Martes, 28 de julio de 2026
Focus Ukraine: Will the war help to consolidate Ukrainian elites and get rid of the raw material conservation of the Ukrainian economy?
Agenda Pública and United Ukraine Think Tank present Focus Ukraine, a weekly article series analysing how the military conflict in Ukraine and the political and economic situation in the country will evolve. The articles are written by Ihor Petrenko, Dmytro Levus, Petro Oleshchuk and Oleksiy Kushch, experts of the United Ukraine Think Tank.
Iran's massive strike on Israel, using about 170 attack UAVs, 130 ballistic and 20 cruise missiles, changed the overall context of the perception of the war in Ukraine. Russia's massive offensive is bringing only isolated tactical successes, so the terrorist country is complementing its actions on the front with missile terror. The war is pushing the government to find a shortcut to a new economic model.
In repelling the attack, Israel received substantial assistance from the Air Force of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, all NATO members. This brought back to life the discussion about the possibility of direct participation of aviation and air defense of individual NATO member states in closing the skies over Ukraine to the Russian aggressor. This is especially true against the backdrop of Russia's still great potential and Ukraine's lack of air defense systems and missiles.
Thus, several NATO member states (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) have shown, on the example of Israel, that they can actually provide virtually complete protection against terror. In the skies of Israel and other countries in the region, they have successfully countered Iranian missiles and drones. Israel is not a NATO country, but NATO countries have come to its defense, and this did not require the activation of the fifth article on collective defense in the Alliance. The genuine defense of Israel against Iranian drones and missiles has not and will not involve NATO allies in a direct confrontation with Iran and will not cause any escalation. Ukraine is not calling for soldiers from partner countries to fight for us on the frontline in Ukraine - we are calling for at least sufficient capabilities to defend ourselves against Russian missiles and drones. When partner aircraft or air defense systems shoot down Russian missiles and drones in the skies of Ukraine or in the skies of the countries where these missiles and drones are flying in, it will not be different from the situation with Israel. This is not a clash with the Russian army. This is help in defending against terror. As President Zelensky said in an interview, terror must lose everywhere and completely, not more or less. This is the only way to keep everyone safe in the world.
For now, the Russians are trying to continue their terror by destroying Ukrainian cities with missile strikes. For example, on April 17, missiles destroyed a social infrastructure facility in Chernihiv, killing 18 people and damaging residential buildings and a hospital. On April 19, a Russian missile hit a five-story building in Dnipro, destroying its upper floors. Three people were killed. At the same time, Russians struck the Dnipro region, where civilians were also killed. The attacks on other cities, including Odesa, continue with the use of Shaheds, cruise and ballistic missiles. Drones, artillery, and guided aerial bombs are used by the Russians to put pressure on frontline and border communities, where civilians are constantly being killed. In particular, Russians are targeting social sector vehicles, including auto shops and electricians' vehicles serving remote areas.
Now in the east, Russia is trying its best to push further beyond the line where its aggression was stopped in 2014-2015. Russia does not care about its losses. In order to advance, Russia is deliberately destroying towns in the Donetsk region, and the whole world can see what Russia has done to Bakhmut and Avdiivka. But the advance is slow. It is twelve kilometers from the runway of Donetsk airport, where the front line was on February 24, 2022, to the village of Umanske, where Ukrainians are holding the line. This is the distance the world's second army has traveled in more than two years. And despite everything, it is trying to move on. According to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Oleksandr Syrskyi: "The enemy is concentrating its efforts to break through our defenses west of Bakhmut, to access the Siversky Donets-Donbas canal, to capture the settlement of Chasiv Yar, to create conditions for further advancement into the Kramatorsk agglomeration... the Russian high command has set its troops the task of capturing Chasiv Yar by May 9." May 9 is the main holiday of the conditional "religion of the great victory in the Great Patriotic War" for the Russian Federation. It has replaced real history, and includes self-justification of Russians for any of their crimes, as they are allegedly fighting not people but "Nazis," although Russia is the embodiment of all the evil that Moscow propagandists have attributed to their enemies. Here is an example of Russian combat activity to implement the offensive plans of the Russian high command in just one typical day during the week: 33 attacks in the Bakhmut sector, 15 in the Avdiivka sector, 30 in the Novopavlivka sector, and 7 in the Orikhiv sector. In the Kherson sector, the Russian occupiers are trying to drive Ukrainian units out of their footholds on the left bank of the Dnipro River and on one of the last days launched five unsuccessful attacks on Ukrainian troops' positions there.
The situation is complicated.
But it is clear that the aggressor country is under great strain.
