist Jeremy Cliffe at the Munich Security Conference, Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares details how the Spanish government seeks to lead the construction of a European digital market that breaks the chains of technological dependency. "If we really want to be free from coercion [...] then we require a sovereign Europe," he explains, while directly linking political to the capacity to compete economically in an environment where "you cannot manage competition without cooperation—because otherwise it just leads to a clash: the stronger imposes itself on the weaker."

The Foreign Minister considers that Spain is at the forefront of that international agenda, drawing a parallel between its leadership on Gaza and multilateralism and its role in technological regulation. As a "pivot state," it sees in its networks of connections opportunities to stimulate change, "deeply embedded in European values," and perceives accelerated political momentum in Brussels: "The consensus is advancing fairly quickly," and "things are moving very, very fast."

Albares defends "fair competition" against the law of the strongest and warns of the dangers of foreign and domestic policy dominated by simplified visions of the world, driven by opaque algorithms: "Nobody wants their children to be exposed to hate speech". The The Spanish roadmap is clear, he says: in the face of threats of institutional destruction, the response is "the law of democracy and international law," building an environment where technology serves humanism, not authoritarianism.

 

Minister Albares attends Munich to address, among other issues, the challenges of digital platforms. Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Saioa Hermosa


This year’s
Munich Security Report, Under Destruction, describes "a period of wrecking-ball politics" in which "a growing number of leaders have risen to prominence by promising to tear existing institutions down rather than reforming them". The Spanish government has recently put regulating big tech forces high on the agenda. How do you see them in the context of that destruction? Are they part of that "wrecking-ball" story?

There are two things we have to look at. The first is disinformation, and the second is dependency. For both, we really need to create a European digital market.

New technologies have allowed citizens to be better informed than ever, but at the same time there is more disinformation than ever. For a democracy to be healthy, information must be verified and real. We have to tackle that. We cannot allow interference in our democracy—our electoral processes, our voting moment. Those are moments when citizens need calm. They need to be able to reflect and make sure they make the right choice. And to make the right choice, you need real information.

"Sovereignty means being free from trade coercion, from the threat of the use of force, and also achieving digital sovereignty"
The second issue is dependency. We are very dependent on companies and forces from outside the European Union. If we really want to be free from coercion—if we want to make sure our way of life is the one we decide, and that we can say yes or no because we are sovereign—then we require a sovereign Europe. And sovereignty means being free from trade coercion, from the threat of the use of force, and also achieving digital sovereignty.

 
That’s interesting: the word "coercion" is often used with big states and foreign governments, and yet we’re talking about companies here—some of which are so big that they have larger turnover than the GDP of many countries. So they are really geopolitical actors, aren’t they? How do you see these forces in the world that are not states, but have power and can threaten countries almost as a state would?

In the technological field it’s very clear: we face monopolies. A lot of information goes through certain digital platforms, and we have to address those issues if we want citizens to be free.

Sometimes I tell people in Spain that we are so dependent on certain digital areas—on certain platforms at the European level—that citizens don’t even realize we are in the hands of a few companies. Sometimes even one single company.

Europe is about competition. Europe is about not having monopolies. So we have to prevent them, or we will become something different from what the European Union stands for.

Some of these platforms seem to lend themselves to a "strongman" mode of politics: declaratory, adversarial, simplistic. You see it in foreign policy too: leaders with an aggressive style, a simplified vision of the world, and the idea that they can get things done where more democratic or pluralistic forces cannot. Do you see a relationship between that authoritarian style in global politics and the abuses or dangers of some digital forces?

Certainly. Without these digital platforms, there couldn’t be such a wide spread of speech that, many times, is not only strongman speech but hate speech. That is very corrosive and divisive for our societies.

"Either you believe confrontation is stronger than cooperation, or you believe the opposite. It’s the law of the jungle or the law of democracy and international law"
In the end, it’s two visions of the world: either you believe confrontation is stronger than cooperation, or you believe the opposite. It’s the law of the jungle or the law of democracy and international law. Ultimately, it’s about values: do you believe in humanist values, or do you believe in authoritarian values? That’s what is at stake.

