Martes, 28 de julio de 2026
EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP IN 2025
Europe needs a new leading bloc: an E5+1 that includes Spain
Europe enters 2025 with a vital question to answer: who will lead the continent in the face of a second Trump era? Jeremy Cliffe, Editorial Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, argues the solution must come from the E5+1, a coalition of Germany, France, Poland, Italy and Spain, with external support from the UK on key issues such as security.
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Cliffe aboga por una solución que llama el E5+1.Agenda Pública / Wikimedia Commons
As a new Donald Trump presidency looms closer, so too does the question: who will lead Europe? It is not in itself new. Henry Kissinger never actually asked, "Who do I call if I want to call Europe?" But the fact that he is remembered as having done so tells us two things. First, the topic of Europe's multipolar leaderlessness is many decades old. Second, that division helps to explain why the continent has over those decades often fallen back, in practice, on American power and impetus (a reality that US administrations have at points exploited, as Kissinger did in his time).
But now the American superpower is turning its back, and – on trade, climate, technology and more – perhaps even turning hostile. So the question of who or what will steer the continent through the coming challenges becomes newly urgent.
Yet the Commission president's strength ultimately depends on national governments and her ability —and that of Antonio Costa, as the incoming European Council president— to convene and broker deals between them. Traditionally, the most pivotal have been Paris and Berlin. At various junctures in the story of the European integration, the historically resonant relationship between those two capitals –despite and sometimes thanks to their many differences– has provided a space where compromises are forged and grand deals struck that have moved the wider project forward. It has proven the value of a small grouping able to get around a table, look one another in the eyes, and break through red lines. In the time of Delors, for example, pacts between François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl paved the way to the Maastricht Treaty and the EU as we know it today. "When France and Germany get on, Europe progresses," Jacques Chirac told journalists in 2003: "When they don't get on, Europe comes to a stop.
At the time of writing, the most likely outcome in Germany is a coalition led by Friedrich Merz of the centre-right Christian Democratic Union, probably with either Scholz's Social Democrats or the Greens as his junior partner. A protégé of Wolfgang Schäuble, Merz shares his erstwhile mentor's romantic commitment to deeper integration. In 2018, he even co-authored an op-ed with the philosopher Jürgen Habermas advocating a European army, European wage policies, and a European unemployment insurance scheme.
If not France and Germany, then who? At points in the past, the United Kingdom joined them in an E3 grouping (central to the creation of the European single market). More recently, it has played a leading role in supporting Ukraine's fight against Russian aggression. But the country is also now outside the EU and its decision-making structures, a fundamental reality that British defence strengths and the (cautious) European reset initiated by the Labour government in London does not change.
A more likely candidate for an E3 today would be the so-called Weimar Triangle: France, Germany and Poland. Warsaw's remarkable economic catch-up with Western Europe combined with its growing military might (its defence spending will reach 4.7% of GDP in 2025) makes it a worthy leader among the central European states that joined the EU in the 2000s. And 2023 election win by a pro-European coalition under Donald Tusk, a respected former president of the European Council, was propitious timing indeed. Over the next six months, in which Poland holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, he will prove a valuable European interlocutor with the incoming Trump administration.
But there is a strong case for expanding this larger EU engine further by adding Italy and Spain, too, in an E5. Why? For one thing, this would add economic weight to this European core. In the 1960s, France and Germany represented about two-thirds of the GDP of what was then the European Economic Community – a weight that enabled them to forge the deals that made the project advance. Today, even adding booming Poland, they are under half of the EU's GDP. By adding Italy (the union's third economy by GDP and second-largest industrial producer after Germany) and Spain (its fourth economy and one growing much faster than the old European core), the new five-part engine would have something closer to the heft of the Franco-German one at its most effective.
Relatedly, on many of Europe's most fundamental challenges on the eve of a new Trump era, Southern Europe has a vital role to play. The continent needs to become more self-sufficient in energy and exports, and in managing challenges like climate change and migration. Italy's links with North Africa give it particular relevance there. But on all of these, Spain too is more significant than its economic weight alone would suggest: as a hub for clean energy, a comparatively successful example when it comes to integrating new migrants into an ageing society, and as a champion of closer trade relations with Brazil and other Latin American economies.
By contrast, Pedro Sánchez is much the most influential Spanish prime minister on the European stage of recent times. He has built closer relations with both France and Germany, played a significant role in vital steps forward like the NextGenerationEU fund, led an achievement-rich Spanish presidency in the second half of 2023, and has forged distinctive and well-judged policies on the Israel-Palestine crisis that have much to teach the rest of Europe.
One measure of his success is that two of his political allies, Nadia Calviño and Teresa Ribera, occupy two of the most powerful positions in the European system: president of the European Investment Bank and number two to Von der Leyen and economy supremo in the Commission. If Meloni personifies Europe's need to mitigate its potential losses from the current global political situation, Sánchez personifies the opportunities for Europe to forge a more confident course: more ambition, more investment, and ultimately more sovereignty.
