From Detroit to Warsaw: Was NATO enlargement driven by US electoral politics?

On 22 October 1996, two weeks before the US presidential election, Bill Clinton travelled to Detroit to deliver a speech in which he announced that the first countries in Central and Eastern Europe invited to join NATO should become full members by 1999, in time for the alliance's fiftieth anniversary.

The choice of Detroit was significant. Michigan, like Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Illinois, was home to large communities of Polish Americans and Americans with roots elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. Many maintained family and cultural ties to countries that had only recently emerged from Soviet domination. For them, Poland's accession to NATO was a matter of security, but also of identity.

"For them, Poland's accession to NATO was a matter of security, but also of identity"

Clinton understood the importance of these voters. So did his Republican opponent, Bob Dole, who advocated faster NATO enlargement and criticised the president for the slow pace of the process. Both were competing for the support of communities that could prove decisive in several states. After his speech, Clinton visited the Polish Village Cafe, a restaurant serving Detroit's Polish-American community. In March 1999, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined NATO.

To what extent was one of the most consequential geopolitical decisions of the late twentieth century shaped by the need to win an American presidential election?

Ian Shapiro has little doubt that electoral considerations mattered. "Clinton wanted to win Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania," he tells me over dinner in New Haven, near Yale University, where he teaches political science. He is the author of After the Fall: From the End of History to the Crisis of Democracy, How Politicians Broke Our World, a book examining the decisions that shaped the international order after the Cold War.

In the first part of our conversation, published in Agenda Pública, we discussed Pedro Sánchez's decision to call an early election, the mistakes of social democracy and the political opportunities that leaders do not always know how to seize. NATO enlargement is another episode that Shapiro examines through this lens.

Foreign policy can win votes, too

In October 1996, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported on the electoral importance of Americans with roots in Central and Eastern Europe. These communities were particularly concentrated in a belt of states stretching from the Northeast to the Midwest. In an electoral system where the presidency is decided state by state, their votes could carry considerable weight, especially where the contest between Democrats and Republicans was close.

For Clinton, NATO enlargement offered a chance to present himself as a guarantor of the independence and security of countries formerly in the Soviet bloc. It was not a policy improvised during the campaign: his administration had formally raised the prospect of enlargement in 1994, following years of debate about NATO's future. But the approaching election provided an additional incentive to make firm commitments and communicate them to particular groups of voters.

"The approaching election provided an additional incentive to make firm commitments and communicate them to particular groups of voters"

In Detroit, Clinton argued that NATO could help stabilise Central and Eastern Europe, just as it had helped safeguard Western Europe's security after 1945. There was a strategic rationale behind his position, but the choice of venue for announcing the enlargement timetable also reflected electoral considerations.

A 2024 study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace documents the lobbying efforts of organisations representing Americans of Central European descent in favour of enlargement, as well as the importance the Clinton administration attached to their support in closely contested Midwestern states. The study notes that the White House used the re-election campaign to announce progress on a policy that was already under way.

Richard N. Haass, an American diplomat who would later become president of the Council on Foreign Relations, also identified in 1997 pressure from these communities as one of the factors behind the decision. His analysis acknowledged the strategic case for enlargement, while warning of the risks of damaging relations with Russia and undermining European security.

Electoral calculations were not the only reason for NATO's expansion. The decision enjoyed the support of the Central European governments seeking membership, much of the American political establishment and several European allies. But domestic political interests also played a part. Even major decisions about international security can be shaped by immediate electoral pressures.

Was NATO enlargement inevitable?

Shapiro takes his criticism of the decisions made in those years much further. "I would have shut down NATO in 1991, or replaced it with a pan-European security alliance," he explains. He stresses that this is not a conclusion reached with the benefit of hindsight: alternative proposals for Europe's security architecture already existed at the time.

"I would have shut down NATO in 1991, or replaced it with a pan-European security alliance"

François Mitterrand and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, among other European leaders, had advocated pan-European security arrangements that could overcome the military divisions inherited from the Cold War. In the United States, figures such as George Kennan, Brent Scowcroft and Senator Sam Nunn also questioned the wisdom of NATO enlargement and warned of its potential consequences for relations with Russia.

Shapiro asks why a military alliance created to contain a Soviet Union that no longer existed should be preserved and expanded.

In his view, the end of the Cold War presented an exceptional opportunity to reform international institutions and establish a different relationship with Moscow. Russia was going through a period of weakness, its leaders were looking for ways to cooperate with the West, and the ideological divisions of the past appeared to have lost much of their relevance.

Yet Washington interpreted the Soviet collapse as confirmation of the superiority of its own model. The United States had emerged as the dominant power and chose to extend the institutions that had organised the Western world for decades. "What strategic interest did the United States have in 1999 in bringing Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic into NATO?" Shapiro asks. In his view, there was no sufficiently compelling strategic necessity to justify the decision.

His position is controversial, particularly when seen from the countries that had lived under Soviet influence. For Poland and its neighbours, the disappearance of the Soviet Union offered no guarantee that Russia had permanently abandoned its territorial ambitions. Central Europe's history of invasion and occupation meant that American protection was seen as a safeguard against the possibility of renewed Russian expansionism.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reinforced those fears. From Warsaw, NATO enlargement can be seen as a decision that anticipated a genuine threat. Any critical assessment of that process must therefore take account of the wishes of the governments and societies that sought membership.