It has to find manpower to compensate for its losses. Moscow is sending personnel from the Russian Pacific Fleet and the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army from the Far East to the war. According to the decision of the Commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet, Viktor Liina, rotations to Syria have been completely stopped, and all personnel who were supposed to go there are going to the war zone in Ukraine. This is approximately 2,000 manpower units. About 400 more soldiers from the military units of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army stationed in the Far Eastern Khabarovsk Territory of Russia will go to equip the 155th and 40th Marine Brigades of Russia, which are fighting against Ukraine and are understaffed due to huge losses. Part of the personnel from the military units of the Russian Far East will join the new motorized rifle brigade of the aggressor state, which is being formed in Voronezh.
It is logical and correct that fierce Russian attacks lead to systematic retaliatory strikes against Russia and Russian facilities in the temporarily occupied territories with painful results for the Russians. For example, the Ukrainian Defense Forces' drones first destroyed a Russian long-range radar in the Bryansk region, Nebo-U, which controlled the airspace 700 kilometers deep into Ukraine. The cost of such a complex could reach $100 million, and it was hit by 7 kamikaze drones. Later, the drones successfully attacked a Russian over-the-horizon radar station in Mordovia, in Kovylkino, 680 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. This is the Kontainer radar, which was put on combat duty in 2019. This radar has the ability to detect targets at a range of up to 3,000 kilometers and at an altitude of over 100 kilometers. This means that these are important components of the Russian aggression forces that allow monitoring the skies over several countries and preparing strikes and air operations against Ukraine. The drones also hit the Gorbunov Aviation Plant in Kazan, which manufactures and repairs military aircraft, including Tu-22M and Tu-160M bombers. An air raid was declared in the area of the plant, and personnel were evacuated from the territory of not only the Kazan Aviation Plant, but also the Kazan Helicopter Plant, and even oil refineries in Nizhnekamsk and Kazan, as well as the plants of the Alabuga Free Economic Zone. The airports of Kazan and Nizhny Novgorod were closed for several hours. Also, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine reported that an occupier's Mi-8 transport helicopter worth $10-15 million was burned in Samara, at the Kryazh airfield. On April 20, there was a large-scale attack by about fifty drones against important facilities of the aggressor country in 8 regions: Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Tula, Smolensk, Ryazan, Kaluga, and even Moscow. The target was the energy infrastructure that feeds the Russian military-industrial complex. After the attacks, some areas experienced problems with electricity and water supply. Although the occupiers claim that they shot down all the UAVs, there is video evidence that proves that Russia is traditionally lying. At least three power substations in Kaluga and Bryansk were hit, and a fuel storage base in the Smolensk region was on fire. The significance of such strikes is not only in the disruption of Russian military and industrial facilities, and the disruption of the rhythm of the Russian economy and business life. It is a clear demonstration to the Russian population that there will be a price to pay and that aggression will be punished.
As a result of the Ukrainian missile strike on the invaders' airfield in the temporarily occupied Crimea in Dzhankoy, 4 S-400 launchers, 3 radars, an air defense control center, and airspace surveillance equipment "Fundament-M" were destroyed. The number of enemy aviation objects damaged or destroyed and the number of casualties among the personnel of the Russian occupation army is still being clarified. Strikes were also carried out on the headquarters of the Russian group in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, with significant losses for the Russian command. In particular, the command post of the 331st Parachute Regiment of the Russian Federation was destroyed in Bakhmut as a result of a strike by the Haimars MLRS. Eight officers were killed, including the artillery chief, intelligence chief, and regimental communications chief. At the same time, it became known that the strike on the Luhansk Machine-Building Plant last week was also effective. The missile strike killed the commander of the 59th Command and Control Brigade of the Russian Armed Forces.
It should also be noted that the critical situation with missiles for Ukraine's air defense and the obvious insufficiency of modern air defense systems did not allow Russia to change the course of the air war in its favor.
Ukraine's air defense system is working effectively, and its effectiveness is increasing.
For example, on the night of April 19, during the repulsion of a Russian attack, 29 out of 36 air targets were shot down. And among these targets, for the first time, there were X-22 cruise missiles, which was impossible before. Most importantly, for the first time, a Russian Tu-22M3 strategic bomber was hit at a distance of more than 300 kilometers over the Black Sea, and it crashed on Russian territory. Strategic bombers are no longer invulnerable.
The situation with the supply of weapons and ammunition required by the Ukrainian Defense Forces tends to change in a positive direction, as the issue is being addressed on a systematic basis at various sites. This topic was discussed at both the NATO-Ukraine Council meeting and the European Council summit. In addition, the U.S. House of Representatives voted in favor of a law allocating $60 billion in additional funding for Ukraine for security, budgetary and economic assistance.
Restrictions on online casinos
An important decree was signed by President Zelensky on April 20 following the NSDC meeting on restrictions for the "gambling business".