This is not to say that they should overlook smaller states. They should both defer to the Commission's traditional role, today embodied by the powerful Von der Leyen, as those states' guardian. And they should seek to bind in those states as they proceed; Germany perhaps using its special relationship with the Nordics and Baltics, Poland with the other central European states, France with the Benelux, Italy with South-Eastern Europe, and Spain –an Atlantic power– with Portugal and Ireland.
In a second Trump era, this E5 could be the group to drive forward new European ambition on economic competitiveness and technological progress, to accelerate moves towards green and independent energy, to push a more integrated European defence and security vision. It could also renew Europe's efforts to diversify its trade networks, and much more. The value of the grouping was already shown when the foreign ministers of the E5 met in Warsaw on 19 November to discuss shared commitments and the significance of the American election result.
But now the American superpower is turning its back, and – on trade, climate, technology and more – perhaps even turning hostile. So the question of who or what will steer the continent through the coming challenges becomes newly urgent.
"The American superpower is turning its back, and – on trade, climate, technology and more – perhaps even turning hostile"The continent's most powerful indivdual figure is arguably Ursula von der Leyen. She is a rare European leader who came to power before the Covid-19 pandemic, still holds it now, and looks secure in it until the final part of the decade. In her hands, the role of European Commission president has become more powerful as the European Union has risen to the challenge of successive crises; a shift consolidated in the structure of the incoming college of commissioners. She is probably its most consequential incumbent since Jacques Delors.
Yet the Commission president's strength ultimately depends on national governments and her ability —and that of Antonio Costa, as the incoming European Council president— to convene and broker deals between them. Traditionally, the most pivotal have been Paris and Berlin. At various junctures in the story of the European integration, the historically resonant relationship between those two capitals –despite and sometimes thanks to their many differences– has provided a space where compromises are forged and grand deals struck that have moved the wider project forward. It has proven the value of a small grouping able to get around a table, look one another in the eyes, and break through red lines. In the time of Delors, for example, pacts between François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl paved the way to the Maastricht Treaty and the EU as we know it today. "When France and Germany get on, Europe progresses," Jacques Chirac told journalists in 2003: "When they don't get on, Europe comes to a stop.
"The French president incapable of forming a stable government and the German chancellor seemingly set to lose the federal election on February 23"Today, however, the Franco-German engine is spluttering and emitting smoke. Perhaps the last time when it was seriously credited with the ability to drive the EU forward was in 2017, when a newly elected Emmanuel Macron delivered a far-reaching speech on European reform that he hoped would move Angela Merkel to resolute joint action. But no meaningful reply to came from the chancellor. Hopes that Olaf Scholz and his centre-left German coalition from 2021 would be more cooperative have largely been dashed. Macron and Scholz have a dismal personal relationship. And today both are politically crippled: the French president incapable of forming a stable government and the German chancellor seemingly set to lose the federal election on February 23.
At the time of writing, the most likely outcome in Germany is a coalition led by Friedrich Merz of the centre-right Christian Democratic Union, probably with either Scholz's Social Democrats or the Greens as his junior partner. A protégé of Wolfgang Schäuble, Merz shares his erstwhile mentor's romantic commitment to deeper integration. In 2018, he even co-authored an op-ed with the philosopher Jürgen Habermas advocating a European army, European wage policies, and a European unemployment insurance scheme.
"A Merz chancellorship may turn out to deliver more continuity than rupture when it comes to Germany's reticent Europeanism"But any expectation that Merz will restore German leadership in the EU must be weighed against an inward-looking, sceptical mood within the country (including growing support for euro-sceptics on the right and the left). Indeed, part of his electoral strength is probably his ability to echo this mood; for example, dismissing Mario Draghi's proposals for closer EU fiscal integration. A Merz chancellorship may turn out to deliver more continuity than rupture when it comes to Germany's reticent Europeanism.
If not France and Germany, then who? At points in the past, the United Kingdom joined them in an E3 grouping (central to the creation of the European single market). More recently, it has played a leading role in supporting Ukraine's fight against Russian aggression. But the country is also now outside the EU and its decision-making structures, a fundamental reality that British defence strengths and the (cautious) European reset initiated by the Labour government in London does not change.
A more likely candidate for an E3 today would be the so-called Weimar Triangle: France, Germany and Poland. Warsaw's remarkable economic catch-up with Western Europe combined with its growing military might (its defence spending will reach 4.7% of GDP in 2025) makes it a worthy leader among the central European states that joined the EU in the 2000s. And 2023 election win by a pro-European coalition under Donald Tusk, a respected former president of the European Council, was propitious timing indeed. Over the next six months, in which Poland holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, he will prove a valuable European interlocutor with the incoming Trump administration.
