Miércoles, 2 de septiembre de 2026
THE INVASION OF UKRAINE
The CIA visit to Moscow: only the tip of the iceberg
Egor Kuroptev, a Russian analyst and director of the EK Strategic Communications Center, examines the current state of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from Moscow’s perspective. Following John Ratcliffe’s visit to the Kremlin, he argues that "the Kremlin's domestic logic connects directly with the risk of military escalation in Europe" and adds that the Russian government "increasingly needs the war not to end".
CIA Director John Ratcliffe, pictured in Alaska during the latest official meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin.Sergei Bulkin / Zuma Press / Europa Press
CIA Director John Ratcliffe's unannounced visit to Moscow on August 25 became news. The threat that apparently brought him there did not. According to subsequent U.S. reporting, Ratcliffe used the trip in part to warn Moscow against military action involving NATO territory. The visit matters not because it revealed a new risk, but because a scenario visible for months in Russian elite signals, propaganda, and policy choices has now entered the public diplomatic agenda.
Only a year ago, most public Western assessments treated direct Russian military escalation against Europe as a medium-term risk. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte spoke of a three-to-seven-year horizon in which Russia could become capable of attacking Alliance territory if NATO failed to strengthen its defenses. By spring 2026, that timeline had begun to compress. The risk moved from years to months, not because Russia had become stronger, but because the political logic inside Russia had become more dangerous.
At the same time, an intra-elite struggle was becoming visible between what EK Stratcom described as the "party of strategic pause" and the "party of permanent war." The first included parts of the economic and civilian establishment and figures such as Sergei Chemezov and Oleg Deripaska. Their argument was neither liberal nor humanitarian. It was pragmatic: a ceasefire or strategic pause could preserve economic and administrative stability and give the regime room to maneuver. The opposing camp, rooted in the security and political establishment, increasingly treated war not as a temporary instrument but as an organizing principle of the state.
By late summer, the balance appeared to be shifting against the advocates of a pause. The Kremlin had tested narratives that could present a ceasefire as victory, yet the subsequent trajectory pointed elsewhere: preparations for possible mobilization, deeper securitization, harsher anti-Western rhetoric, and the systematic normalization of prolonged confrontation.
This changes the central question. It is no longer simply how the Kremlin intends to end the war. It is whether Putin's regime can afford to end it.
At the same time, public demand is moving in the opposite direction. In February, a record 67 percent of Russians surveyed by the independent Levada Center said the country should move to peace negotiations; only 24 percent favored continuing military action. By July, nearly two-thirds still favored negotiations.
For the Kremlin, that is precisely the problem. Peace would expose every issue that war allows the regime to explain through an external enemy: stagnation, declining living standards, budget constraints, casualties, repression, and the absence of a convincing future. As long as war continues, the regime retains a universal explanation for almost everything that goes wrong, while the political space for repression, censorship, and other instruments of authoritarian control remains exceptionally broad.
A new cycle of political mobilization, and of coercing Russians to accept continued aggressive policy without resistance, requires a threat of a different scale. Not simply: the "special military operation" continues. But: Russia is no longer fighting Ukraine; NATO has entered the war against Russia. After a real Russian military escalation in Europe, mobilization can be reframed as defense of the homeland regardless of who initiated the new conflict, repression as a struggle against enemy collaborators, and economic hardship as the price of national survival.
The question Moscow would try to force on European governments is simple: are you really prepared to enter a major war with a nuclear power over a limited Russian military action involving a Baltic state, for example?
The information environment is already being prepared for precisely that question. In July, EK Stratcom documented a coordinated escalation in rhetoric among Kremlin officials, security figures, propagandists, and pro-war channels portraying war with Europe as increasingly inevitable. In August, Kremlin-linked foreign information manipulation and interference, or FIMI, networks in Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states were building a pre-emptive justification model: Ukraine was recast as the source of the threat, European defense preparations as preparations for aggression, and possible future Russian action as a forced response.
A year ago, that risk was mostly discussed in years. Since spring, the relevant horizon has increasingly been months.
The CIA director's visit to Moscow showed that the iceberg visible since at least April in Russian elite signals, propaganda, and domestic regime dynamics has now broken the surface of public policy.
The most dangerous mistake today is to keep looking at 2029 or 2030 while the threat is already approaching Europe's gates. Europe can no longer plan to prepare for defense at some undefined point in the future. The choice is to prepare now, or risk discovering later that the time to do so has already passed.
Only a year ago, most public Western assessments treated direct Russian military escalation against Europe as a medium-term risk. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte spoke of a three-to-seven-year horizon in which Russia could become capable of attacking Alliance territory if NATO failed to strengthen its defenses. By spring 2026, that timeline had begun to compress. The risk moved from years to months, not because Russia had become stronger, but because the political logic inside Russia had become more dangerous.
"The risk moved from years to months, not because Russia had become stronger, but because the political logic inside Russia had become more dangerous"Madrid-based, Russia-focused think tank EK Strategic Communications Center began documenting this shift at least in April. A report published on April 25 found that Russia's security bloc was not merely intensifying anti-NATO rhetoric but was openly pushing for an expansion of the war beyond Ukraine, combining accusations of imminent European aggression with concrete provocations in the Baltic region. On May 7, another report documented the next stage: Kremlin propaganda was preparing domestic opinion for possible escalation beyond Ukraine while assigning responsibility for it to the West in advance.
At the same time, an intra-elite struggle was becoming visible between what EK Stratcom described as the "party of strategic pause" and the "party of permanent war." The first included parts of the economic and civilian establishment and figures such as Sergei Chemezov and Oleg Deripaska. Their argument was neither liberal nor humanitarian. It was pragmatic: a ceasefire or strategic pause could preserve economic and administrative stability and give the regime room to maneuver. The opposing camp, rooted in the security and political establishment, increasingly treated war not as a temporary instrument but as an organizing principle of the state.