The main provisions of the document are as follows:
-restrict online casino advertising;
-to set limits on gambling per week and spending limits;
-introduce an online monitoring system;
-introduce restrictions for the military;
-The SBU should conduct inspections of gambling organizers;
-block illegal gambling websites.
It all started with a petition by military serviceman and civic activist P. Petrychenko, which was registered on March 29 this year and quickly gained the required number of votes from citizens. Mr. Petrychenko was killed at the front in April, which only increased public attention to the issue of restrictions for online casinos.
One of the main complaints that Ukrainian society has against online casinos is the fact that they actually receive funds from military personnel through fraudulent schemes. Thus, they affect the army's combat capability and morale.
A feature of President Zelenskyy's political activity is that he tends to lead powerful social movements and initiatives, giving them political and legal status. The story of online casinos is illustrative in this case. There is a social initiative that reflects a real problem, opinion leaders and activists unite around it, start collecting signatures under a petition, and when this petition receives the required number of votes, the president himself supports the initiative at the highest level.
Obviously, such socio-political initiatives are evidence that, despite the war, civil society in Ukraine continues to consolidate and develop, and that it recognizes itself as a subject of Ukrainian politics that can and should determine key rules for the state.
Ukraine is solving the extremely difficult task of launching its own defense industry, and this process is taking place both in the context of pre-war deindustrialization and during the demographic and personnel crisis of wartime
How has the structure of exports from Ukraine changed since 2005? We can say that it has changed dramatically. In general, 2005 can be considered a marker year. In 2004, Ukraine demonstrated one of the highest economic growth rates in the world. It's hard to believe now, but back then Ukraine's GDP grew by 11.8%.
In general, Ukraine has demonstrated strong economic growth dynamics in terms of gross domestic product since 2003:
- 2002 - 5.3%.
- 2003 - 9.5%.
- 2004 - 11.8%.
Some experts say that it was an opportunistic growth due to the high dynamics of world prices for our exports after the long crisis of the 1990s.
Be that as it may, Ukraine was even called an "Eastern European tiger" at the time, similar to Asian tigers: South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
By the way, in the period from 2002 to 2005, Ukraine did not cooperate with the IMF in terms of receiving loan tranches from the Fund. In 2004, a so-called "precautionary stand-by" was agreed upon, but this program was not activated.
What was the structure of Ukrainian exports then?
Exports of food and agricultural raw materials amounted to only $4.26 billion, or 13.2%. Exports of mineral products (minerals) amounted to $4.1 billion or 12.9%. The volume of machinery, vehicles, equipment and appliances, i.e. goods with a high level of added value, amounted to $4.31 billion or 13.4%. The first place was taken by metal exports - $13.78 billion or 42.8%.
Since 2005, there has been a break in the development trend, and this process has intensified since 2008, when Ukraine actually became a permanent patient of the IMF's "resuscitation vehicle" for 16 long years.
However, exports of high value-added goods had two more growth points in 2011 and 2012, when the figure amounted to $10.72 and $11.18 billion, respectively.
As for the total exports from Ukraine, we have seen four growth peaks:
2008 - 63.2 billion dollars.
2011 - 62.38 billion dollars.
2012 - 64.5 billion dollars.
2021 - 63.11 billion dollars
Ukraine has never had exports higher than in 2012.
In 2023, this indicator fell to $34.7 billion, returning almost to the level of 2005. And if we take into account the value of money over time (dollar inflation), it was much lower.
At the same time, imports exceeded $62 billion in 2023.
In general, the ceiling for the growth of Ukrainian exports clearly does not exceed $80 billion at current prices. The main reason for this is the raw material nature of the economy.
Raw materials have a diminishing return: each new ton of grain yield or conventional ton of raw materials in depleted fields will require more capital investment. And despite the investments, sooner or later the growth ceiling will be reached. Plus, there are marginal labor and capital productivity and returns, and low economies of scale. The relative capitalization of the commodity economy without the development of industry and services will continue to decline.
With marginal commodity exports at 70 billion, the maximum level of imports (consumer and investment) for Ukraine will be no more than 90 billion (taking into account the maximum permissible level of trade deficit of minus 20 billion dollars).
In the context of the development of the domestic sector of the economy, the maximum level of GDP for Ukraine will reach no more than $300 billion in current prices (foreign trade in Ukraine is about 50% of GDP).
That is, if the raw materials economic model is preserved, Ukraine will never reach a GDP level of $500 billion, let alone one trillion dollars - the growth ceiling, like a speed limiter on a truck, simply will not allow it.