 

Albares and Cliffe assess the potential political effects of social networks on democracy. Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Saioa Hermosa


Let’s move to solutions. You’ve talked about more competition. What role can diplomacy play in all of this? And can you say more about the role of international relationships in finding solutions that put these technologies within that humanist frame?


Our foreign policy has to have clear ideas. You cannot manage multiplicity without multilateralism, and you cannot manage competition without cooperation—because otherwise it just leads to a clash: the stronger imposes itself on the weaker.

There is an entire space—the digital space—where we have to put order: in competition, from an enterprise and economic point of view; in the flow of information, to make sure it is verified and truthful; and to prevent the spread of hate speech. That is why we need rules, and we need to do it multilaterally because, of course, there are no borders there. That is how our foreign policy approaches it.
 
How does the Spanish government want to take this agenda forward internationally? It has attracted a lot of attention—including after the prime minister’s comments in Davos last year. With which partners do you see opportunities, in which formats, and with what instruments?

One of the paradoxes of today’s world is that these strong, authoritarian voices seem to be taking the lead, while those of us who share humanist values can look more isolated. The truth is: they are the ones who are isolated. We remain an overwhelming majority of countries and people around the world who believe in multilateralism, fair competition, free trade, regulation and international law.

So it’s not partners that we are lacking. What we need is to find the right framework, and to have the political will to move forward against all the noise—and sometimes against real coercion, coming from very powerful actors.

The Ibero-American Digital Charter is one of our answers. Building a European digital market is another. But the partners are there. Nobody wants foreign interference in their national elections. Nobody wants their children to be exposed to hate speech. The partners are there.

Within Europe, some digital giants have stepped up coercive pressure. There’s even been talk of sanctioning individual European officials for their role in regulation. Do you feel there is enough consensus and energy to resist this agenda at the European level? Do you sense momentum?

Certainly. There is momentum, and the consensus is building. Things are moving very, very fast. I always joke with my team: "We are in mid-February, and it feels like we are already in September."

It goes so fast that we think everything is moving slowly, but we are moving quickly. If you think about where we were a year ago here in Munich—what the mood was then and what it is today—you can see the momentum. The consensus is advancing fairly quickly.
 

Minister Albares positively assesses the European Union's progress in seeking consensus. Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Saioa Hermosa


The Commission published its "Democracy Shield" proposals on combating disinformation in November. Some experts said: "It’s good, but it doesn’t go far enough. Europe should be ready to hit back more firmly in cases of disinformation, manipulation, or interference." Does Europe need to go further—so it has not just a democracy shield, but also, so to speak, a democracy sword?

I don’t think it’s the instruments that are lacking. We have the instruments. What is missing is, sometimes, awareness that we can use them—and sometimes the will. The will to go into those spaces and confront those types of speeches.

This is a huge challenge for our democracies and for the European project. If we don’t address it, they will try to divide us and weaken us, because if they separate states, they make us more fragile. It is very corrosive for our societies.

So it isn’t even a choice. We have to do it. This is the new space where we must defend democracy and social cohesion.

To finish: this is an example of Spain setting an international agenda. It has happened also on migration, on Gaza, on European issues. I’ve written about Spain as a "pivot state", able to build relationships with many actors and bridge gaps. How does that fit with being in the vanguard and leading an agenda? Can you be ahead of the crowd and still be the one building all those networks?

We have done it, for instance, with the recognition of the State of Palestine. We have been on the front line from the very beginning in supporting Ukraine’s independence and freedom. We do it by defending multilateralism and development cooperation—and on the digital agenda as well.

In the end, Spain has a global vision of the world for many reasons: the language we speak, our history, and because we truly believe in cooperation and multilateralism. That is why we have a global foreign policy, but at the same time one with its own identity. And that identity is deeply embedded in European values and in the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Ultimately, it is the humanist values versus an authoritarian vision of the world. We believe that cooperation is always stronger than confrontation.

Thank you very much.
Jeremy Cliffe
Jeremy Cliffe
Editorial director and senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations
He is based in Berlin. Previously he was international editor of the 'New Statesman'. Before that he spent eight years at The Economist, where he served as bureau chief in Brussels and Berlin, and was first the 'Bagehot' (UK) and then 'Charlemagne' (Europe) columnist. He studied at the universities of Oxford and Harvard.
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