Shapiro does not deny that Poland had good reasons to seek such protection. What he questions is whether the American response necessarily had to involve expanding a military alliance. He believes there were other ways to provide security for Central Europe while building a cooperative relationship with Russia.

This is one of the central arguments of After the Fall. Major historical transformations are not entirely determined by economic structures, institutions or ideologies. At certain moments, political leaders have exceptional room to choose between different courses of action.

"At certain moments, political leaders have exceptional room to choose between different courses of action"

In the 1990s, the West could have built different security institutions and established a different relationship with Russia. NATO enlargement resulted from decisions shaped by strategic interests, international commitments, diplomatic pressure and the electoral incentives facing American leaders.

From Clinton to Trump: Europe's dilemma

Thirty years after Clinton's Detroit speech, Donald Trump has once again placed America's commitment to European security at the centre of political debate. I ask Shapiro how he understands the differences between the two presidents and their respective views of America's role in the world.

Clinton believed that the Cold War had left his country with the power to organise the international system around its own institutions and priorities. His foreign policy reflected an internationalist outlook in which Washington was expected to lead the Western world. NATO enlargement was part of that project.

Trump, by contrast, approaches international relations from a much more nationalist and transactional perspective. His willingness to question longstanding commitments to European allies has cast doubt on some of the foundations of the order built after 1989.

In 1996, an American president was advocating NATO enlargement both as a security guarantee for Europe and a means of consolidating US leadership. Three decades later, another repeatedly questions America's obligations to defend its allies.

Europeans, meanwhile, depend on decisions made by leaders they cannot vote for. I put this democratic contradiction to Shapiro because I believe it is particularly important to understanding the limits of European sovereignty. The security of Poland, Germany and Spain is affected by the outcome of American presidential elections in which their citizens have no say.

"The security of Poland, Germany and Spain is affected by the outcome of American presidential elections in which their citizens have no say"

In 1996, Polish-American voters in Michigan could influence the decision to bring Poland into NATO. Those living in Warsaw, who would be directly affected by that decision, could not vote for the American president.

This dependence does not absolve European governments of responsibility, nor does it undermine the legitimacy of decisions taken in Washington. But it reveals how far the domestic priorities of a major power can determine other countries' security. Even when a presidential election is decided by a narrow margin in a handful of states, its consequences can reach far beyond America's borders.

The risks of a nationalist Europe

I ask what might happen if Europe's major countries were to come under nationalist governments. We discuss a possible victory for the French far right, the rise of Alternative for Germany, Giorgia Meloni's government in Italy and the prospect of a coalition between the People's Party (PP) and Vox in Spain.

His answer is unsettling: "I think it would enormously increase the chances of war in Europe, including wars between Europeans."

Shapiro fears that some nationalist governments might turn to confrontation abroad if their economic programmes fail to meet voters' expectations. The use of a common enemy to mobilise support against immigration or domestic political opponents could eventually spill over into relations between states.

"The use of a common enemy to mobilise support against immigration or domestic political opponents could eventually spill over into relations between states"

The hypothesis is open to debate. Nationalist governments do not all share the same foreign policy positions, and their ideology alone does not mean they will necessarily provoke armed conflict. Nor does Shapiro present this outcome as inevitable. His warning concerns the risks of a political outlook that treats relations between groups and countries as a competition in which one side can gain only at another's expense.

The problem would be particularly serious in a Europe whose security depends on agreements between governments with different interests. Treaties and international institutions provide mechanisms for cooperation, but their effectiveness also depends on the political coalitions that come to power and the decisions their leaders make.

Europe could find itself with governments increasingly unwilling to cooperate with one another, just as Washington is redefining its international priorities. That combination would make it considerably harder for Europe to respond to external threats.

The election that helped reshape European security

Clinton's visit to the Polish Village Cafe illustrates the connections between domestic politics and international relations. The American president met Polish-American voters after announcing a decision of profound importance for European security, in the middle of his re-election campaign.

Clinton did not go to Detroit simply to win votes. His administration had a strategic vision for Europe, shared by many Western leaders and supported by the Central European governments seeking NATO membership. Enlargement answered security concerns that cannot be reduced to the interests of an American presidential campaign.

"Enlargement answered security concerns that cannot be reduced to the interests of an American presidential campaign"

But that international strategy also had electoral appeal. The commitment to admit new members was announced to a particularly receptive audience, with barely two weeks to go before the election.

Shapiro believes that the end of the Cold War offered opportunities Western leaders failed to seize. It is possible to disagree with his proposal to dissolve NATO or his assessment of the merits of enlargement, particularly in light of Russia's subsequent invasion of Ukraine. Yet his analysis demands that we consider both the strategic arguments behind the decisions of that period and the interests of those who made them.

On 22 October 1996, Clinton announced in Detroit a commitment that would help transform European security. The Polish Americans listening to his speech could vote in the presidential election on 5 November. The citizens of Poland, who had been seeking NATO membership for years, could not.

Thirty years later, Europe still relies to a considerable extent on decisions made in Washington to guarantee its security. And those decisions may be shaped by the electoral interests of leaders Europeans have no vote in electing.