In 2023, the structure of Ukraine's exports will have significantly changed toward greater dependence on raw materials:
- exports of food and agricultural raw materials amounted to USD 22 billion or 63.4%;
- exports of mineral products fell to USD 2.3 billion (6.5%), but the logistics factor played a role here - in 2022 (i.e., the first year of the war), this figure was the traditional USD 4.1 billion or 10%;
- exports of goods with a high level of added value decreased to USD 2.15 billion or 6.2%, losing even to the export of minerals in the context of the transportation blockade;
- exports of metals fell to $3.9 billion or 11.2%.
In other words, we see a set of exogenous and endogenous negative factors that resulted in the raw material conservation of the Ukrainian economy.
The former include the war and the loss of traditional markets for complex industrial products.
The latter include the absence of internal shock absorbers and compensators, blocking of lending activity, lack of a national industrial policy, and degradation of the education system.
The current situation has certain positive and negative aspects.
Let's start with the negative ones.
The limited level of capitalization of the economy due to its raw material nature means relatively low wages, social standards, and pensions. The level of wages is a derivative of the level of added value in the economy.
The "Dutch disease" of commodity economies, which leads to deindustrialization and an underdeveloped service sector, is also at work.
And the "Matsuyama effect" - when a highly profitable raw material industry appears in an economy, all capital flows there.
And Bruno Knall's poverty trap: a drop in the level of added value leads to a simplification of the labor market, a reduction in domestic resources that can be directed to education and science, and, in a new round, another drop in economic productivity.
But there is an upside: against the backdrop of the demographic gap, raw materials will be distributed to fewer people, meaning that per capita income may increase.
But even if this happens, it must be remembered that such growth will only occur if the country has a kind of reserve fund to accumulate the country's raw material revenues.
Otherwise, all export revenues will go to a few FIGs: oligarchic and transnational. And this model does not provide for the allocation of sufficient funds for education, science and defense.
In other words, a raw material country will be able to exist only under some kind of security umbrella with imported weapons and foreign technologists and technicians.
The transition to a new economic model will require the launch of a modern "Ukrainian project" in the economy.
What is the difference between a conventional "corporatocracy" and a "state-building" state?
The former is focused on profit, the latter on security.
For example, if it is profitable for a multinational corporation to locate its value chains in other countries, it will do so. Thus, the largest American companies have opened their factories in Asia. The state has no right to think this way.
How should the state act?
Let's say that the cost of production per unit of goods in Asia is 30% lower than in the corresponding country.
But companies operating on their territory will pay taxes to the local budget. Jobs will be created and their citizens will be paid. Again, taxes will go to the budget and pension funds. Employees will spend their salaries in the national trade and services sector. The multiplier effect will lead to a GDP growth of at least 1:3. The service sector will create jobs, pay taxes, and pay salaries. The money will return to the budget. The state will transfer salaries to state employees, doctors, and teachers. They will also spend money in the service sector. Even taking into account imports, the multiplier effect will be several times higher than the start-up costs and cost growth. That is why the Poles do not allow Ukrainian grain, even though it is cheaper and, according to the logic of Ukrainian officials, can stimulate the development of Polish pig production.
Thus, on one side of the scale is 30% of additional corporate profits, while on the other side is GDP growth 2-3 times higher than the initial costs.
The American economist Leontief once received the Nobel Prize in Economics for his theory of inter-sectoral balances and flows: one unit of expenditure in mechanical engineering = 0.3 units in metal production + 0.2 units in chemistry and polymers, etc.
State-building or nation-building is more successful the more correctly the model of intersectorial interaction is applied. Extremes in the form of autarky are also harmful here. The economy needs to develop in a harmonious, balanced way.
Unfortunately, the Ukrainian agricultural model of the economy is structurally disproportionate. It's bad when the state is concerned with corporate profits rather than creating a harmonious and functional economic "body".
In Ukraine, the expert mainstream has decided that:
- "the state should not regulate anything at all;
- We should only do what is cheaper in terms of cost than in other countries.
This is how a specific agro-cult emerged. The agro-cult does not need the state, except for VAT refunds and cheap logistics when exporting raw materials. And only the production of agricultural products in Ukraine is cheaper than in other countries, though this is based on low land rent.
After the land market is updated, the agricultural sector's profits will decline significantly, as it will have to pay more for land or divert financial resources to buy it back.
In the context of the global aggravation of the situation, corporate building and security issues are replacing corporatocracy, and the security factor is replacing the profit factor.
What awaits Ukraine in this context? There is a risk of the emergence of "young oligarchs" who will then push out the old oligarchic "guard" having made their fortunes during the war. The arrival of transnational corporations is also possible. Time will tell what will happen next. It would be nice if we could move to state-building, but this will require a complete rewiring of the mainstream semantic matrix.
