Martes, 28 de julio de 2026
CONVERSATIONS
"The time for the sanitary cordon to the ultra-right in Spain has passed"
The normalization of the extreme right and its impact on liberal democracy are key issues in this conversation between expert Cas Mudde and Juan Rodríguez Teruel at the CCCB in Barcelona. They also discuss the possible impact of the entry of Vox in the government after the July elections.
Cas Mudde and Juan Rodríguez Teruel talk at the CCCB in Barcelona.AGENDA PÚBLICA
Cass Mudde, one of the main international voices in the study of populist and radical right movements, talks with the professor Juan Rodríguez Teruel on the ideological and political transformations of these parties in contemporary democracies. This exchange, which has been possible thanks to the Barcelona Contemporary Culture Center, offers us a deep look at the tensions between liberal democracy and the forces that challenge its normative principles.
Almost 20 years ago, you published that we were living a Zeitgeist populist. Are we still living in a radical right Zeitgeist today?
I think not. I think the radical right was most powerful in 2015-2017, before COVID and now the war in Ukraine really broke it. The acceptance and pervasiveness of the far right remained the same, but the dominance of its themes and frameworks declined because we simply talked about it less.
The acceptance and generalization of the far right remained the same, but the dominance of its themes and frameworks decreased because we simply talked about it lessBut what you see is that once we talk about immigration, we talk of it in the frameworks of the extreme right. But in 2015-17, all we talked about was far-right issues in the frameworks of the far-right and increasingly with the far-right. Today I believe that transversality is stronger than ever.
On the other hand, I think the Zeitgeist has moved a bit away from the radical right. I would say that he has even moved away from populism a bit. Both COVID and Russia have made us look at the State again, they have made us look at the experts. And although we have a very vocal minority that opposes it, which is amplified by the media, what the studies actually show is that trust in experts, trust even in teachers, trust in the media in many countries, has increased.
"For a growing number of people, these are normal parties. They relate to the radical right, just as they relate to the social democrats or the greens"At the moment, confidence in the army is rising , another traditional institution of the State. But perhaps this shows that the far right does not depend on immigration. The extreme right is already part of our political system. For a growing number of people, these are normal matches. They relate to the radical right, just as they relate to the social democrats or the greens. But it is no longer the party that sets the agenda.
Thinking in the terms of the public debate in Spain and in Spanish, I would like you to clarify a little the distinction between the concepts of far right, extreme right and radical right.
This has actually been a big problem with most of my translations, not just Spanish. The term far right It has no real equivalence in many Latin languages, not even in Dutch or German. For example, the term ultra (used for some of the translations), which in many ways works better, has a specific connotation. In Italy, in particular, with violence in football and with neo-Nazis. In many languages, Far It doesn't work the same way.
"The 'far right' is the extreme right plus the radical right. They are two different concepts"That is why, at the beginning, all my translators wanted to translate far by extreme. But what I want to say is that the far right It is the extreme right plus the radical right. They are two different concepts: the extreme right is fundamentally antidemocratic, which means that they are against popular sovereignty and majority rule. They do not believe that the people should elect their own leaders. And better if one thinks about fascism, or, here, Francoism. Most of the far right is undemocratic because they are elitist. Not only do they think that one nation is superior to the other, but they think that within the nation, some people are superior to others. Hitler was a superior German, and if you believe that, then democracy is meaningless. And as Hitler himself said, democracy is mediocracia. It means that the mediocre rules.
Now, elitism, although it still exists, of course, is not very fashionable. In today's world, where democracy is hegemonic, even groups that have a problematic relationship with democracy claim to be democratic. The radical right claims to be democratic, believing in populist sovereignty and majority rule.
The radical right claims to be democratic, believing in populist sovereignty and majority ruleBut it has problems with central elements of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy is the system we live in and often refer to as democracy, but in reality it is much more than that. It combines popular sovereignty and majority rule with the rights of minorities, with the rule of law, with the separation of powers, with the independence of the media and the judiciary. The far right has problems with these things, particularly minority rights, the independence of the judiciary, the media, etc.