By late summer, the balance appeared to be shifting against the advocates of a pause. The Kremlin had tested narratives that could present a ceasefire as victory, yet the subsequent trajectory pointed elsewhere: preparations for possible mobilization, deeper securitization, harsher anti-Western rhetoric, and the systematic normalization of prolonged confrontation.
This changes the central question. It is no longer simply how the Kremlin intends to end the war. It is whether Putin's regime can afford to end it.
Can Putin afford to end the war?
Russia is not on the verge of economic collapse. The problem is different. The wartime economy that helped sustain employment, military production, and selected household incomes is increasingly becoming a trap. The Central Bank cut its 2026 growth forecast to 0-1 percent while keeping its key rate at 14 percent. Ukrainian strikes on refineries and other infrastructure have also made the costs of war more immediate inside Russia, contributing to fuel shortages and price pressure."The wartime economy that helped sustain employment, military production, and selected household incomes is increasingly becoming a trap"The human resource for the war is becoming more expensive as well. Contract soldiers require ever larger regional payments while the state expands the legal, digital, and administrative infrastructure that could support another mobilization. EK Stratcom's August assessment found a narrowing flow of contract recruits, rising recruitment costs, and accelerated legal preparation for a possible post-election mobilization scenario, potentially covert, while stressing that no final decision had been established.
At the same time, public demand is moving in the opposite direction. In February, a record 67 percent of Russians surveyed by the independent Levada Center said the country should move to peace negotiations; only 24 percent favored continuing military action. By July, nearly two-thirds still favored negotiations.
For the Kremlin, that is precisely the problem. Peace would expose every issue that war allows the regime to explain through an external enemy: stagnation, declining living standards, budget constraints, casualties, repression, and the absence of a convincing future. As long as war continues, the regime retains a universal explanation for almost everything that goes wrong, while the political space for repression, censorship, and other instruments of authoritarian control remains exceptionally broad.
"As long as war continues, the regime retains a universal explanation for almost everything that goes wrong"The Kremlin therefore no longer necessarily needs to win the war. It increasingly needs the war not to end. Ukraine, meanwhile, is becoming less effective at generating a fresh rally-around-the-flag effect, including across parts of the pro-war milieu. Russians show little appetite to fight themselves, while polling continues to show a sustained preference for negotiations.
A new cycle of political mobilization, and of coercing Russians to accept continued aggressive policy without resistance, requires a threat of a different scale. Not simply: the "special military operation" continues. But: Russia is no longer fighting Ukraine; NATO has entered the war against Russia. After a real Russian military escalation in Europe, mobilization can be reframed as defense of the homeland regardless of who initiated the new conflict, repression as a struggle against enemy collaborators, and economic hardship as the price of national survival.
The risk of limited escalation
This is where the Kremlin's domestic logic connects directly with the risk of military escalation in Europe. Putin does not need to believe Russia can defeat NATO. He only needs to believe that NATO will hesitate to respond adequately."Putin does not need to believe Russia can defeat NATO. He only needs to believe that NATO will hesitate to respond adequately"The most dangerous scenario is therefore not a Russian offensive toward Warsaw or Berlin, where Moscow would risk a powerful military response. It is a limited escalation that the Kremlin believes it can keep below the threshold of a full Alliance response. The goal would be to test collective defense, deepen fear and division inside Europe, and restore siege psychology at home. The Kremlin has increasingly driven itself into a position in which perpetual war is becoming a factor in the survival of Putin's regime.
The question Moscow would try to force on European governments is simple: are you really prepared to enter a major war with a nuclear power over a limited Russian military action involving a Baltic state, for example?
The information environment is already being prepared for precisely that question. In July, EK Stratcom documented a coordinated escalation in rhetoric among Kremlin officials, security figures, propagandists, and pro-war channels portraying war with Europe as increasingly inevitable. In August, Kremlin-linked foreign information manipulation and interference, or FIMI, networks in Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states were building a pre-emptive justification model: Ukraine was recast as the source of the threat, European defense preparations as preparations for aggression, and possible future Russian action as a forced response.
"In other words, audiences are being told before any potential incident why Russia should not be blamed for what happens next"In other words, audiences are being told before any potential incident why Russia should not be blamed for what happens next. Russia's hybrid war against Europe is already underway through sabotage, cyber operations, FIMI, political interference, and coercive pressure. European authorities have linked Russia to drone incursions, sabotage, cyberattacks, and other hostile activity across the continent. The question is no longer whether the Kremlin would have to start an entirely new conflict with NATO. It is when Moscow decides to turn a limited part of the confrontation that already exists into open warfare.
A year ago, that risk was mostly discussed in years. Since spring, the relevant horizon has increasingly been months.
The CIA director's visit to Moscow showed that the iceberg visible since at least April in Russian elite signals, propaganda, and domestic regime dynamics has now broken the surface of public policy.
The most dangerous mistake today is to keep looking at 2029 or 2030 while the threat is already approaching Europe's gates. Europe can no longer plan to prepare for defense at some undefined point in the future. The choice is to prepare now, or risk discovering later that the time to do so has already passed.
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Egor Kuroptev
Director del EK Strategic Communications Center
Egor Kuroptev es un exiliado ruso y defensor de los derechos humanos. Experto en defensa, contrainteligencia y análisis político, desempeña el cargo de director en el EK Strategic Communications Center.
Etiquetas
Agenda Pública in English, Rusia, defensa, Guerra Híbrida, Guerra, Ucrania, Estados Unidos, economía, Vladímir Putin Ahora en portada
1 de septiembre de 2026
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