Iran's massive strike on Israel, using about 170 attack UAVs, 130 ballistic and 20 cruise missiles, changed the overall context of the perception of the war in Ukraine. Russia's massive offensive is bringing only isolated tactical successes, so the terrorist country is complementing its actions on the front with missile terror. The war is pushing the government to find a shortcut to a new economic model.
In repelling the attack, Israel received substantial assistance from the Air Force of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, all NATO members. This brought back to life the discussion about the possibility of direct participation of aviation and air defense of individual NATO member states in closing the skies over Ukraine to the Russian aggressor. This is especially true against the backdrop of Russia's still great potential and Ukraine's lack of air defense systems and missiles.
Thus, several NATO member states (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) have shown, on the example of Israel, that they can actually provide virtually complete protection against terror. In the skies of Israel and other countries in the region, they have successfully countered Iranian missiles and drones. Israel is not a NATO country, but NATO countries have come to its defense, and this did not require the activation of the fifth article on collective defense in the Alliance. The genuine defense of Israel against Iranian drones and missiles has not and will not involve NATO allies in a direct confrontation with Iran and will not cause any escalation. Ukraine is not calling for soldiers from partner countries to fight for us on the frontline in Ukraine - we are calling for at least sufficient capabilities to defend ourselves against Russian missiles and drones. When partner aircraft or air defense systems shoot down Russian missiles and drones in the skies of Ukraine or in the skies of the countries where these missiles and drones are flying in, it will not be different from the situation with Israel. This is not a clash with the Russian army. This is help in defending against terror. As President Zelensky said in an interview, terror must lose everywhere and completely, not more or less. This is the only way to keep everyone safe in the world.
For now, the Russians are trying to continue their terror by destroying Ukrainian cities with missile strikes. For example, on April 17, missiles destroyed a social infrastructure facility in Chernihiv, killing 18 people and damaging residential buildings and a hospital. On April 19, a Russian missile hit a five-story building in Dnipro, destroying its upper floors. Three people were killed. At the same time, Russians struck the Dnipro region, where civilians were also killed. The attacks on other cities, including Odesa, continue with the use of Shaheds, cruise and ballistic missiles. Drones, artillery, and guided aerial bombs are used by the Russians to put pressure on frontline and border communities, where civilians are constantly being killed. In particular, Russians are targeting social sector vehicles, including auto shops and electricians' vehicles serving remote areas.
Now in the east, Russia is trying its best to push further beyond the line where its aggression was stopped in 2014-2015. Russia does not care about its losses. In order to advance, Russia is deliberately destroying towns in the Donetsk region, and the whole world can see what Russia has done to Bakhmut and Avdiivka. But the advance is slow. It is twelve kilometers from the runway of Donetsk airport, where the front line was on February 24, 2022, to the village of Umanske, where Ukrainians are holding the line. This is the distance the world's second army has traveled in more than two years. And despite everything, it is trying to move on. According to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Oleksandr Syrskyi: "The enemy is concentrating its efforts to break through our defenses west of Bakhmut, to access the Siversky Donets-Donbas canal, to capture the settlement of Chasiv Yar, to create conditions for further advancement into the Kramatorsk agglomeration... the Russian high command has set its troops the task of capturing Chasiv Yar by May 9." May 9 is the main holiday of the conditional "religion of the great victory in the Great Patriotic War" for the Russian Federation. It has replaced real history, and includes self-justification of Russians for any of their crimes, as they are allegedly fighting not people but "Nazis," although Russia is the embodiment of all the evil that Moscow propagandists have attributed to their enemies. Here is an example of Russian combat activity to implement the offensive plans of the Russian high command in just one typical day during the week: 33 attacks in the Bakhmut sector, 15 in the Avdiivka sector, 30 in the Novopavlivka sector, and 7 in the Orikhiv sector. In the Kherson sector, the Russian occupiers are trying to drive Ukrainian units out of their footholds on the left bank of the Dnipro River and on one of the last days launched five unsuccessful attacks on Ukrainian troops' positions there.
The situation is complicated.
But it is clear that the aggressor country is under great strain.
It has to find manpower to compensate for its losses. Moscow is sending personnel from the Russian Pacific Fleet and the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army from the Far East to the war. According to the decision of the Commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet, Viktor Liina, rotations to Syria have been completely stopped, and all personnel who were supposed to go there are going to the war zone in Ukraine. This is approximately 2,000 manpower units. About 400 more soldiers from the military units of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army stationed in the Far Eastern Khabarovsk Territory of Russia will go to equip the 155th and 40th Marine Brigades of Russia, which are fighting against Ukraine and are understaffed due to huge losses. Part of the personnel from the military units of the Russian Far East will join the new motorized rifle brigade of the aggressor state, which is being formed in Voronezh.