I agree that the terminology is very contextual and that its use is related to connections to fascism. When a party is called "fascist," it can easily distance itself by pointing out that it does not meet some key aspect of that definition. For example, if it declares: "We do not want to murder six million Jews" and actually does not do so, that party no longer fits the label of "fascist." From that moment on, he not only stops being fascist according to that logic, but he also seems less problematic.
The use of such loaded terms with such a high bar is strategically problematic. The far right can simply respond, "They're just smearing us," and if they have a concrete case to prove it, they will continually exploit it. For example: "Remember when they called us fascists? Now they call us anti-immigrants." This creates a dynamic in which part of the electorate perceives these accusations as unjustified attacks.
I have always had problems with the use of the term fascism, because it is more restrictive than other concepts, and I consider it the ultimate sin. I come from the Netherlands, from a generation shaped by the memory of the Second World War, and for me, fascism was an exceptionally evil system. Using this term broadly trivializes their crimes and is an affront to the victims of the regime. Plus, it's an incredibly high bar. For a long time, far-right parties have had an easy time getting around this: they have only had to demonstrate that they are not undemocratic, that they are not anti-Semitic, or that they do not seek to physically eliminate their opponents.
When the debate focuses on these extreme standards, other worrying behaviors are relativized. For example, if you say, "They don't want genocide, but they do want to expel people from the country," that stance seems less alarming by comparison. Thus, setting such a high bar ends up reducing the impact of legitimate complaints.
This does not mean that there are no parallels with fascism in figures like Bolsonaro or even Trump, especially in their rhetoric, mass events and promotion of violence. However, in parties like Vox, the problem is different. What can be noted is his notable tolerance towards the former authoritarian regime, which may be an indication of his ambivalence towards democratic values.
Still, I think strategically it's not the best way to approach it. Beyond his position on figures like Franco, what really matters is his vision of pluralism and marginalized groups. It is that stance that makes them problematic for liberal democracy.
Another clarification I would like to make is about populism, because you are one of the main references, and most of your initial research helped clarify the concept of populism. To what extent should we distinguish between populism and this new radical right? That is, are there non-populist radical right parties? How does populism help us understand this evolution of the right?
First, a hobby. I studied the radical right before populism. I do not consider myself a student of populism. in my book Populist radical right parties in Europe, I used the term populist radical right instead of the then more common term, which was radical right populism. Radical right-wing populism puts populism first and says that we are dealing with a radical right version of populism. While my argument is that the radical right is central and that we are facing a populist version of the radical right.
"Populism is not going to be so important in Vox, but nativism and authoritarianism remain the core"As I maintain in this book, Nativism is the founding concept, and we are facing a populist version of nativism. I think populism was very crucial for the radical right since the 1980s. I think it is losing importance today. It is a logical consequence of mainstreaming.
When you're outside the system, you can put it all together and make it elite. But if a significant part of the elite is happy to collaborate with you, if not the entire elite, as was the case in Denmark, then why are you going to be a populist? And you see that populism is not, I think, that important in the Swedish Democrats, it's not that important in Maloney, I guess. It will not be as important in Vox, but nativism and authoritarianism remain at the core.
I agree with you that Vox does not like the label of a populist party, as is usually done in comparative studies. Turning to the causes of the rise of radical right parties, you have often mentioned the historical impact of what happened after 9/11 in 2001 in the United States and how this opened a new time for nativism and Islamophobic tendencies. But you have also pointed out the problems of liberal democracy as a central driver of the evolution of the right.
It is important to recognize that the extreme right is a complex phenomenon, with multiple causes that vary depending on the context of each country. However, most discourses do not do justice to this complexity.
In the 1990s, there was a convergence in socioeconomic policy between the left and the right, making it difficult for parties to differentiate themselves in that area. At the same time, there was unease regarding multiculturalism and immigration, although a normative taboo on these issues still prevailed.