But there is a strong case for expanding this larger EU engine further by adding Italy and Spain, too, in an E5. Why? For one thing, this would add economic weight to this European core. In the 1960s, France and Germany represented about two-thirds of the GDP of what was then the European Economic Community – a weight that enabled them to forge the deals that made the project advance. Today, even adding booming Poland, they are under half of the EU's GDP. By adding Italy (the union's third economy by GDP and second-largest industrial producer after Germany) and Spain (its fourth economy and one growing much faster than the old European core), the new five-part engine would have something closer to the heft of the Franco-German one at its most effective.
"Europe's long-term future will be decided just as much by its southern flank as by its eastern one"But there are also other, more strategic reasons to add the Mediterranean two. Europe's long-term future will be decided just as much by its southern flank as by its eastern one. Turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, and the demographic rise of sub-Saharan Africa beyond, may even prove more fundamental to European interests over the coming decades than the Russian threat (unlikely though it is that the latter will diminish). A Trump administration dominated by restrainers (who want to rein in US global commitments generally) and prioritisers (who want to refocus them on the contest with China in the Indo-Pacific) will likely provide little steer or support to Europe in managing that southern flank. Rome and Madrid have more experience of dealing with it than most; valuable counterpoints to eastern-oriented Warsaw.
Relatedly, on many of Europe's most fundamental challenges on the eve of a new Trump era, Southern Europe has a vital role to play. The continent needs to become more self-sufficient in energy and exports, and in managing challenges like climate change and migration. Italy's links with North Africa give it particular relevance there. But on all of these, Spain too is more significant than its economic weight alone would suggest: as a hub for clean energy, a comparatively successful example when it comes to integrating new migrants into an ageing society, and as a champion of closer trade relations with Brazil and other Latin American economies.
"Spain too is more significant than its economic weight alone would suggest"Of course, the governments of the two countries are of very different political hues and their influence in Europe takes very different forms. Giorgia Meloni lacks the influence of predecessors like Romano Prodi or Mario Draghi (reflected in the fact that she was relatively sidelined as Von der Leyen built her new European Parliament majority). But she does act as a significant interlocutor between the European mainstream and the rising hard right – and potentially with the Trump administration.
By contrast, Pedro Sánchez is much the most influential Spanish prime minister on the European stage of recent times. He has built closer relations with both France and Germany, played a significant role in vital steps forward like the NextGenerationEU fund, led an achievement-rich Spanish presidency in the second half of 2023, and has forged distinctive and well-judged policies on the Israel-Palestine crisis that have much to teach the rest of Europe.
One measure of his success is that two of his political allies, Nadia Calviño and Teresa Ribera, occupy two of the most powerful positions in the European system: president of the European Investment Bank and number two to Von der Leyen and economy supremo in the Commission. If Meloni personifies Europe's need to mitigate its potential losses from the current global political situation, Sánchez personifies the opportunities for Europe to forge a more confident course: more ambition, more investment, and ultimately more sovereignty.
"Sánchez personifies the opportunities for Europe to forge a more confident course: more ambition, more investment, and ultimately more sovereignty"The best possible steering committee for the EU in the coming years would see the E5 —Germany, France, Poland, Italy and Spain— work together to break through the divisions and find common positions that can command majorities in the European Council and the European Parliament.
This is not to say that they should overlook smaller states. They should both defer to the Commission's traditional role, today embodied by the powerful Von der Leyen, as those states' guardian. And they should seek to bind in those states as they proceed; Germany perhaps using its special relationship with the Nordics and Baltics, Poland with the other central European states, France with the Benelux, Italy with South-Eastern Europe, and Spain –an Atlantic power– with Portugal and Ireland.
In a second Trump era, this E5 could be the group to drive forward new European ambition on economic competitiveness and technological progress, to accelerate moves towards green and independent energy, to push a more integrated European defence and security vision. It could also renew Europe's efforts to diversify its trade networks, and much more. The value of the grouping was already shown when the foreign ministers of the E5 met in Warsaw on 19 November to discuss shared commitments and the significance of the American election result.
"An E5+1 with an EU core, but which includes Britain on matters of shared security relevance, would be the strongest possible leadership available to Europe in such times"But they were also joined there by an old partner: the UK, represented on a video link by foreign secretary David Lammy. On security and defence, it would be churlish for the EU to exclude Britain; one of the continent's major military powers, its second-largest supporter of Ukraine, and one of its two nuclear-armed states. Brexit means Brexit, as former prime minister Theresa May famously said. It will not be reversed in many years, possibly not in decades. But dark times call for new pragmatism. An E5+1 with an EU core, but which includes Britain on matters of shared security relevance, would be the strongest possible leadership available to Europe in such times. If the Franco-German engine is moribund, and the Weimar Triangle is insufficient, then the Warsaw hexagon is the continent's best hope.
Jeremy Cliffe
Editorial director and senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations
He is based in Berlin. Previously he was international editor of the 'New Statesman'. Before that he spent eight years at The Economist, where he served as bureau chief in Brussels and Berlin, and was first the 'Bagehot' (UK) and then 'Charlemagne' (Europe) columnist. He studied at the universities of Oxford and Harvard.
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27 de julio de 2026
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