It is logical and correct that fierce Russian attacks lead to systematic retaliatory strikes against Russia and Russian facilities in the temporarily occupied territories with painful results for the Russians. For example, the Ukrainian Defense Forces' drones first destroyed a Russian long-range radar in the Bryansk region, Nebo-U, which controlled the airspace 700 kilometers deep into Ukraine. The cost of such a complex could reach $100 million, and it was hit by 7 kamikaze drones. Later, the drones successfully attacked a Russian over-the-horizon radar station in Mordovia, in Kovylkino, 680 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. This is the Kontainer radar, which was put on combat duty in 2019. This radar has the ability to detect targets at a range of up to 3,000 kilometers and at an altitude of over 100 kilometers. This means that these are important components of the Russian aggression forces that allow monitoring the skies over several countries and preparing strikes and air operations against Ukraine. The drones also hit the Gorbunov Aviation Plant in Kazan, which manufactures and repairs military aircraft, including Tu-22M and Tu-160M bombers. An air raid was declared in the area of the plant, and personnel were evacuated from the territory of not only the Kazan Aviation Plant, but also the Kazan Helicopter Plant, and even oil refineries in Nizhnekamsk and Kazan, as well as the plants of the Alabuga Free Economic Zone. The airports of Kazan and Nizhny Novgorod were closed for several hours. Also, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine reported that an occupier's Mi-8 transport helicopter worth $10-15 million was burned in Samara, at the Kryazh airfield. On April 20, there was a large-scale attack by about fifty drones against important facilities of the aggressor country in 8 regions: Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Tula, Smolensk, Ryazan, Kaluga, and even Moscow. The target was the energy infrastructure that feeds the Russian military-industrial complex. After the attacks, some areas experienced problems with electricity and water supply. Although the occupiers claim that they shot down all the UAVs, there is video evidence that proves that Russia is traditionally lying. At least three power substations in Kaluga and Bryansk were hit, and a fuel storage base in the Smolensk region was on fire. The significance of such strikes is not only in the disruption of Russian military and industrial facilities, and the disruption of the rhythm of the Russian economy and business life. It is a clear demonstration to the Russian population that there will be a price to pay and that aggression will be punished.
As a result of the Ukrainian missile strike on the invaders' airfield in the temporarily occupied Crimea in Dzhankoy, 4 S-400 launchers, 3 radars, an air defense control center, and airspace surveillance equipment "Fundament-M" were destroyed. The number of enemy aviation objects damaged or destroyed and the number of casualties among the personnel of the Russian occupation army is still being clarified. Strikes were also carried out on the headquarters of the Russian group in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, with significant losses for the Russian command. In particular, the command post of the 331st Parachute Regiment of the Russian Federation was destroyed in Bakhmut as a result of a strike by the Haimars MLRS. Eight officers were killed, including the artillery chief, intelligence chief, and regimental communications chief. At the same time, it became known that the strike on the Luhansk Machine-Building Plant last week was also effective. The missile strike killed the commander of the 59th Command and Control Brigade of the Russian Armed Forces.
It should also be noted that the critical situation with missiles for Ukraine's air defense and the obvious insufficiency of modern air defense systems did not allow Russia to change the course of the air war in its favor.
Ukraine's air defense system is working effectively, and its effectiveness is increasing.
For example, on the night of April 19, during the repulsion of a Russian attack, 29 out of 36 air targets were shot down. And among these targets, for the first time, there were X-22 cruise missiles, which was impossible before. Most importantly, for the first time, a Russian Tu-22M3 strategic bomber was hit at a distance of more than 300 kilometers over the Black Sea, and it crashed on Russian territory. Strategic bombers are no longer invulnerable.
The situation with the supply of weapons and ammunition required by the Ukrainian Defense Forces tends to change in a positive direction, as the issue is being addressed on a systematic basis at various sites. This topic was discussed at both the NATO-Ukraine Council meeting and the European Council summit. In addition, the U.S. House of Representatives voted in favor of a law allocating $60 billion in additional funding for Ukraine for security, budgetary and economic assistance.
Restrictions on online casinos
An important decree was signed by President Zelensky on April 20 following the NSDC meeting on restrictions for the "gambling business".
The main provisions of the document are as follows:
-restrict online casino advertising;
-to set limits on gambling per week and spending limits;
-introduce an online monitoring system;
-introduce restrictions for the military;
-The SBU should conduct inspections of gambling organizers;
-block illegal gambling websites.
It all started with a petition by military serviceman and civic activist P. Petrychenko, which was registered on March 29 this year and quickly gained the required number of votes from citizens. Mr. Petrychenko was killed at the front in April, which only increased public attention to the issue of restrictions for online casinos.