9/11 broke this taboo and allowed an Islamophobic discourse to emerge, no longer based on ethnic nationalism ("they are not like us"), but on a supposed defense of values such as liberal democracy, gender equality or security. .
On the other hand, liberal democracy, as a system, faces inherent tensions between majority rule and minority rights. There is no objective balance that determines how much power should be given to each principle, and this conflict generates decisions that can lean one way or the other.
"Populism has exploited this tension by promoting a majoritarianism that goes against the foundations of liberal democracy"Populism has exploited this tension by promoting a majoritarianism that goes against the foundations of liberal democracy. In this system, even if 90% of the population wanted to restrict the rights of the other 10%, it should not be possible to do so. However, this idea appears to have been diluted in public discourse, where minority protections are increasingly perceived as privileges, eroding the ideological pillars of liberal democracy.
Furthermore, we live in an ideological vacuum where the foundations of our system, such as neoliberalism, multiculturalism or European integration, have been declared failed, but we continue to function under them.
The Great Recession showed that neoliberalism was not a perfect system. Leaders like Sarkozy, Cameron and Rutte recognized this, but did not present alternatives. The same goes for multiculturalism and European integration: they are openly criticized, but not replaced.
"Macron has been elected twice with the vote against Le Pen, but his successor will probably not have the same luck"This vacuum generates disaffection. On the one hand, the far right offers an alternative. On the other hand, the rest of the parties adopt a defensive posture: "There is no alternative" and ask for the vote as a barrier against the threat. This strategy may work once or twice, but it does not solve the underlying problems or mobilize in the long term.
France is an extreme example: Macron has twice been elected against Le Pen, but his successor is unlikely to be so lucky. If no one proposes an alternative narrative within the framework of liberal democracy, this system will become increasingly weakened.
This reminds us of the strategy of cordon sanitaire. Is it still valid? In Spain, left-wing political leaders insist a lot on it.
There have been few sanitary cords in the story, and they usually work only at the beginning. In Spain, that opportunity has already passed. Vox quickly became normal: just a month after its first regional elections, the PP was willing to talk to them. Now, how could the PP justify a change of position? Saying "we were wrong" is unlikely, especially if the leadership remains the same, and Vox has not changed substantially since then.
Furthermore, the left demands the cordon sanitaire because, if the PP cannot govern with Vox, the left ensures power. But from the right, the counterargument is clear: "You governed with the communists, why can't I do it with the radical right?" If he cordon sanitaire was based on principles of liberal democracy, then it would not be possible to collaborate with the communists either. And if the argument is that the latter accept democratic rules, the same could be said of Vox, at least within certain limits.
On the other hand, the elections called by Sánchez with the message of "only I can prevent Vox from becoming empowered" have further complicated the debate. Sánchez has already assumed that the PP will work with Vox, which leaves the PP with two options: admit it or ask for enough votes to not depend on them. But, to get that support, the PP must occupy part of Vox's political space, because otherwise it would lose those who are between both parties.
The cordon sanitaire, therefore, is ruled out, both in terms of ideas and coalitions.
As for voters, there are different groups. Some will never return to the PP, mainly because of their rejection of corruption; For them, it is not an ideological issue, but an institutional one. This is a key vote for Vox, especially among young people. However, other more dissatisfied voters could support the PP if they believe that Vox weakens the possibility of a right-wing government. These are the voters that the PP should try to attract, but it will depend on how the electoral context is presented.
It seems that this mechanism was a very important part of the story in the 2019 elections, where Vox benefited from a group of voters who thought that at that time the PP had no chance of governing. So they supported Vox just to express their protest and disaffection. This set of voters could easily lean towards the PP again. In more general terms, it could show the nature behind this rise of the radical right, understood as a kind of corrective or counterweight to the pitfalls of liberal democracy, related to technocratic elitism or the government of radical left populist parties. , when they did not meet the expectations of their voters.
