The Red Sea Crisis and Its Implications for Spain’s Participation in International Missions

On 18 December 2023, Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin proposed the creation of a Red Sea mission. Its aim is to ensure freedom of navigation in the face of increasing attacks by Houthi forces on ships, in theory identified with Israel, but in practice affecting ships from other sources, generating enormous concern in light of the importance of this trade route for the economy and global stability and security.

Subsequently, a striking situation arose in which Spain formulated its refusal to participate, incurring in a series of contradictions. Initially, Spain made its willingness to participate in this mission conditional on the creation of a mission distinct from Atalanta by the European Union or NATO. After the uproar, and in a context in which the EU was in favour of the creation of a mission linked to the Red Sea, Spain expressed its refusal to participate on the grounds of its commitment to peace and the large number of missions that Spain already faces with limited resources. Behind the scenes, domestic political issues and the lack of support from government partners were also mentioned.

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Indeed, this crisis exposes some of the major shortcomings of our foreign and defence policy. Elements such as legalism, the lack of transparency in our decision-making process, the scarcity of resources, as well as the enormous aversion to risk, are publicly exposed.

But it also opens a debate on Spain’s participation in missions and the reasons behind it.

According to the Ministry of Defence’s own website, Spain participates in 17 international missions, in which up to 3,000 soldiers and civil guards take part. The scenarios are enormously varied, as are the functions to be performed. Among them are air policing duties in Bulgaria and Romania and in the Baltic States, the European Union mission in Mali, the United Nations mission in Lebanon and the mission to verify the Peace Agreement in Colombia.

Spain has traditionally boasted of its participation in such missions, highlighting its solidarity with allies and its contribution to international peacekeeping. They have also been used politically as a token of Spain’s contribution to the security of our allies, compensating for much more modest figures in terms of our own defence spending.

Paradoxically, while other allies prioritised their own interests, increasing defence spending on interests considered key to them, Spain’s contribution has been directed towards an apparent show of solidarity that has not always had the expected returns. In terms of our position in NATO, participation in missions did not compensate for the scarce resources invested, and some allied states, consumers of security rather than suppliers, have even publicly reproached our scant commitment to the NATO rule. And all this in a scenario where the challenges to national security in our priority geographic theatres have not only not disappeared but are tending to increase.



In view of the Red Sea crisis and the implications it has generated, perhaps the time has come to consider some kind of mechanism to link Spain’s national security interests with the development of international missions in which the Spanish army participates. A kind of cost-benefit calculation that, at a time of scarce resources, would allow strategic priorities to be established. Not of a merely economic nature, where material elements related to the direct implications for our national security, their importance for vital relations that are key to our security, such as the one we have with the United States, or the geographical area in which they are carried out, are evaluated. Also, the development of certain, rather than merely hopeful, counter-performances in geographic scenarios of key interest to us.

This logically does not exclude the political calculation of image for those cases that do not require a large investment. Nor does it deny the value that these have had in historical moments of adaptations to change for our armed forces or even their usefulness in times of scarce resources in a context of economic crisis.

Notwithstanding, it would be interesting to review our presence in missions according to these parameters in order to establish some kind of objective criteria of a political, and not just legal or economic, nature for our participation.

In an interview with El País, the prime minister argues that it is our high level of participation in missions, with 3,000 soldiers stationed abroad, that prevents Spain from participating in the Red Sea mission. But probably, and with the argument of “room for manoeuvre” ruled out by the European Union’s recent request to establish a mission, other concerns related to domestic politics or risk aversion in conflict scenarios will probably play a greater role.

If it is for this reason, and following the case of the Red Sea, the implications derived from the importance of maintaining a key trade route for the stability of the international economy and, of course, for our economy, or its importance in the framework of a bilateral relationship with the United States, which has already been publicly acknowledged as vital, would make it more relevant than other missions in which Spain participates.

Taking advantage of the Red Sea crisis and as a consequence of the Spanish government’s refusal to participate in it, it would be advisable to make a virtue out of necessity and establish clear objective criteria for our participation or, at the very least, open the debate on what political criteria should be established for Spain to participate in international missions.