One of the main complaints that Ukrainian society has against online casinos is the fact that they actually receive funds from military personnel through fraudulent schemes. Thus, they affect the army's combat capability and morale.
A feature of President Zelenskyy's political activity is that he tends to lead powerful social movements and initiatives, giving them political and legal status. The story of online casinos is illustrative in this case. There is a social initiative that reflects a real problem, opinion leaders and activists unite around it, start collecting signatures under a petition, and when this petition receives the required number of votes, the president himself supports the initiative at the highest level.
Obviously, such socio-political initiatives are evidence that, despite the war, civil society in Ukraine continues to consolidate and develop, and that it recognizes itself as a subject of Ukrainian politics that can and should determine key rules for the state.
Ukraine is solving the extremely difficult task of launching its own defense industry, and this process is taking place both in the context of pre-war deindustrialization and during the demographic and personnel crisis of wartime
How has the structure of exports from Ukraine changed since 2005? We can say that it has changed dramatically. In general, 2005 can be considered a marker year. In 2004, Ukraine demonstrated one of the highest economic growth rates in the world. It's hard to believe now, but back then Ukraine's GDP grew by 11.8%.
In general, Ukraine has demonstrated strong economic growth dynamics in terms of gross domestic product since 2003:
- 2002 - 5.3%.
- 2003 - 9.5%.
- 2004 - 11.8%.
Some experts say that it was an opportunistic growth due to the high dynamics of world prices for our exports after the long crisis of the 1990s.
Be that as it may, Ukraine was even called an "Eastern European tiger" at the time, similar to Asian tigers: South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
By the way, in the period from 2002 to 2005, Ukraine did not cooperate with the IMF in terms of receiving loan tranches from the Fund. In 2004, a so-called "precautionary stand-by" was agreed upon, but this program was not activated.
What was the structure of Ukrainian exports then?
Exports of food and agricultural raw materials amounted to only $4.26 billion, or 13.2%. Exports of mineral products (minerals) amounted to $4.1 billion or 12.9%. The volume of machinery, vehicles, equipment and appliances, i.e. goods with a high level of added value, amounted to $4.31 billion or 13.4%. The first place was taken by metal exports - $13.78 billion or 42.8%.
Since 2005, there has been a break in the development trend, and this process has intensified since 2008, when Ukraine actually became a permanent patient of the IMF's "resuscitation vehicle" for 16 long years.
However, exports of high value-added goods had two more growth points in 2011 and 2012, when the figure amounted to $10.72 and $11.18 billion, respectively.
As for the total exports from Ukraine, we have seen four growth peaks:
2008 - 63.2 billion dollars.
2011 - 62.38 billion dollars.
2012 - 64.5 billion dollars.
2021 - 63.11 billion dollars
Ukraine has never had exports higher than in 2012.
In 2023, this indicator fell to $34.7 billion, returning almost to the level of 2005. And if we take into account the value of money over time (dollar inflation), it was much lower.
At the same time, imports exceeded $62 billion in 2023.
In general, the ceiling for the growth of Ukrainian exports clearly does not exceed $80 billion at current prices. The main reason for this is the raw material nature of the economy.
Raw materials have a diminishing return: each new ton of grain yield or conventional ton of raw materials in depleted fields will require more capital investment. And despite the investments, sooner or later the growth ceiling will be reached. Plus, there are marginal labor and capital productivity and returns, and low economies of scale. The relative capitalization of the commodity economy without the development of industry and services will continue to decline.
With marginal commodity exports at 70 billion, the maximum level of imports (consumer and investment) for Ukraine will be no more than 90 billion (taking into account the maximum permissible level of trade deficit of minus 20 billion dollars).
In the context of the development of the domestic sector of the economy, the maximum level of GDP for Ukraine will reach no more than $300 billion in current prices (foreign trade in Ukraine is about 50% of GDP).
That is, if the raw materials economic model is preserved, Ukraine will never reach a GDP level of $500 billion, let alone one trillion dollars - the growth ceiling, like a speed limiter on a truck, simply will not allow it.
In 2023, the structure of Ukraine's exports will have significantly changed toward greater dependence on raw materials:
- exports of food and agricultural raw materials amounted to USD 22 billion or 63.4%;
- exports of mineral products fell to USD 2.3 billion (6.5%), but the logistics factor played a role here - in 2022 (i.e., the first year of the war), this figure was the traditional USD 4.1 billion or 10%;
- exports of goods with a high level of added value decreased to USD 2.15 billion or 6.2%, losing even to the export of minerals in the context of the transportation blockade;
- exports of metals fell to $3.9 billion or 11.2%.
In other words, we see a set of exogenous and endogenous negative factors that resulted in the raw material conservation of the Ukrainian economy.
The former include the war and the loss of traditional markets for complex industrial products.