This reaction is very specific to Spain and Greece. In most European countries, the radical left is irrelevant. For a long time, the far right was said to be asking the right questions, but giving the wrong answers. This had some truth: it addressed issues such as immigration or European integration, which were important to a minority but were outside the political debate. However, today those issues are already on the agenda, so that corrective role no longer applies.
That said, in some countries, the radical right has managed to return certain sectors of the population to the political sphere, making them feel represented, which is positive. An undervalued aspect of their integration into politics is that it does not always imply their growth. For example, in the French presidential elections, Marine Le Pen did not do well in the first round, but improved considerably in the second, even surpassing her father in 2002. This suggests that her most loyal followers voted in the first round, while which in the second attracted people who are not related to the extreme right, but see it as an acceptable option in the absence of preferred alternatives.
The same thing happened in Austria in 2016, when a significant part of the conservative electorate preferred the leader of the radical right over a moderate green politician. This reflects a normalization of the extreme right: although they are not the first option, they become a viable alternative.
Something similar happens in Spain. There are voters who are not fervent followers of Vox, but see it as a strategic vote against the PP. This group is different from the ideological supporters of Vox, who operate outside the logic of liberal democracy. Strategic voters, on the other hand, do not see Vox as a threat and are easier to convince that this vote may not be the best long-term decision.
That could be a threat to liberal democracy or, on the contrary, it could be proof of their resistance, that liberal democracy has finally forced them to adapt. In this sense, Peter Mair, his thesis director and one of the most influential European political scientists, argued that European party systems had become cartelized in the 1990s. Do you think that these parties have contributed to breaking that cartelization?
I don't believe it. Rather, I think they have become part of the cartel. In most cases, these parties do not seek to fundamentally change the system. For example, the FPÖ, which was the first to openly position itself against the cartel, ended up consolidating itself as a third pillar instead of dismantling the system. The same thing happens with the Danish People's Party or Meloni in Italy: they do not transform the system, but they do not strengthen it either. In some cases, they even weaken it, such as with widespread corruption, which can lead to a kleptocracy.
"The normalization of the extreme right is not positive for liberal democracy. Even if they adapt to the system and do not change it immediately, their long-term objective may be to alter its foundations"The normalization of the extreme right is not positive for liberal democracy. Even if they adapt to the system and do not change it immediately, their long-term goal may be to alter its foundations: restrict minority rights, weaken judicial independence, or limit press freedom. Its monistic vision of the world conceives elites as illegitimate and only recognizes a homogeneous nation as legitimate, relegating the rest to second-class citizenship. Therefore, although they are integrated into traditional politics, it is important not to confuse them with conservative parties. Its ideological basis is outside the normative and legal principles of liberal democracy.
What is your assessment of Giorgia Meloni's first six months in Italy?
Meloni is an intelligent and typical leader of the far right, operating from within the system. It follows the PiS line in foreign policy and has learned to move in a geopolitical context dominated by opposition to Putin. Its firm support for Ukraine and its caution with the EU respond both to a strategy of alignment with the United States and to the need for European financing.
"With Italy on the verge of bankruptcy and war in Ukraine a priority, Meloni has already introduced ideas against what he calls gender ideology"However, his appointments include openly fascist figures, and he has promoted laws and speeches that are worrying for journalists, minorities and institutional independence. Although it has not yet surpassed the limits of liberal democracy, it is straining them. Many of its changes are symbolic, but significant, such as the law that requires the exclusive use of the masculine in State communications. Although it may seem minor, it fits into a broader agenda against gender equality and LGBTQI rights, linked to opposition to the so-called "gender ideology."
In six months, with Italy on the verge of bankruptcy and war in Ukraine as a priority, it has already introduced these symbolic measures. This indicates that, beyond the immediate emergencies, there is a clear ideological agenda that must be followed carefully.
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27 de julio de 2026
27 de julio de 2026
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