Political assassinations and attempts have punctuated the history of democracies both in stable times (such as the assassination of Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh in 2003) and, more frequently, in periods of political crisis and unrest. Often, such dramatic events see political leaders from all sides express their solidarity with the victim and call for unity against violence—even when, as in the case of Dutch radical right leader Pim Fortuyn, assassinated in 2002, the victim comes from a group outside the political mainstream. The victim, or their political party, typically enjoys a temporary boost in popularity. Even in situations of political crisis, violent attacks against prominent figures might stimulate all sides to come together to protect the Constitution, and—like the assassination of Italian Christian Democratic leader Aldo Moro by terrorists during the 1970s—even mark a turning point in the political crisis and usher in a more stable period. Their implications must be analyzed in the political context where they happen.
The US is certainly not new to such events. The assassination attempt against ex-President Donald J. Trump on Saturday at one of his rallies in Pennsylvania is the last of a long list of Presidents and presidential candidates who were victims of (completed or thwarted) similar attacks. Past attacks against such US figures have, like similar events elsewhere, typically led to more moderate tones by all political sides and the avoidance of extreme confrontation in their aftermath.
This is unlikely to happen this time. The attack against Trump comes in a phase of extreme polarization in the US electorate, which students of electoral behavior have amply documented. Americans are divided on many fronts, and much of this division gravitates around the political figure of Trump himself. To take one crucial example, more than three years after the infamous attack on the Capitol in January 2021, about two-thirds of Republican voters believe Trump's version that the 2020 elections were stolen from him. Support for this view among Democrats hovers around 4-6%. Surveys also show a decrease, on both sides of the political divide, in the inhibition to resort to violence against one’s political adversaries.
Beyond the risk of further violence due to the combination of the spark of the Pennsylvania shooting and the tinderbox of extreme political polarization, Saturday’s attack is likely to have negative consequences for the Democrats in their presidential campaign, for three main reasons.
First, the attack hits the Democrats at a vulnerable time. Joe Biden's performance in the last debate has led to mounting doubts about his mental fitness. He's been under pressure from Democratic lawmakers to step aside for a younger candidate, and even prominent figures like ex-President Barack Obama and ex-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi have withheld full support. This attack might temporarily ease this pressure but could also intensify calls for Biden's withdrawal over the coming weeks if polls start showing a stable advantage for Trump.
Second, the attack diverts attention from the critical debate on the risks that a second Trump presidency would entail for US democracy. Thanks to detailed reports by some liberal media outlets and NGOs, the public was beginning to focus on the dangers outlined in "Project 2025", a volume authored by the American Enterprise Institute and other right-wing think tanks and widely considered as the plan for a second Trump Presidency. The volume articulates plans for a significant aggrandizement of executive powers and a parallel reduction of executive accountability –the main markers of potential democratic erosion—such as stripping the Department of Justice of its independence and politicizing the oversight of elections. Now, it will be harder for Democrats to maintain focus on these issues, crucial for the rule of law and liberal democracy. In fact, the Biden campaign quickly pulled a multi-million dollar ad campaign, indicating a broad-ranging strategic shift.
Lastly, the Democrats face an asymmetrical rhetorical battle. While Biden and Democratic leaders responded to the attack with calls for unity and moderation, Republicans took a different stance. House Speaker Michael Johnson blamed the attack on the constant "vilification" of Trump by the “media”, “the Hollywood elite”, and even “the justice system”. He claimed that the “false accusation” of threatening US democracy leveled against Trump created the political climate that led to the assassination attempt. Other Republican figures like Newt Gingrich and Marjorie Taylor Greene were even less subtle.
Hence, Democrats are unlikely, in the short term at least, to successfully highlight Trump’s lies, his endorsement of conspiracy theories, and the risks that his victory would pose to US democracy and an already precarious international situation, without being accused by Republicans of fomenting violence. The judicial proceedings against Trump, several of which are related to actions during his presidency, will be labeled by Republicans as not only politically motivated but also as exposing their future nominee to physical danger. The likely consequence is that, in the next phase of the campaign, Trump’s extreme rhetoric, his endorsement and encouragement of violence (most notably the Capitol insurrection), and his refusal to concede power peacefully, echoed by many prominent Republicans, will be less prominent.
With several months left in the campaign, the possibility of a second Trump presidency remains a real threat—but it's not inevitable. Trump's likely post-attack polling bump (no polls subsequent to the attack have yet been published at the time of writing) might diminish. Biden—or his potential replacement—could leverage the strong economic record of the past three and a half years. Unexpected (not necessarily violent) events could also hinder Trump's return to power. This uncertainty underscores, yet again after many events and developments of recent years in many democracies have done too, the fragility of liberal democracy. In particular, the notion that economic success –economic growth; low unemployment and inflation—can safeguard democracy is showing its limitations. France's recent elections, where Macron's economic achievements didn't prevent the far-right Rassemblement National from nearly winning, highlight this vulnerability. The recent rise of the extreme right in Germany tells the same story. A robust economy is no longer enough; defenders of liberal democracy must actively counter attacks on its institutions and values. How pro-democracy forces in the US mobilize in the coming months will be crucial for America and its allies worldwide.