The latter include the absence of internal shock absorbers and compensators, blocking of lending activity, lack of a national industrial policy, and degradation of the education system.
The current situation has certain positive and negative aspects.
Let's start with the negative ones.
The limited level of capitalization of the economy due to its raw material nature means relatively low wages, social standards, and pensions. The level of wages is a derivative of the level of added value in the economy.
The "Dutch disease" of commodity economies, which leads to deindustrialization and an underdeveloped service sector, is also at work.
And the "Matsuyama effect" - when a highly profitable raw material industry appears in an economy, all capital flows there.
And Bruno Knall's poverty trap: a drop in the level of added value leads to a simplification of the labor market, a reduction in domestic resources that can be directed to education and science, and, in a new round, another drop in economic productivity.
But there is an upside: against the backdrop of the demographic gap, raw materials will be distributed to fewer people, meaning that per capita income may increase.
But even if this happens, it must be remembered that such growth will only occur if the country has a kind of reserve fund to accumulate the country's raw material revenues.
Otherwise, all export revenues will go to a few FIGs: oligarchic and transnational. And this model does not provide for the allocation of sufficient funds for education, science and defense.
In other words, a raw material country will be able to exist only under some kind of security umbrella with imported weapons and foreign technologists and technicians.
The transition to a new economic model will require the launch of a modern "Ukrainian project" in the economy.
What is the difference between a conventional "corporatocracy" and a "state-building" state?
The former is focused on profit, the latter on security.
For example, if it is profitable for a multinational corporation to locate its value chains in other countries, it will do so. Thus, the largest American companies have opened their factories in Asia. The state has no right to think this way.
How should the state act?
Let's say that the cost of production per unit of goods in Asia is 30% lower than in the corresponding country.
But companies operating on their territory will pay taxes to the local budget. Jobs will be created and their citizens will be paid. Again, taxes will go to the budget and pension funds. Employees will spend their salaries in the national trade and services sector. The multiplier effect will lead to a GDP growth of at least 1:3. The service sector will create jobs, pay taxes, and pay salaries. The money will return to the budget. The state will transfer salaries to state employees, doctors, and teachers. They will also spend money in the service sector. Even taking into account imports, the multiplier effect will be several times higher than the start-up costs and cost growth. That is why the Poles do not allow Ukrainian grain, even though it is cheaper and, according to the logic of Ukrainian officials, can stimulate the development of Polish pig production.
Thus, on one side of the scale is 30% of additional corporate profits, while on the other side is GDP growth 2-3 times higher than the initial costs.
The American economist Leontief once received the Nobel Prize in Economics for his theory of inter-sectoral balances and flows: one unit of expenditure in mechanical engineering = 0.3 units in metal production + 0.2 units in chemistry and polymers, etc.
State-building or nation-building is more successful the more correctly the model of intersectorial interaction is applied. Extremes in the form of autarky are also harmful here. The economy needs to develop in a harmonious, balanced way.
Unfortunately, the Ukrainian agricultural model of the economy is structurally disproportionate. It's bad when the state is concerned with corporate profits rather than creating a harmonious and functional economic "body".
In Ukraine, the expert mainstream has decided that:
- "the state should not regulate anything at all;
- We should only do what is cheaper in terms of cost than in other countries.
This is how a specific agro-cult emerged. The agro-cult does not need the state, except for VAT refunds and cheap logistics when exporting raw materials. And only the production of agricultural products in Ukraine is cheaper than in other countries, though this is based on low land rent.
After the land market is updated, the agricultural sector's profits will decline significantly, as it will have to pay more for land or divert financial resources to buy it back.
In the context of the global aggravation of the situation, corporate building and security issues are replacing corporatocracy, and the security factor is replacing the profit factor.
What awaits Ukraine in this context? There is a risk of the emergence of "young oligarchs" who will then push out the old oligarchic "guard" having made their fortunes during the war. The arrival of transnational corporations is also possible. Time will tell what will happen next. It would be nice if we could move to state-building, but this will require a complete rewiring of the mainstream semantic matrix.
Ihor Petrenko
Director del think tank United Ukraine
Doctor of Political Sciences, Associate Professor, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Associate Professor of Political Science Department of the Faculty of Philosophy, city of Kyiv, Ukraine.
Petro Oleshchuk
Doctor en Ciencia Política y Profesor. Experto en el think tank United Ukraine
Oleksiy Kushch
Investigador en el think- tank United Ukraine
Es economista. Anteriormente dirigió el Departamento de Valores y el Centro Hipotecario en bancos comerciales y trabajó como director de gestión de valores en la Asociación de Bancos Ucranianos, así como director de una empresa de inversión.
Ahora en portada
27 de julio de 2026
27 de julio de 2026
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